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REVITALIZING ENVIRONMENTAL
FEDERALISM
Daniel C. Esty*
INTRODUCTION
Politicians from Speaker Newt Gingrich to President Bill Clinton,
cheered on by academics such as Richard Revesz, are eagerly seeking
to return authority over environmental regulation to the states.1 In the
European Union, localist opponents of environmental decisionmaking in
Brussels rally under the banner of "subsidiarity. "2 And in debates over
international trade liberalization, demands abound for the protection of
"national sovereignty"3 in environmental regulation. All of these efforts
presume that a decentralized approach to environmental policy will
yield better results than more centralized programs. This presumption is
misguided.
While the character of some environmental concerns warrants a
preference for local control, a sweeping push for decentralized regula-

* Yale Law School and Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies; for
merly Deputy Chief of Staff and Deputy Assistant Administrator for Policy, Planning
and Evaluation at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. A.B. 1981, Harvard; M.A.
1983, Oxford; J.D. 1986, Yale.
Ed. Thanks to Bruce Ackerman, Akhil Amar, Rich
ard Andrews, Steve Charnovitz, Andre Dua, Robert Ellickson, William Eskridge, Wil
liam Fischel, Damien Geradin, Michael Gerrard, Michael Graetz, Howard Kunreuther,
Reid Lifset, Roberta Romano, Carol Rose, James Salzman, Josh Sarnoff, Peter Schuck,
Peter Swire, and Jonathan Wiener for comments on earlier drafts. Thanks to Jamie Art,
Georgie Boge, Katie Genslea, Karen Krob, Todd Millay, Shalini Ramanathan, and Will
Wade-Gery for research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Bill Clinton, State of the Union Address (Jan. 24, 1995), in WEEKLY
COMPILATION OF PREsIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, Jan. 30, 1995, at 99; CONTRACT
WITH AMERICA 133 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994); NEWT GINGRICH, To
RENEW AMERICA 9 (1995); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition:
-

Rethinking the "Race to the Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation,
67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210 (1992); see also John H. Cushman, Jr., Senate Panel Votes to
Cut E.P.A. Budget, N.Y. T!MEs, Sept. 12, 1995, at A21; Jane Fritsch, Threat to Cut
E.P.A. Budget Reflects a New Political Shift, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1995, at A l .
2. See, e.g., Cliona J.M. Kimber, A Comparison of Environmental Federalism in
the United States and the European Union, 54 Mo. L. REv. 1658 (1995); Koen
Lanaerts, The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Environment in the European Union:
Keeping the Balance of Federalism, 17 FORDHAM INTI... LJ. 846 (1994).
3. See Joel P. Trachtman, L'Etat C'est Nous: Sovereignty, Economic Integration
and Subsidiarity, 33 HAR.v. INTL. LJ. 459 (1992); Steve Charnovitz, Environmentalism
Confronts GAIT Rules, J. WORLD TRADE, Jan. 1993, at 37.
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tion cannot be justified. Not on1y are some problems better dealt with
on a national (or international) basis, but each environmental issue also
presents a set of subproblems and diverse regulatory activities, some of
which are best undertaken centrally. While the current decentralization
rage represents thinking that has come full circle in the past thirty
years,4 this article urges not another 180-degree turn but rather a break
with unidirectional conclusions about the proper governmental level for
environmental policymaking. In trying to stabilize the "environmental
federalism" debate,5 I argue that what is required is a multitier regula
tory structure that tracks the complexity and diversity of environmental .
problems.
Part I reviews how environmental protection efforts can go awry.6
It makes clear that under the environmental rubric falls a diverse set of
public health and ecological harms that range widely in scope, duration,
severity, and ease of prevention or abatement. It also shows that each
separate regulatory problem presents a unique set of technical and ana
lytic challenges, potential "structural" or jurisdictional mismatches en
compassing important "choice of public" questions, and public choice
4. From a presumption that environmental problems were largely a state or even a
local matter, the pendulum swung in the 1960s and 1970s to a conclusion that many is
sues required centralized policy responses. However, arguments in favor of a more de
centralized regulatory structure have been advanced since the enactment of the first na
tional environmental regulatory programs in the United States. See, e.g., C. Boyden
Gray, Regulation and Federalism, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 93 ( 1983); Wallace E. Oates &
Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing
or Distortion Inducing, 35 J. Poo. EcoN. 333 ( 1988); Revesz, supra note 1; Harry N.
Scheiber, American Federalism and the Diffusion of Power: Historical and Contempo
rary Perspectives, 9 U. ToL. L: REV. 6 19 ( 1978).
5. The term "federalism" has been ascribed more than one meaning. In some
uses, it implies a structure of shared power among national, state and local levels of
government. See Morton Grodzins, Centralization and Decentralization, in A NATION
OF STATES l, 2 1 (R. Goldwin ed., 1963). But see Scheiber, supra note 4. In other con
texts, federalism (or more particularly "new federalism") is used to suggest a govern
mental structure with power decentralized away from national authorities. For an intro
duction to environmental federalism, see Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism:
Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REv. 1 14 1 ( 1995). Given the
current sweeping support for environmental devolution, my argument for a balance be
tween centralization and decentralization, of necessity, devotes considerable attention to
rebutting the claims of decentralizers. But this focus should not be mistaken for support
of a presumption in favor of centralized regulation.
6. Environmental policies often fall short of society's goals and expectations. But
the argument for state-based regulation cannot rest solely on the claim that federal envi
ronmental programs have functioned poorly. Instead, the policy flaws in federal envi
ronmental programs must be specified and the logic of state regulation identified. In
deed, to sharpen the focus of this article, I stipulate 'at the outset to the need for better
environmental policy tools and strategies - especially more use of market mechanisms.
This article thus seeks to explain how and why we suffer regulatory failures and to ex
amine whether decentralization will ameliorate these problems.
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concerns. Simplistic notions of regulatory reform - including attempts
to establish a single, appropriate level of governmental intervention are doomed to fail. Grounded in the hard realities of environmental
policymaking, Part I sets the stage for later arguments highlighting the
significant degree to which current decentralization theory assumes
away the very issues that make regulatory intervention necessary in the
environmental domain.
Part

II describes the environmental federalism debate to date. It re

views the political arguments made in support of national environmental
laws in the late sixties and early seventies, including Professor Richard
Stewart's influential

1977

articles7 advancing the theoretical case for

federal regulation. It then turns to the abundant "second-generation"
environmental federalism literature that questions mru.iy of the claims
about

the

advantages

of federal

regulation

that

underlie

"first

generation" thinking. Building on Charles Tiebout's seminal analysis of
jurisdictional competition, it considers the work of William Fischel,
Wallace Oates and Robert Schwab, and the recent work of Richard
Revesz and many others who argue that decentralized environmental
regulation offers significant social welfare advantages over more cen
tralized policymaking.8 Some commentators go so far as to argue that
decentralized

regulation

should

be

considered

"presumptively

beneficial. "9

7. See Richard B. Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasiconstitu
tional Law in Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the
Clean Air Act, 62 IowA L. REv. 713 (1977) [hereinafter Stewart, Development]; Rich
ard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?: Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Im
plementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE LJ. 1196, 1210-20 (1977)
[hereinafter Stewart, Pyramids]; see also SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, Pollution and
Federalism, in CONTROLLING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC
LAW IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 37-54 (1995) (refining the case for reg
ulatory federalism).
8. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
EcoN. 416 (1956); William A. Fischel, Fiscal and Environmental Considerations in the
Location of Firms in Suburban Communities, in FISCAL ZoNING AND LAND UsE
CONTROLS 119 (Edwin S. Mills & Wallace E. Oates eds., 1975); Oates & Schwab,
supra note 4; Revesz, supra note 1; see also WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E.
OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (2d ed. 1988); GINGRICH, supra
note 1; Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Trade and the Environment, AM. ENTERPRISE, May/June
1993, at 42; James E. Krier & Mark Brownstein, On Integrated Pollution Control, 22
ENVTL. L. 119, 126-27 (1992); James E. Krier, The I"ational National Air Quality
Standards: Macro- and MicroMistakes, 22 UCLA L. REv. 323 (1974); John Cushman,
Senator, in Fury, Advances Regulatory Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1995, at A16.
9. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 1253; see also GINGRICH, supra note 1, at 9. Even
politically "moderate" groups, such as the Democratic Leadership Council, have made
a presumption in favor of decentralization a central tenet of their reform proposals. See
DEBRA S. KNOPMAN, SECOND GENERATION: A NEW STRATEGY FOR ENVIRON-
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Part ill critiques the second-generation orthodoxies using the theo
retical framework developed in Part I. It begins by asking, for example,
if we really want every state or hamlet to determine for itself whether
polychlorinated biphenyls create additional cancer risks greater than

lQ-6, and if so, at what cost these risks are worth worrying about. Sound
environmental policies depend on good science, which, in tum, requires
a level of investment in sophisticated technical analysis that many
smaller jurisdictions are in no position to make. Given such capacity
problems and the significant economies of scale in environmental anal
ysis, Part ill contends that across-the-board decentralization is unlikely
to yield better results and may court disaster by weakening the scien
tific underpinnings of our policies.

Part ill next makes clear that many environmental policy deficien

cies arise from "structural failures" that occur when the scope of envi
ronmental effects does not match the jurisdiction of the regulating au
thority. Regulators tend to ignore extrajurisdictional harms (or benefits),
which results in a skewed regulatory cost-benefit analysis. While some
welfare loss .arises because states are forced to pay for nationally man
dated levels of environmental protection that their citizens would not
have chosen, these "internalities" . are relatively easy to fix without
wholesale decentralization. Externalities - which occur when physical,
economic, and psychological harms spill across jurisdictional lines -

pose a greater policy difficulty. As Part ill points out, insofar as the
central reason for environmental regulation is to mitigate the impact of

market failures that emerge from uninternalized externalities, drawing
more lines on the map only multiplies the potential for transboundary
. spillovers.
Part ill also assesses the applicability of regulatory competition
theory in the environmental realm and finds it limited. Many environ
mental problems exhibit threshold effects, time lags, and uncertainties
that obscure the benefits of addressing them, especially in contrast with
the visible and tangible gains of economic growth and jobs. While
economists downplay fears of a race to the bottom, politicians cannot
escape the image, in Ross Perot's memorable words, of a "giant suck
ing sound" as U.S. factories and jobs go down the drain to jurisdictions
with more lax environmental standards and lower compliance costs.10
The slow and silent accumulation of greenhouse gases leading to ellME NTAL PROTECTION (1996). Much of Revesz's article is more nuanced than this quo
tation suggests, but his opening challenge and conclusion are provocatively stark.
Revesz himself seems to have begun to back away from this position. See Richard L.
Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341 (1996).
10. Ro ss PEROT, SAVE YoUR JOB, SAVE OUR COUNTRY 41 (1993).
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matic change and agricultural declines thirty years from now on some
one else's political watch is far less likely to be taken seriously by poli
ticians obsessed with today's poll numbers and next year's elections. As

Part ill illustrates, the prospect of systematic miscalculations in the

tradeoffs between environmental and economic goals makes the state
versus-state competitive dynamic likely to unleash welfare-reducing
strategic behavior rather than efficiency improvements.

Finally, Part ill focuses on whose views should "count" in the

policy calculus. Modem Americans have a complex community identity
with regard to environmental issues that makes this "choice of public"
question nontrivial. Does the Grand Canyon, for example, belong only
to Arizonans, or is. it the birthright of all Americans? Devolution may
neither improve the representativeness of environmental decisionmaking
in any meaningful way nor reduce "public choice" distortions in the

policymaking process. In making this observation, Part ill ultimately re

casts the second-generation arguments for decentralization as a set of

policy

rationales that sometimes will be salient within an overall argu

ment for a multilevel regulatory structure designed to obtain the issue
specific advantages of both centralization and devolution.
The article concludes with a call for a presumption against pre
sumption. It suggests that the challenge is to find the best fit possible
between environmental problems and regulatory responses11 - not to
pick a single level of government for all problems. The optimal envi
·
ronmental policy level and approach will depend on the problem at
hand and what sorts of regulatory failures are most significant.
I.

TOWARD OPTIMAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION

Before delving into the question of what level of government is
best positioned to address environmental issues, it is important to estab
lish why environmental regulation12 is needed at all, what problems it
seeks to correct, and how governmental intervention designed to im
prove social welfare might fall short. With a clear picture of optimal en
vironmental regulation in mind and a rrrm understanding of how policy

11. See STEVEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982) (making a
similar argument that social goals and regulating strategies must be aligned).
12. My use of the tenn "regulation" should not be read to imply any preference
for "regulations" per se (particularly not "command and control" technology man
dates) as the means by which environmental goals are achieved. Indeed, in many cases,
market mechanisms, such as pollution charges or emissions allowance trading mecha
nisms, will be superior to any traditional system of regulation. As used in this article,
the tenns "regulations" or "regulatory" thus should be read loosely to apply to all en
vironmental policy strategies and instruments.
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failures arise, we then can assess the relative merits of decentralized
and centralized regulatory structures.
A.

Starting Points

Harms to the environment represent a diverse set of physical, bio
logical, and chemical threats to human health or to the health of ecosys
tems on which we depend for sustenance or about which we care be
cause of some other sociological, historical, or aesthetic reason. In
short, such harms pose a threat to social welfare.13 This is not merely
because environmental quality is an element of well-being, but also be
cause environmental resources

-

air, water, and land - are inputs in

all processes of production, if only as a place to dispose of waste. As a
result, if social welfare is to be maximized by allocating resources with
optimal efficiency, environmental resources must be valued properly in
light of full social marginal costs.14
As externalities, environmental harms represent a threat not only to
allocative efficiency and social welfare maximization, but also to the se
curity of property. While not every spillover intrudes on the spillee's
enjoyment of his land, those that do raise an issue of property rights.
Whether or not one believes in a natural right to a clean environment, 15
a longstanding norm of behavior, embodied in the common law of nui
sance, protects property owners from unreasonable and uncompensated

13. While some ecological commentators argue that there is an independent moral
obligation to protect the natural environment, see, e.g., ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND
COUNTY ALMANAC (1949), I do not rely on this ethical claim, but rather on a more
traditional utilitarian view of environmental protection as an element of quality of life
and therefore of social welfare. In this regard, Gifford Pinchot, one of the founders of
the American conservation movement, offers a useful definition of the goal: "the fore
sighted utilization, preservation, anclfor renewal of forests, waters, lands, and minerals,
for the greatest good of the greatest number for the longest time." GIFFORD P!NCHOT,
BREAKING NEW G ROUND 505 (Island Press 1987) (1947).
14. See, e.g., BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 8; Maureen L. Cropper & Wallace
Oates, Environmental Economics: A Survey, 30 J. EcoN. LITERATURE 675, 676 (1992).
Value cannot, of course, be determined extrinsically from the political or regulatory pro
cess itself. See, e.g., MARK SAGOFF, THE EcoNOMY OF THE EARTH (1988); Howard
Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic ]!.isk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG.
89, 90 (1988). Without gainsaying the significance of the political dimension of the en
vironmental policymaking process, I believe that disputes over the inherent value of re
sources explain only a small fraction of the nonoptimal environmental policies in place.
As discussed below, other failures in the regulatory process represent a far bigger
problem.
15. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., Bringing People Back: Toward a Comprehensive
Theory of Takings in Natural Resources Law, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 205 (1982); see also
JOSEPH SAX, MOUNTAINS W ITHOUT HANDRAILS: REFLECTIONS ON THE NA
TIONAL PARKS (1980).
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spillovers.16 Our sense of justice and fairness thus is offended when pol
lution harms go uncompensated or uncontrolled.17
More fundamentally, efficiency cannot be discussed without estab
lishing the boundaries of property rights, which in turn requires norma
tive assumptions about what constitutes an environmental harm or an
extemality.18 Does A have a right to use his land in a way that affects
B? We generally answer this question by reference to the "reasonable

ness" of A's activities - a definition drawn from the common law of
nuisance and derived from community standards of normal behavior
and land use.19
This endpoint, however, is not entirely satisfactory. First, although
community standards may evolve, they often lag behind knowledge
about harms, especially in the environmental realm, where scientific un
derstanding is constantly improving.20 Second, if an environmental harm
16. See REsTATE:MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821-22 (1978). For a historical
discussion of the importance of the security of property, see Carol M. Rose, A Dozen

Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights, and the New Takings Legislation, 53
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 265 (1996).
17. See Frank I. Michelman, Property,

Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Eth
ical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1218-24
(1967); see also Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational
Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 23 (1989)
(suggesting that the importance of "vested" rights is often underestimated in law and
economics analysis). One can argue that utility depends, in part, on the fulfillment of
public expectations that include preserving the sanctity of property. In this case, a good
environmental regime protects property rights as a dimension of social welfare. Alterna
tively, protecting property rights may be seen as an absolute good and therefore as a
limitation on the pursuit of welfare maximization. See JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DIS
COURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY 44 (Donald A. Cress trans., Hackett Pub
lishing Co. 1992) (1754) ("The first person who, having enclosed a plot of land, took it
into his head to say this is mine . was the true founder of civil society."); ADAM
SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, RE:PORT OF 1762-63 (R.L. Meek et al. eds.,
1979); see also Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAMB L.
REv. 329 (1996). In either case, the virtue of a regulatory regime depends in part on its
success in protecting property rights.
18. See Stephen Cheung, The Myth of Social Cost, CATO PAPER #16, Cato Insti
tute (1980); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness ofPareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100
YALE LJ. 1211 (1991); Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 22 CHEMTECH
1 (1992) (discussing the normative underpinnings of externalities).
19. See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules
and Fines as Land Use Controls, U. Cm. L. REv. 681, 729-31 (1972) [hereinafter El
lickson, Alternatives to Zoning]; Robert C. Ellickson, Takings Legislation: A Comment,
20 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POLY. (forthcoming 1996); see also WILLIAM A. FISCHEL,
REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, EcoNOMICS AND POLITICS 351 (1995); Donald
Whitman, First Come, First Served: An Economic Analysis of "Coming to the Nui
sance," 9 J. LEG. STUD. 557 (1980).
20. At one time, for example, lead was not known to be harmful, and normal be
havior included allowing lead smelters "to operate without pollution controls. Once the
harmfulness of lead emissions was established, so too I believe was the existence of an
•

•
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spans more than one community, reliance on communal standards of
normal behavior may be inadequate, as there may be no agreement on
such standards between communities. Finally, the harm from environ
mental insults often rises nonlinearly because of threshold effects. If the
harm from the one thousandth emitter is greater than that from the first,
economic efficiency - marginal cost pricing - demands that the later
emissions increments be priced higher than the earlier ones.21 Thus, in
addition to grounding property rights on community norms, which
might be summed up as "do unto others as you would have them do
unto you," the boundaries of reasonable activity must also be - and in
practice are - defined by a scientifically derived "do no harm"
principle.22
B.

The Need for Regulation

If property rights over environmental resources were clearly de
fined and enforced23 and the transaction costs of negotiating their
purchase and sale were negligible, then a free market for environmental
resources would produce environmental-harm-internalizing, welfare
maximizing,24 fair outcomes.25 There would be no environmental
problems to be solved, and hence no need for regulation. Private party

infringement of the property rights of those facing spillovers from smelters, regardless
of the fact that it might have taken some number of years for community standards to
catch up with the evolving epidemiological understanding of lead. Of course, "elite"
recognition of such harms is likely to lead "mass" perception of a new externality, cre
ating policy stress such as currently exists with regard to wetlands and endangered spe
cies protection. See, e.g., Bettina Soderbaum, Revaluing Wetlands, OECD OBSERVER,
Feb.-Mar. 1996, at 47-50 (noting that half of the available wetlands worldwide have
been destroyed because of the misconception that wetlands are useless).
21. Marginal cost pricing may raise equity issues insofar as some people will per
ceive unfairness to the extent that later polluters will be asked to pay more than earlier
ones for the same measure of emissions.
22. Harm here is defined as anything more than de minimis welfare loss. T here
are many examples in which property rights are delimited not by prevailing community
standards but by the identification of harm. See, e.g., Penn Central Terminal v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (holding that no one has a right to use their property in
a manner that harms others). A Calabresian principle of lodging rights in ways that
maximize welfare also would argue for a definition of externalities derived from mea
surable harm rather than from community behavioral norms. See GUIDO CALABRESI,
THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND EcONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).
23. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 51 AM.. EcoN.
REV. 347 (1967).
24. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960) (ob
serving that efficiency can be achieved regardless of who holds the property rights).
25. "Fair" in this context refers only to the issue of respecting property rights. A
broader fairness issue - whether the initial endowment of rights is equitable - re
mains open and is not addressed in this article.
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exchanges and a simple framework of tort and contract rules to ensure
that established rights could be vindicated would define a sufficient en
vironmental protection regime.
Because of the nature of environmental problems, however, the
relevant property rights are often poorly defined,26 and the transaction
costs of negotiating their sale and purchase are frequently high.27 Both
circumstances entail market failures and a concomitant need for envi
ronmental regulation. The specific sources of such failures are enumer
ated below.

1.

Technical Transaction Costs

Some costs associated with addressing environmental harms are
the product of

technical uncertainty. Even when property rights to envi

ronmental resources are clearly defined, the value of these resources is
not easily reduced to monetary figures that can be compared and ex
changed. A person holding a property right against pollution may not
know - or be able to know - the terms on which he rationally would
trade all or some of that entitlement. Not only are infringements of
property rights hard to detect given the invisibility of many pollutants,
but individuals also cannot easily judge what risks of public health or
ecological damage are posed by pollution. Told that a particular expo
sure creates

10-s

risk of death, people do not know what value to place

on the harm they are suffering and thus how much compensation to
seek.28

26. See Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strate
gies for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE LJ. l; see also RICHARD A POSNER, AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (4th ed. 1992); Peter L. Kahn, The Politics of Unregu
lation: Public Choice and Limits on Government, 15 CORNELL L. REv. 280 (1990).
For more on the reasons why one might want property rules in some cases and liability
rules in others, see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 1089 (1972);
Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning, supra note 19; Frank I. Michelman, Pollution as a
Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi's Costs, 80 YALE LJ. 647, 667-83
(1971); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Controlling Externalities and Protecting Entitlements:
Property Right, Liability Rule, and Tax-Subsidy Approaches, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1979); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85
CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 931 (1985).
27. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 18, at 1215; Robert L. Rabin, Environmental
Liability and the Tort System, 24 Hous. L. REv. 27 (1987) (discussing regulation via
tort system); Stewart, Pyramids, supra note 7, at 1212.
28. See MARK LANDY ET AL, THE ENVm.ONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY:
AsKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS 283-88 (1990) (arguing that environmental risks are
very imperfectly understood); Rabin, supra note 27 (discussing problems of identifica
tion, boundaries, and sources of environmental pollution); Palma J. Strand, Note, The

Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmental Risks: The Example of
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Resolving such uncertainties is complicated by the diversity of pol

lution problems and the risk of "information overload" that they create.

Particulates in the air, organic wastes in water, and most solid wastes
disposed of on land can be seen as "flow" pollution that degrades rela
tively rapidly and for which the environment has some assimilative or

absorptive capacity. Pollutants of this type pose a threat only when they

are concentrated spatially and temporally. "Stock" pollutants; on the

other hand, such as some radioactive materials, heavy metals, certain
toxic chemicals, and other bioaccumulative substances, degrade much

more slowly. Because the environment has little or no absorptive capac

ity for these substances, they have an additive or cumulative effect that

makes connecting particular proportions of observed harms to specific

sources of pollution difficult. In addition, as�umptions about how much

harm certain environmental problems cause are constantly changing as

scientists uncover new harms, new pathways of exposure to old harms,

new connections between emissions and public health or ecological in

juries, and new ways to reduce the risks from environmental threats.
Moreover, the ability of science to measure ever smaller amounts of
pollution adds to the fluidity of environmental knowledge.

On top of this causal complexity, individuals face the additional

difficulty of putting an appropriate value on the harms caused by pollu

tion. While contamination at low levels may not be harmful, many pol
lutants exhibit threshold effects such that initial increments of emissions

cause no harm while exposure beyond a certain point causes damage.29

Furthermore, as epidemiologists, toxicologists, and ecologists recognize,

for every pollutant there exists a unique dose-response function that re

sults in a distinct pattern of deleterious effects on human health or·eco
logical resources.

Deriving cumulative and net harms from pollutants heightens the

technical complexity of environmental policymaking. Many pollutants

interact with each other and with other substances. For example, radon,

a naturally occurring radioactive gas found in the basements of millions

Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35 STAN. L. REv. 575 (1983); William D.
Nordhaus, Locational Competition and the Environment: Should Countries Harmonize
Their Environmental Policies 5-8 (1994) (discussion paper No. 1079, Cowles Founda
tion for Research and Economics, Yale University) (discussing the heterogeneity of pol
lution with respect to time, space, cost, and economic impact).
29. Pezzey usefully distinguishes between "effluent" and "pollution," the fonner
reflecting emissions up to the threshold of harm, the latter describing emissions beyond
the assimilative capacity of an ecosystem. See John Pezzey, Market Mechanisms of Pol
lution Control: "Polluter Pays," Economic and Practical Aspects, in SUSTAINABLE
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 190 (R. Kerry Turner
ed.,

1988).
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of homes in America, produces much more serious lung-cancer risks for
smokers than it does for nonsmokers. Similarly, some pollutants cause
multiple harms. For example, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) not only
cause depletion of the ozone layer but are also greenhouse gases. A pol
lutant may also evince both harmful and helpful effects simultaneously.
Sulfur dioxide, for instance, causes potentially serious respiratory harm
as a ground-level air pollutant but appears to cool the upper atmos
phere, thus counteracting the risk of global warming.
Technical transaction costs are driven up further by the wide range
of exposure routes through which environmental harms arise. Environ
mental scientists devote a great deal of effort to tracing the "fate and
transport" of chemicals. Some pollutants, such as sulphur dioxide,
spread relatively uniformly through the environment into which they are
injected. Other forms of pollution, such as toxic substances disposed of
on land, tend to concentrate geographically and mix nonuniformly with
the surrounding environment.
Progress in addressing the most obvious sources of pollution (the
emissions from major factory smokestacks and effluent pipes) means
that our residual pollution problems are more diffuse, less visible, and
more technically challenging. As the emissions from thousands of
smaller sources (such as bakeries, dry cleaners, and garages), "non
point" sources (such as runoff from farms or lawns), and the cumula
tive effects of millions of individual environmental impacts (such as
auto emissions) become more central, the prospect of individual prop
erty holders being able to vindicate their rights through a nonregulatory,
contract-tort regime becomes less and less likely.
Regulation, of course, does not eliminate these various technical
uncertainties,30 but it does allow for broad-based scientific activities that
benefit from economies of scale and for collectively derived best ap
proximations about environmental harms. Regulation thereby dramati
cally reduces technical transaction costs.
30. There is, of course, a debate over how objective science, and thus technical
analysis, can be. Huber argues a strong positivist line. See PETER HUBER, GALILEO'S
REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 221 (1991). Jasanoff, in contrast, re
jects the idea that science represents an objective reality waiting to be uncovered. See
SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFrH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS AS POLICYMAKERS
12-14 (1990). Similarly, Latin suggests that we drop the pretense that regulatory deci
sions have a purely scientific or rational underpinning and acknowledge that they are
also matters of political choice. See Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation and
Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 89, 90 (1988); see also Peter A. Schuck,
Multi-Culturalism Redux: Science, Law, and Politics, 11 YALE L. & POLY. REv. 1, 1516 (1993) (arguing that "the contingent, socially constructed, and validated, resource
constrained character of scientific paradigms and propositions .. . is an important anti
dote to the more transcendent, universal pretensions of certain conceptions of science").
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2. Administrative and Strategic Transaction Costs
Assume now that in addition to fully defined property rights over
environmental resources, technical transaction costs are zero. The fate,
transport, and ecological and public health effects of every pollutant are
known to all affected parties. A second set of transaction costs that de
rive from the dynamics of bargaining becomes evident. People do not
arrive at tenns readily in complicated multiparty exchanges, even if a
range of universally acceptable outcomes exists. Holding out, free rid
ing, and other strategic actions may preclude an efficient outcome.31
Regulation reduces these strategic transaction costs by selecting and en
forcing preferred outcomes directly.32 In addition, regulation reduces or
eliminates the administrative costs of negotiating an exchange of rights
or suing to vindicate rights with respect to private parties.33

3.

Legal Uncertainty or Poorly Defined Property Rights

Drop the initial assumption of clearly established individual prop
erty rights over environmental resources, and a further argument for
regulation emerges. Not only are the transaction costs of delineating
property ·rights substantial - indeed, prohibitive in some cases - but
the lack of established rights can also lead to direct system failures as
non-rights-holders take advantage of the confusion to do as they please.

31. See AVINASH Docrr & BARRY NALEBUFF, TiiINKING STRATEGICALLY
(1991); HOWARD RAIF'FA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982); see
also Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More Sa
lute to Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & EcoN. 553, 582-84 (1993).
32. See Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining
Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 24-25 (1985) (arguing that courts apply judg
mental entitlement-determination rules in nuisance cases, in which the barriers to pri
vate transactions would be relatively high, while they apply mechanical entitlement-de
termination rules that facilitate private bargaining in trespass cases, in 'Yhich the barriers
are relatively low); see also SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, STUDY OF
FEDERAL REGULATION, s. Doc. No. 95-91, at 7 (1978); RICHARD B. STEWART &
JAMES E. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 198-324 (2d ed. 1978) (dis
cussing the failure of private litigation in dealing with environmental problems); George
J. Stigler, The Economists' Traditional Theory of the Economic Function of the State, in
THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE 103, llO (1975); Robert Ellickson, Public Property

Rights: A Government's Rights and Duties When Its Landowners Come Into Conflict
With Outsiders, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 1627, 1632-43 (1979); Richard B. Stewart & Cass
R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1193, 1236-37
(1982).
33. If the cost of bringing a legal action exceeds the likely recovery for an envi
ronmental injury, the existence of the property right may be clear, but that right will not
be vindicable due to the transaction costs. Many environmental injuries inflict small
banns on many people such that individually no one has enough of a stake in bringing
the harm-causer to justice to justify the legal costs involved.
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Without clear rules, a Hobbesian state of nature takes hold.34 Polluters
pollute with impunity, and the strong seize commonly held resources

without restraint.35 Government failure - or, more precisely, the ab
sence of a functioning legal regime - compounds the market failure.

a. The Problem of the Commons. Some natural resources, such as

the atmosphere, are inherently "public goods" and simply not suscepti

ble to division into private property holdings.36 Other environmental re

sources, such as national parks, while not intrinsically public, have a
long history of being collectively "owned."37 When shared resources

become scarce, a familiar dynamic - the tragedy of the commons -

takes hold.38 Because, by definition, individuals do not pay the full mar

ginal cost of the public goods that they acquire, each person has an in

centive to overconsume. Without clear property rights and allocation

rules, the resulting overconsumption leaves the participants worse off

then they would have been had they agreed on an appropriate resource

division among themselves.39 Powerful individuals or groups, moreover,

may seize disproportionate shares of limited public goods and enrich
34. See THOMAS HOBBES. LEVIATHAN (1885). Hobbes argues generally that a
centralized government (the Leviathan) is required to quell the decentralized "state of
nature," which inevitably will lead to the destruction of man if not stopped.
35. Theoretically, the state of nature favors the strong, not necessarily polluters.
Thus, one could envision circumstances whereby, in the absence of clear property
rights, lower-than-efficient pollution levels would result, enforced by a powerful state
with low-pollution preferences. For example, the United States might force Mexico to
close factories along the border although the harm suffered in the United States was
very minor (for instance, unsightly plumes of steam). In practice, however, the unclear
rights scenario almost always favors polluters or consumers of public goods. This result
follows because, in the absence of property rights to which deference must be given,
other legal norms apply - notably, the belief that "possession is nine-tenths of the
law" and that exercising force in the absence of a clear claim of right is unseemly if not
immoral.
36. A property rights regime can be established for emissions into the atmosphere.
See, for example, the sulfur dioxide (acid rain) allowance trading system set up under
the Clean Air Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (1995).
37. Many Americans consider their ownership interests in such resources to be
part of the national patrimony, making privatization problematic and management as a
public resource preferable. See, e.g., Christopher K. Leman & Robert H. Nelson, The
Rise of Managerial Federalism: An Assessment of Benefits and Costs, 12 ENVTL. L.
981, 1001-02 (1982); Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Com
merce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 711 (1986). Of course, not
all traditionally publicly held resources are created equal. It may well be that the federal
government need not retain all of the land it currently holds.
38. Although the understanding of this problem as the tragedy of the commons is
relatively new, the problem of scarcity and its effect on property rights can be traced to
Locke and Blackstone. See Rose, supra note 16, at 267-70.
39. For the classic version of this problem, see Garre tt Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45 (1968); see also Gordon Tullock, Federalism:
Problems of Scale, 6 PuB. CHOICE 19, 25-28 (1969).
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themselves unfairly at the expense of the rights others hold to a share of
the commons. The need for collective action to respond to this "prison
ers' dilemma" dynamic is now well understood and represents a strong
argui:p.ent for regulation.40

b. The "Reasonableness" of Externalities. Even if all property is
privately owned, disputes over environmental harms will persist. As
noted above, when A spills something onto B's property, there will
often be some .uncertainty over whether A has a right to emit or B has a
right not to be polluted. Although historically the touchstone has been

the reasonableness of the intrusion,41 property rights often will be in

dispute because there is no bright-line definition of what is reasonable.
Moreover, reasonable levels of pollution may evolve over time as new
harms emerge, conditions become more crowded (and once-reasonable
emissions intermingle with other emissions, cumulatively becoming

un

reasonable), and science advances our knowledge of harms such that
activities that once seemed relatively innocuous are deemed harmful
and unreasonable. Thus, even in a seemingly simple case, disputes as to
who holds rights may arise.
As in the case of the uncontrolled commons, the absence of clear
property rights leads to a Hobbesian Rule of the Strong. The results
likely will be unsatisfactory because the default rule (polluters seize the
property rights) violates our underlying norm against uncompensated
spillovers. Of course, the outcome in this case need not be inefficient if
Coasian bargaining results in the pollutee paying the polluter to reduce
emissions to an optimal level.42 But regulation may produce a superior

40. See MANCUR OLSON THE Lome OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965); see also JOHN STUART Mn..L, ON
LIBERTY (Viking Penguin 1982) (1859) (observing that no function of government is
less optional than the regulation of forests, waters, etc.). But see Demsetz, supra note 23
(suggesting that the clarification of private property rights will help to address the col
lective action problem).
41. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821-22 (1978). This legal principle
- effectively placing property rights with potential pollution victims - represents a
powerful moral intuition that has had status as a behavioral norm for centuries. See
Rose, supra note 16.
42. A real-world example of this phenomenon can be seen in the environmental
relationship between China and Japan. China's coal burning results in considerable sul
fur dioxide emissions that have measurable (multibillion dollar) impacts on Japan.
Nothing prevents Japan from asserting a property right not to be disturbed by this trans
boundary harm. See Declaration on the Human Environment: Report of the United Na
tions Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Conference on the Human Environ
ment, at 5, U.N. Doc. NCONF.48 114/Rev.l (1972), reprinted in 11 ILM 1416 (1972);
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Conference on Environment
and Development, at 5, U.N. Doc. NCONF.15115 (1992), reprinted in 31ILM 874, 876
(1992). However, given that there is no mechanism for vindicating these property rights
,
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outcome by establishing the boundaries of permitted behavior and
thereby ensuring that the results are fair as well as efficient.

The following chart summarizes the potential shortcomings of a

common law approach to controlling environmental harms. If property
rights are not defined or transactions costs are not low, we end up with

economic inefficiency and welfare loss, or a violation of basic property

rights, or both. In either case, governmental intervention offers the
promise of improved results.43

CHART A: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND 'TRANSACTION COSTS
Clear Property Rights

No or Low
Transaction
Costs

- rights respected
- bargaining produces
efficient results

Property Rights not Clear
- unlear rights lead to default rule
(polluters seize property rights)
- Coasian bargaining may nevertheless

- no need for regulation

produce efficient results
- government intervention needed to

- rights may not be

- unclear rights leads to default rule
(polluters seize property rights)

ensure fair results

High
Transaction
Costs

C.

vindicable
- transaction costs make
bargaining to efficient
results unlikely
- regulation may lead to more
efficient and fair results

A

- bargaining to efficient results
unlikely
- need regulation to achieve efficient
and fair results

Typology of Environmental Regulatory Failures

While regulatory approaches to environmental problems can im

prove social welfare, the specific regulatory strategies undertaken often

fall short of the optimum. To maximize utility, environmental regula

tions must be pushed to the point - and only to the point - where the

benefits of an additional dollar of pollution prevention or control equal

in the international realm, any such assertion by Japan is essentially useless. As a result,
Japan's rights effectively do not exist, and China by default claims the right to pollute.
Japan therefore is forced to subsidize Chinese sulfur dioxide abatement through a
"Green Aid" program aimed at getting the Chinese to install scrubbers on their power
plants. See Peter Evans, Japan's Green Aid, CmNA Bus. REv., July-Aug. 1994, at 3943.
43. Within a single jurisdiction, property rights may be relatively clear and vindi
cable so that transaction costs become the dominant variable determining the optimal
response to environmental harms. When, however, we move from an island jurisdiction
to a multiple-jurisdiction world, we raise the specter of property-rights uncertainties and
further strain the possibility that a decentralized tort- and contract-based approach to en
vironmental harms will be adequate.
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the costs of the activities undertaken.44 Viewed another way, "least so
cial cost" environmental regulation should minimize the sum of pollu
tion abatement expenditures (including regulatory costs) and losses in
flicted by unabated pollution harms.45 With this objective in mind, three
broad categories of regulatory failure and welfare loss can be discerned:
technical

deficiencies,

structural

mismatches,

and

public

choice

problems.

I.

Technical Deficiencies in Regulation

Technical welfare losses arise for two distinct reasons. First, the in
formation on which regulatory decisions rest can be incomplete or inac
curate. How much acid-rain-causing S02 has been emitted may be mea
sured incorrectly or miscalculated. Similarly, the public health or
ecological risks arising from a particular environmental harm may be
misunderstood or miscalculated. What level of exposure to sulfates
causes respiratory disease? How much acid rain will cause trees to die?
Mistakes in answering such questions represent a weakness in technical

capacity. In such cases, more accurate data, scientific analysis, risk as
sessment, or cost-benefit calculations would improve the technical con
tent of regulation and thus would result in more accurate environmental
resource pricing.46
A second type of technical welfare loss consists of the administra

tive costs of regulation. This set of technical costs has two conceptually
distinct components. First, for any given level of technical capacity,
regulatory systems may have differing administrative costs. For in
stance, federal bureaucrats and state bureaucrats may both be able to
44. This utilitarian goal, as discussed earlier, should be pursued subject to the con
straint that property rights are respected. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
45. For a thorough review of the economics of environmental regulation, see
BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 8. Least social cost analysis implies that benefits and
costs can be quantified at least roughly and then compared. As discussed supra note 30,
some commentators argue that science is so uncertain and subjective and that individu
als and communities vary so widely in their risk valuations that aU environmental pol
icy decisions are political and thus that cost-benefit analyses are of limited value. Yet
some aspects of policy analysis are objective - for example, measurements of pollu
tion; this means that better technical analysis will reduce the scope of policy uncertainty
and thus the sphere in which political judgment is required.
46. It is important to realize that this category of regulatory failure is broad
enough to encapsulate various "political" or quasi-normative incapacities, particularly
with regard to how much value to place on policy interventions. For instance, a commu
nity may believe that controlling a certain risk is worth on average

$2

million per life

saved. A regulator, even trying in good faith to discern the community's values, may
not have the technical capacity to arrive at the $2 million figure. Some "technical" fail
ures - particularly in cost-benefit analysis - will thus be hard to distinguish from
"public choice" or political failures.

See infra

text accompanying notes

79-89.
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determine what level of benzene in the air is safe to breathe and to do
so in the same amount of time, but federal bureaucrats have higher
wages, making the federal system more costly. Alternatively, the federal
officials may work longer or faster, thus producing more regulatory out
put per dollar invested, making the federal system more cost-effective
from an administrative point of view. Second, a tradeoff exists between
improved technical content and the costs associated with running a reg
ulatory system that achieves greater precision. For example, although
equating the marginal cost and benefit of pollution control for every
person in the country on an individual basis - such as by specifying
individualized benzene standards for the air around each household would minimize welfare losses associated with divergences between
policy outcomes and individual preferences, it would come at a vast ad
ministrative cost. Thus, additional welfare losses arise from failures to
regulate with optimal specificity.47
Although technical failure can occur at any stage of the regulatory
process,48 the effects of "early" mistakes may be compounded and
hence more serious. Some errors will result in total regulatory failure,
while other mistakes will affect only the level of response.49 The big
gest errors, which occur when causal connections are misunderstood or
when risks are misjudged by multiple orders of magnitude, are more
likely to arise from the "technical" end of the regulatory process (such
as

faulty data collection and analysis) than from "political-technical"

47. There is a significant body of literature that addresses the optimal specificity
of regulations and the tradeoffs between uniform standards and regulatory diversity. See,
e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, AN EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 367-70 (4th ed. 1992)
(arguing that the key question is whether the benefits of particularization outweigh the
costs); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Rulemaking, 3 J. LE
GAL STUD. 257, 262 (1974); see also Colin Diver, The Optimal Precision of Adminis
trative Rules, 93 YALE LJ. 65 (1983).

48. Technical failure, as understood here, can occur simultaneously within one,

some, or all of these elements:
1. Problem identification
2. Data collection

3. Fate and transport analysis
4. Epidemiological and ecological studies
5. Risk assessment
6. Policy design and alternatives development
7. Cost-benefit analysis
8. Implementation and enforcement
9. Evaluation
49. For example, mistaken fate-transport or epidemiological analyses can lead reg
ulators to target the wrong cause of harm, whereas using a $20 million figure per value
of life saved versus the actual community value of $2 million simply results in a stan
·

dard being set ten times too high.
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activities (such as using the wrong "values" in a cost-benefit
calculation).50
2.

Structural Mismatches

Environmental regimes also risk structural failure unless the regu
lating entity adds up all the costs and benefits of a proposed policy. In
particular, if some of the cost-bearers or beneficiaries of an environ
mental action fall outside the borders of the regulating jurisdiction, their
interests in the policy outcome may not be taken into account.51 When
ever the scope of an environmental harm does not match the regulator 's
jurisdiction, the cost-benefit calculus will be skewed and either too little
or too much environmental protection will be provided. Chart B shows
how structural mismatches can be broken down into four basic forms:
(1) negative externalities; (2) positive externalities; (3) internalities; and
(4) potential takings.
Negative externalities result when the jurisdiction of the regulating
entity is too small and harms accrue beyond the boundaries of the regu
lator. When such a mismatch occurs, and external harms are disre
garded, the cost-benefit calculation undertaken by the regulator will un
derstate the costs of the emissions, and underregulation (too much
pollution) results. Transboundary pollution spillovers represent the clas
sic negative externality. Positive externalities arise when an activity,
such as protecting a tropical forest, produces benefits that accrue be
yond the regulating jurisdiction.52 In this case, because the regulator ig
nores the potential welfare gains of the extrajurisdictional beneficiaries,
too little of the public good is provided.

50. Specifically, although disputes over the value of a human life saved might
range across an order of magnitude and although some value clashes might even rise to
two orders of magnitude, scientific estimates (for example, the likelihood that a certain
chemical exposure will cause harm) often vary by many orders of magnitude and may
even result in "directional" errors.
51. See, e.g., John B. Braden, The Economics of Environmental Policy-Making in
a Multi-Level Government Structure, in RECENT ECONOMIC AND LEGAL DEVELOP
MENTS IN EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 49-74 (Filip Abraham et al. eds.,
1995).
52. Forests, for example, provide carbon sequestration benefits that reduce the risk
of climate change across the entire planet In addition, many forests support biological
diversity, which benefits all humankind. For a discussion of various kinds of positive
externalities in the environmental context, see DANIEL C. EsTY, GREENING THE
GA'IT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE FUTURE 125-26 (1994).
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II.

Positive Extemality

III. Intemality

IV. Potential Taking
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When the jurisdiction is broader than the scope of the public good
in question, internalities may arise because majoritarian voting denies
an optimal level of public goods to a subjurisdiction.53 Such a mismatch
arises, for example, if a neighborhood wants to build a park and is will
ing to pay for it, but is voted down by the other citizens of the town
who fear higher taxes.s4 Similarly, internalities arise if a subjurisdiction
would opt out of acquiring a particular public good but is forced to pay
for an unwanted level of environmental protection by a decision made
at a higher level of government. An example of this type of structural
mismatch would be a requirement that local water suppliers install na
tionally specified drinking-water pollution controls.ss
The fourth type of mismatch arises when the regulating entity pro
vides benefits broadly but concentrates costs unfairly on a narrow
group. Assuming that the cost-bearers have done nothing to justify a
disproportionate burden, their property rights may be infringed.56 In
deed, the problem of a potential taking is not a structural mismatch but
rather a question of protecting property rights against majoritarian and
utilitarian overreaching.
Externalities and internalities could be dealt with by clarifying who
holds the property rights if transaction costs were low and bargaining
could be undertaken. If, however, transaction costs are high, then regu-

53. See Mancur Olson, Jr., Strategic Theory and Its Applications
The Principle
of "Fiscal Equivalence": The Division of Responsibilities Among Different Levels of
Government, 59 AM. EcoN. R.Ev. 479, 482 (1969) (observing that "intemalities" exist
-

when a public good reaches only a subset of the population in a jurisdiction). As Olson
notes: "In a situation of this type and a democratic political system with voting by ma
jority rule, the provision of a collective good for a local area will hurt more people than
it helps, even if Pareto optimality would have required that the collective good be pro
duced." Id.
54. My categories of regulatory failure obviously blur at the margins. For exam
ple, the defeated park could be seen as a case in which local preferences diverge from
those of the broader jurisdiction. The situation could also be seen as a public choice
problem because the welfare loss arises from a disjunction between the wishes of those
in the subjurisdiction and the policy program imposed on them from a higher level. But
of those I call this a structural mismatch and instead reserve the public choice rubric for
cases in which the problem arises not as a result of a jurisdictional misalignment be
tween the scope of a public good and the boundaries of the regulating entity, but rather
because of distortions in the translation of the public's desires into policy within a prop
erly defined jurisdiction.
55. See Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3 (1994).
56. Seizing a private property owner's land to create a public park would, for ex
ample, constitute a taking and require compensation under the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution. Who should be compensated and by how much is, of course, a matter of
considerable controversy. See, e.g., FISCHEL, supra note 19; Frank Michelman, Prop

erty, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensa
tion" Law, 80 HAR.v. L. REv. 1165 (1967); Rose, supra note 16.
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lation is necessary and welfare maximization requires that the jurisdic
tion of the regulating authority - or at least the scope of costs and ben
efits factored into the regulatory calculus - be coterminous with the
extent of the harm to be prevented or the good to be provided. To
achieve optimality, externalities require some form of centralization and
internalities require some degree of decentralization .
In general, internalities will be easier to fix than externalities. Par
tial devolution (a tax just on the neighborhood that will benefit from the
park) can make the scope of the costs and benefits match. Although in
ertia must be overcome, no one has to act against his own fundamental
interests to achieve a solution. In contrast, internalizing externalities re
quires getting outsiders to cooperate. Insofar as those groups that are
externalizing costs or receiving positive spillovers currently enjoy
something for free, they have no incentive to pay.57 For example, fertil
izer use by Massachusetts farmers greatly affects the quality of water in
the Connecticut River. Connecticut, however, has had little success in
getting the upstream farmers to change their behavior. Not only does
Connecticut have no direct authority over the Massachusetts polluters,
but the upstream farmers also balk at bearing the costs of control - in
reduced yields or higher fertilizer-application costs - when they will
receive little benefit. Similarly, although Americans seem quite willing
to insist that Brazil protect its rainforests, they are much less excited
about paying for the biodiversity, oxygen production, carbon sequestra
tion, and other conservation benefits that they receive from Brazil.
The need for an overarching governmental response to externalities
does not, of course, settle the question of what sort of regulatory regime
should be put in place. One answer is a centralized regulatory system.
But multijurisdictional spillovers also might be addressed by collabora
tion among decentralized governments. W hether a collaborative regime
rather than a centralized one will be sufficient to address the collective
action problem turns on a number of factors:

(1) the existence of com

mon environmental norms; (2) the direction of the spillovers in ques
tion; and

(3)

the ease with which property rights can be exchanged or

vindicated.58
At the outset, collaboration depends on the existence of common
environmental norms that make determinations about the boundaries of

57. Unless, of course, the externalities go both ways, in which case today's winner
may be tomorrow's loser. This changes the game to a prisoner's dilemma and provides
sufficient reciprocity to support collective action solutions.
58. The problem of getting optimal interjurisdictional environmental policy
through collaboration mirrors the difficulty of using a common law approach to address
environmental harms in the first place. See supra text accompanying notes 23-43.
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property rights possible. Absent, for example, an agreed-upon standard
of reasonableness in the nuisance context across the jurisdictions in
question, there is no basis for deciding whether an extemality exists.59
In the terminology of game theory, there is no zone of agreement
among the parties.
The direction of the flow of harms will also affect the likelihood of
achieving effective interjurisdictional cooperative policies. If spillovers
go both ways, each party has an incentive to collaborate in the pursuit
of collective-action solutions that establish a workable control regime. A
limits its emissions onto B so B will control its spillovers onto A.
When, however, the flow of harms is substantially unidirectional, the
problem takes on a zero-sum flavor that makes collaboration much
more difficult. If the flow is always from A to B, why should A control
its emissions? In such nonreciprocal cases, environmental norms clash
with other norms in ways that may make collaboration more difficult.
For example, if the pollution flows from the stronger to the weaker
party, the tendency of the strong to advance its own self-interest may
override its commitment to the control of transboundary environmental
harms.60 The United States, for instance, long refused to acknowledge
Canadian claims about acid rain. Of course, if the harm flows from the
weaker party onto the stronger, the no-transboundary-pollution norm is
more likely to hold because the power relationship reinforces the envi
ronmental rules.61

59. To see the importance of common norms, consider the difficulty of 9-etting
China and the United States to agree on a unified approach to the problem of climate
change. In the negotiations, the United States might declare that transboundary emis
sions of greenhouse gases must be controlled or compensation paid. The United States
might cite the longstanding common law of nuisance or the "no transboundary spill
overs" norm embodied in Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration. The Chinese, however,
will respond that the fundamental principle must be that poor nations should be allowed
to do what they must to develop quickly. They might cite the law of necessity or the
"right to develop" in the Rio Declaration in support for their norm.
60. The commitment to vague norms, such as not allowing transboundary pollu
tion harms, may break down in confrontation with the demands of self-interest. Indeed,
in the environmental realm, where norms are often weak or ambiguous, normative dis
sonance is a common problem. U.S. enthusiasm for the enforcement of a no-spillover
rule in the international domain, for example, appears to have been tempered by the rec
ognition that the United States is a major international net polluter. Interestingly,
China's rapid economic rise and the accompanying increase in its transboundary emis
sions may soon put the shoe on the other foot for the United States and convert Ameri
cans into advocates for real enforcement of the no-transboundary-spillovers norm.
61. The unidirectional flow may result in "too much" control because there is no
prospect of the stronger party being saddled with excess costs when the circumstances
are reversed. Thus, for instance, Mexico agreed to install scrubbers on a number of its
power-generating stations along the U.S. border even though the plants complied fully
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Finally, the possibility of interjurisdictional nonregulatory collabo
ration depends on the presence of mechanisms both for the exchange of
property rights and for their enforcement at relatively low cost. In par
ticular, common tort and contract rules must exist or courts must be
willing to execute judgments from other jurisdictions. Obviously, the
prospects of establishing this sort of legal collaboration depend greatly
on the relationship among the jurisdictions at issue. When the entities in
question are U.S. states, strong links make interjurisdictional coordina
tion conceivable. When the jurisdictions cross international lines, how
ever, the transaction costs of case-by-case collaboration are likely to be
much higher and the probability of making such a regime work corre
spondingly lower. Although there might be a potential zone of agree
ment between or among the parties, the cost of finding it may be
prohibitive.
Regulation, of course, does not eliminate these difficulties. But the
shift to a more centralized policy regime facilitates negotiations by fo
cusing on general principles and rules rather than on case-specific out
comes. Because the parties do not know their precise future environ
mental positions, the process benefits from something of a Rawlsian
veil of ignorance that supports principled decisionmaking.62

If spillovers from one jurisdiction to another represent a serious is
sue, decentralized collaborative policy responses are likely to be subop
timal for the same reasons that common law approaches to environmen
tal problems do not work: high transaction costs and unclear property
rights. Whenever we create multiple regulatory jurisdictions in an at
tempt to better tailor policies to local needs and desires, our ability to
limit transjurisdictional pollution to an efficient level and to protect
property rights diminishes. At the very least, the gains from reduced in
ternalities must be offset against the losses from increased externalities.
Agreement on the principle that externalities generally justify some
degree of regulatory centralization does not, however, solve the policy
problem. There remains the issue of what sorts of externalities create
structural failures and how best to respond to them.

with Mexican environmental laws and the only violation was of U.S. visibility stan
dards. See EsTY. supra note 52, at 187.
62. See ROGER FISHER & WIT.LIAM URY, GETIING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981) (spelling out the advantages of negotiating
about principles rather than positions). Of course, in some cases the parties do know
their specific future positions and thus will negotiate principles with their own needs in
mind. For example, the Chinese government cannot be expected to negotiate rules about
climate change that fail to reflect China's heavy dependence on coal.
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a. Physical Spillovers. Transboundary pollution represents the par
adigmatic extemality. The physicality of the spillover and the 'tangibility
of the harm make vivid the potential threat to allocative efficiency and
to property rights, and clearly justify regulation if transaction costs are
high. The more widespread the physical risks posed by a given pollu
tant, the larger the scope of governmental activity must be to account
for every affected property interest. Thus, the extent of the externality
- the harm caused or benefit provided - represents a critical determi
nant of the scale of the optimal governmental response. To be

structur

ally adequate, an environmental policy must encompass the costs and
benefits felt by all potential victims and cost-bearers.63

b. Economic Externalities. While physical-pollution spillovers rep
resent the classic extemality, structural issues do not arise solely from
the physical reach of environmental harms.64 From a utility-maximizing
perspective, parties suffering from economic65 or psychological spill
overs also should have their interests factored into the regulatory
calculus. For example, if a landowner allows industries located on her
property to forego the use of costly pollution-reducing technologies,
other landowners may be affected. Even if the resulting pollution does
not spill onto their land, they face a choice between adopting a similar
policy and suffering the environmental effects, or rejecting it and suffer
ing potential competitiveness effects. The use of environmental re
sources in the first instance has external economic effects on other par
ties, even when no pollution actually travels.66

63. This matching principle is widely accepted with regard to physical spillovers.

See OLSON, supra note 4-0, at 48, 53-57 (noting that political boundaries must be coter
minous with the scope of a public good to ensure optimal investment in the collective
good); see also BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 8; Revesz, supra note 1, at 1250-53;
Stewart, Pyramids, supra note 7.
64. Stewart, for example, identifies three sorts of externalities beyond traditional
pollution spillovers: resource externalities (for example, wasteful consumption of re
sources by others), preservation externalities (for example, when resources consumed in
one jurisdiction deprive others of "nonuse values" they might have enjoyed), and com
petitiveness externalities (for example, when states set suboptimal environmental stan
dards due to fears of job loss and industrial dislocation). See Richard B. Stewart Inter
national Trade and the Environment: Lessons from the Federal Experience, 49 WASH
& LEE L. REV. 1329, 134-0-41 (1992).
65. See EsTY, supra note 52; infra note 134 (explaining that the main impact of
the race to the bottom is on the environmental policymaking dynamic and not on indus
try competitiveness per se).
66. Indeed, it was problems of this sort that motivated the first U.S. federal envi
ronmental laws. Specifically, Senator Ed Muskie feared that Maine pulp mills, which
were subject to relatively stringent environmental controls, might suffer in competition
with mills in the less rigorously regulated West. See Esrr, supra note 52, at 22, for a
legislative history of these competitiveness arguments.
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Some commentators argue that such economic externalities are
somehow less "real" than physical spillovers. Revesz, for instance,
makes a theoretical distinction between "technological (or real)" exter
nalities, such as pollution from an upwind state, and "pecuniary exter
nalities," in which "one individual's decisions affect the financial cir
cumstances of the other, but there is no misallocation of resources. "67
When an increase in the number of shoes demanded increases the price
of leather and thus affects the welfare of handbag buyers, Revesz argues
that there is no real externality present. He claims that this is simply a
market-clearing mechanism which is

by definition welfare-optimizing,

assuming a free market for leather, shoes, and handbags. Nevertheless,
a range of

real externalities exists that goes beyond physical pollution

spillovers.68
Many pollution-control or resource-use decisions have economic
impacts that cannot be dismissed simply as a function of welfare
enhancing resource reallocation. California's adoption of auto emissions
standards that exceed national requirements may reflect the fact that
Californians stand to benefit greatly from lower emissions and to pay
relatively little of the extra pollution control costs that will be borne
largely by out-of-state automakers.69 In this case, there is no market
mechanism to ensure that California's action is

nationally welfare

enhancing. Californians may pay part of the bill for their more stringent
pollution controls through higher prices for cars, but consumers else
where may also be forced to pay increased prices, essentially subsi
dizing California's reduced-pollution benefits.70 In particular, we have
no guarantee that the benefits to California outweigh the sum of the
costs imposed both inside and outside of California. An excessively
narrow understanding of "real" externalities, such as that provided by
Revesz, misses such cases.71

c. Psychological Externalities: The "Choice of Public" Issue. In
some cases, the harm suffered by people beyond the borders of the reg-

67. Revesz, supra note 1, at 1223. In support of this distinction, see BAUMOL &
OATES, supra note 8, at 21-23, 155-234.

68. See Stewart, supra note 64, at 1340-41.
69. See E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Fed
eralization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. EcoN. & 0RG. 313 (1985).
70. If the extra price for the "California car" were fully borne by Californians -

that is, internalized - there would be no efficiency problem, but given national market
ing progrants and other constraints, automakers end up selling California cars at a
discount
71. For further arguments defining various types of economic spillovers, see Steve
Chamovitz, Trade Measures and the Design of International Regimes, 5 J. ENVT. &
DEV. 153 (1996).
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ulating jurisdiction is neither physical nor economic, but rather is psy
chological.72 Americans deplore the killing of whales in international
waters. Europeans,. in large numbers, express outrage at the use of pain
ful leghold traps to capture beaver and mink for furs. The welfare loss
in these cases is undeniable. The question is whether those suffering the
harm have a

legitimate interest in the policy decision made elsewhere.
right to have their feelings factored into

More precisely, do they have a
the policy calculus?

Whether an extemality exists, and thus whether a regulatory pro
cess that disregards psychological harms has failed structurally, depends
on the reach of the property rights in question.73 If those with legitimate
claims are ignored, the regulatory calculus will be off-kilter.74 In the
case of public goods or resources, the question of legitimate interests
and thus of "missing voices" among those with property rights may be
even murkier. If a public resource belongs to us and is to be managed in
our interests, who is "us"?
Frequently the boundaries of an environmental resource are not
fixed. Who, for example, holds legitimate interests vis-a-vis the Grand
Canyon? Even if we accept that an environmental resource must be, or
should be, publicly held and managed, there remains an issue about the
proper management entity. Part of the current environmental contro
versy in the United States centers not only on whether public lands and
other environmental resources should be owned and managed privately
as opposed to by the government, but also on the appropriate scope of
the decisionmaking community.75 Resource managers could represent:

72. See Richard Blackhurst & Arvind Subramanian, Promoting Multilateral Coop
eration on the Environment, in THE GREENING OF WORLD TRADE ISSUES 247 (Kym
Anderson & Richard Blackhurst eds., 1992); Walter PJ. Wils, Subsidiarity and EC En
vironmental Policy: Taking People's Concerns Seriously, 6 J. ENVI'L. L. 85 (1994).
73. Permitting unusual or irrational psychological harms to drive regulatory policy
seems especially troubling. Beyond the property rights issue, such concerns reflect a
fear that our regulatory decisions might be distorted by inaccurate data on psychological
harms and a worry that psychological harms might be overstated. Indeed, without a
"willingness to pay" mechanism to check the reality and depth of such harms, there ex
ists a moral hazard problem of potentially significant proportions because those claim
ing injury have little reason to report accurately on their welfare losses and much reason
to exaggerate. Nevertheless, as Michael Gerrard notes, while fears of living near a haz
ardous waste dump or a nuclear waste depository may be irrational, the disutility is real.
See MICHAEL B. GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD, WHOSE RISK 100-07 (1994).
74. See JOHN D. GRAHAM & JONATHAN BAERT WIENER, RISK VERSUS RISK
230-32 (1995) (discussing the similar problem of "omitted voices" in risk analyses).
75. Another issue is the decisionmaker's location. Some of the current public
lands management concern reflects dissatisfaction with the concentration of day-to-day
decisionmaking in Washington, D.C., and a belief that it would be better undertaken by
those "on the scene." But decentralizing control to avoid micromanagement from
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(1) the narrow class of citizens who physically use the resource; (2)
members of the town in which the common property is located; (3) the
citizens of the state; or (4) the entire country.
Community identity is fixed in neither time nor space. Given the
threshold effects and lag times that characterize many resource-use and
environmental problems, the temporal dimension of environmental pro
tection is often significant. Some of the CFCs released into the atmos
phere in the 1980s still will be eating away the ozone layer at the end
of the twenty-first century. Present generations may ignore or discount
growing public health or ecological harms at the expense of future gen
erations.76 Spatial extensions of our sense of community also may be
important in light of ever broader transportation networks and commu
nication systems. People today live and work in different communities
and sometimes even different states or countries. In addition, the mobil
ity of society means that many people have friends, relatives, and im
portant ties to places quite removed from their immediate surroundings.
Moreover, many people live in several communities, states, and even
countries over the course of their lives. All of these dimensions of mo
bility create an expanded sense of community and therefore of political
identity.77 As a result, "we" become "they," and vice versa. Media
coverage of environmental news, which is increasingly national or even
international, further expands political identity.78

Washington and to ensure that federal authorities coordinate with state and local offi
cials should not be confused with having central government resources managed for the
benefit of the state in which they happen to be located. Just as federal money in New
York banks is managed for the benefit of the national treasury and not for the welfare of
New Yorkers, federal lands should be managed for the American public at large. As a
separate matter, one might consider selling federal lands that do not have national
significance.
76. Thus, in some cases, as Edith Brown Weiss and other commentators have
noted, the relevant political constituency should be expanded to include future genera
tions. See EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTER
NATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY
(1989). The problem arises because bequest motives may not be strong enough to en
sure that the current populace adequately represents the interests of future generations.
See, e.g., Peter A. Diamond, A Framework for Social Security Analysis, 8 J. PuB.
EcoN. 275 (1977). But see Harold P. Green, Legal Aspects of Intergenerational Equity
Issues, in EQUITY ISSUES IN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT 189 (Roger E.
Dasperson ed., 1983) (arguing that the absolutism of some laws overvalues the future).
77. My argument is not that people should be more "communitarian," but simply
that they, as a matter of fact, perceive themselves to be part of various communities.
See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A
PuBLIC PHILoSOPHY (1996); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS
OF JUSTICE 59-65 (1982).
78. See Daphne Abeel, Ideas, The Media, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 7,
1984, at 34; James R. Campbell, Newspapers: The Battle for Tzme, UNITED PREss
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The relevant political community is not, of course, inexorably ex
panding. Individuals' sense of community and political identity can
shrink as well as expand. The claims of some self-styled constituents
may be rejected by others as the views of outsiders. Furthermore, "dis
tant" parties should not necessarily see th�ir preferences prevail. It is
clear, however, that in environmental policymaking, the sphere of af
fected interests may expand or contract depending on an evolving defi
nition of community. Moreover, these two considerations intertwine: as
more externalities or internalities are perceived, political identity may
change accordingly; and as political identity changes, new structural in
adequacies may come to light. In attempting to maximize environmental
social welfare, we should be careful not to conclude too hastily that we
know the precise boundaries of the appropriate community and thus
whose costs and benefits should "count."

3.

Public Choice Problems

Added to the problem of the right "choice of public" is the prob
lem of public choice. The two issues are conceptually distinct. The for
mer is essentially a matter of clarifying whose interests should count in
the regulatory process. The latter, however, may exist even though the
choice of public issue has been resolved, correctly or otherwise. Opti
mal regulation depends on the public's political preferences being faith
fully and accurately translated into policy outcomes.
Environmental regulation has several features that generate public
choice issues. Notably, the costs of environmental regulation are gener
ally more concentrated and tangible than the benefits.79 Costs are often
borne by particular industries or enterprises, and are translated readily
into monetary terms. Benefits, however, accrue to the general public in

!NTL., Apr. 24, 1989; Tom Curley,
DAY, Jan. 8, 1990, at 13A.

One Million New Readers Added in 1989, USA TO

79. This asymmetry has long been recognized. See JAMES BUCHANAN &
GORDON TuLLoCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); Bruce Ackerman, Beyond
Carolene Products, 98 HAR.v. L. REv. 713, 723-26 (1985) (obseiving the advantage
concentrated interests have over diffuse ones); see also Roger G. Noll, Economic Per
spectives on the Politics of Regulation, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZA
TION 1265 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Wtllig eds., 1989) (stating that "large,
heterogeneous groups with relatively small per capita stakes . . . will be disadvantaged
relative to small, homogeneous groups with high per capita stakes"). When the reverse
is true - that is, the benefits of controls are concentrated and the costs diffuse - the
opposite public choice problem, a NIMBY ("not in my backyard") situation, may arise,
resulting in systematic overregulation. See, e.g., James T. Hamilton, Missing the
Mark(et) in Siting Hazardous Waste Facilities, 1 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL. F. 1 1
(1991).
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ways that are hard to discern and monetize.80 These asymmetries in in
fonnation and the concentration of regulatory costs and benefits may
give rise to asymmetries of political activity and influence between pol
luters and pollutees or between common-resource users and the public
owners of these resources. 81 Because these asymmetries may be more
significant at the state and local levels,82 decentralization may represent
a strategy to advance deregulation for the benefit of certain special
interests.83
For most people, moreover, environmental quality comprises only
a limited dimension of their welfare. Economic prosperity and material
well-being are far more important determinants of their quality of life.
Thus, few people vote or choose where to live on the basis of environ
mental factors alone.84 The resulting "bundling" of issues at election
time works against the seamless translation of the public's environmen
tal views into environmental policy.85 In addition, unlike taxing and
spending decisions and the issues in some other regulatory domains, the
public has a hard time discerning its own interests in the environmental
realm. Simply put, people can tell if the roads or schools are meeting
their needs, but they cannot assess the adequacy of a residue standard of
seven parts per million for the pesticide EBDC. The more uncertain,
technically complex, and nonintuitive the policy choice, and the greater
the difficulty in reducing the decision to easily understood dollar tenns,
the higher the risk of special interest distortions.

80. Thus, the technical complexity and inherent uncertainty of environmental regu
lation, see supra text accompanying notes 28-30, intersects with public choice problems
to create additional regulatory failures. The particular obscurity of the political process
in the environmental domain creates an especially wide opening for special interest in
tervention and distortion of the regulatory process.
81. See Daniel A. Farber, Economic Analysis and Just Compensation, 12 INTI...
REv. L. & EcoN. 125, 130-31 (1992) (noting that landowners have greater power than
the public at large).
82. See Stewart, Pyramids, supra note 7, at 1213; see also Warren L. Ratliff, The
De-Evolution of Environmental Organization, J. LAND, REs,. & ENVTL. L. (forthcom
ing 1997).
83. See, e.g., ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 159-73 (arguing that the decen
tralization thrust in the Reagan Administration represented no grand theory of optimal
regulation but rather a simple desire to help business interests).
84. See Joseph Kalt & Mark Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory
of Politics, 14 AM. EcoN. REv. 279, 281-85 (1984); see also Noll, supra note 79, at
1270-72.
85. Bundling of issues tends to dilute the impact of any one issue. See, e.g., James
D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner, Public Choice and the Conduct of Representative
Government, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 3, 10, 19
(James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner eds., 1988); Robert D. Tollison, Rent Seek
ing: A Survey, 35 KYKLOs 575, 594 (1982).
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The threshold effects and time lags associated with pollution exac
erbate these problems. Governmental officials rarely are eager to pay
the political price for spending money today to fix a problem that will
emerge, if at all, at some future date. From a politician's perspective,
there is little incentive to impose costly controls on greenhouse gas
emissions that must be borne today when the benefits will not show up
until 2050,86 let alone in time to claim credit in the next election two or
four years hence.87 When pollutants have very long lifetimes,88 in
tergenerational equity and additional public choice issues emerge.
In sum, environmental protection involves a wide range of
problems demanding an equally diverse set of response strategies. Ar
guments that decentralization or any other "silver bullet" environmen
tal reform might set us on the right course misapprehend the nature of
the policy challenge.89 Environmental problems are complicated and
messy, as are the best solutions.
DECENTRALIZATION VS. CENTRALIZATION: THE DEBATE To

II.

DATE

This Part identifies the origins and current state of the environmen
tal federalism debate. Section II.A traces the development of centralized
environmental regulatory initiatives and of the arguments marshaled in
their support. Section Il.B discusses the second-generation response to
centralized environmental regulation and examines the five core second
generation arguments in support of decentralization.
86. Of course, how sigruficant the problem of climate change will prove to be re
mains uncertain and thus creates a further reason for politicians to disregard the
problem.
87. Jn economic terms, politicians have a high discount rate. The difference be
tween the discount rates of the public and of political leaders is one of the systemic
public choice problems associated with environmental regulations. See, e.g., W. Kip
Viscusi, Equivalent Frames of Reference for Judging Risk Regulation Policies, 3 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. LJ. 431 , 437 (1995) (arguing that the time lag between asbestos regulation and
benefits "substantially reduce[s] . . . value and the relative attractiveness of the
regulation").
88. Some CFCs and greenhouse gases persist in the atmosphere for hundreds of
years, and radioactive wastes may be harmful for thousands of years. See, e.g., Owen
Davies, Air Repair, OMNI, June 1993, at 62, 94; A.R. Ravishankara et al., Atmospheric
Lifetimes of Long-Lived Halogenated Species, 259 SCIENCE 194 (1993).
89. To the academic reader, this point may seem banal. But this article is written
against the backdrop of a political debate over the proper locus for environmental regu
lation in which some of the loudest voices are calling, without nuance, for total decen
tralization. See, e.g., GINGRICH, supra note 1, at 9 ("We must replace our centralized,
micromanaged, Washington-based bureaucracy with a dramatically decentralized system
"); see also H.R. 473-480, 104th Cong. (1995) (legislation sponsored by Congress
man Tom DeLay abolishing wholesale Federal Clean Air regulation).
•

•

•

.
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First-Generation Thinking: The Development of and Arguments
for Centralization

Until quite recently, the banns that accrued from air and water pol
lution were addressed not by environmental regulation but through the
most decentralized of control mechanisms: nuisance law.90 Beginning in
the 1 880s and 1 890s, a number of cities, including Chicago, New York,
and Pittsburgh, adopted "smoke abatement" ordinances.91 Garbage
dumping also became subject to local regulation.92 These early attempts
at environmental regulation reflected the recognition that common law
private nuisance actions could not respond efficiently to the pollution
problems of an industrial society.93
Although some states adopted air and water pollution laws as early
as the end of the nineteenth century, state regulation of environmental
problems did not begin in earnest until the post-World War Il indus
trial boom.94 The state regulatory efforts of the 1950s and 1960s, how
ever, did little to stem the flow of pollution,95 and by the mid-60s, the

90. Tort-law based, case-by-case, pollution-harm determinations made through pri
vate nuisance lawsuits represent the ultimate decentralization of "regulation." See, e.g.,
Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658 ( 1904); St Helen's
Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 35 L.G.Q.B. 66, 1 1 H.L. Cas. 642, 13 Wkly. Rep. 1083
( 1865); Aldred's Case, 9 Co. Rep. 57 b., 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1611). Public nuisance
cases involving states rather than individuals represent the first step toward centraliza
tion of the response to environmental harms. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206
U.S. 230 ( 1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 ( 1906).
91. See ROBERT v. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 103-04 (1992); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., A Century of Air Pollu
tion Control Law: What's Worked; What's Failed; What Might Work, 2 1 ENVTI... L.
1549, 1516 ( 1991).
92. See MARTIN v. MELOSI, GARBAGE IN THE CITIES: REFUSE, REFORM AND
THE ENVIRONMENT, 1880-1980 ( 1981); Christopher Niemczewski, The History of
Solid Waste Management, in THE ORGANIZATION AND EFFICIENCY OF SOLID
WASTE MANAGEMENT (Emanuel S. Saras ed., 1977).
93. The difficulty with reliance upon tort remedies as a pollution control strategy
was remarked upon as early at 1862 by the British House of Lords Select Committee on
Injury From Noxious Vapours, which noted: "partly in consequence of the expense such
actions occasion, partly from the fact that where several works are in immediate juxta
position, the difficulty of tracing the damage to · any one, or of apportioning it among
several, is [so] great as to be all but insuperable." HousE OF LoRDs SELECT CoMM.
ON INJURY FROM NOXIOUS vAPOURS, 1862 REPORT v ( 1862), reprinted in [1862)
14 Parl. Papers l, 3, quoted in Joel Franklin Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Industrial
Revolution, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 403, 425 ( 1974).
94. Oregon created the first state environmental (air pollution control) agency in
1952. In 1955, the California legislature charged the State Department of Public Health
with establishing air pollution standards. See Health & Safety Code, ch. 1312, sec. 1,
§ 425, 1955 Cal. Stat 2385, repealed by ch. 1545, § 1, 1967 Cal. Stat 3679.
95. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL AIR POLLUTION
TRENDS, 1900-1992, at ES-4 (1993) [hereinafter EPA].
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demand for more centralized regulation was growing.96 In 1963, Con
gress adopted the first Clean Air Act,97 authorizing the Secretary of the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, as it was then called, to
establish advisory air quality "criteria" and to convene "conferences"
when interstate pollution endangered public health or welfare.98 Simi
larly, the Water Quality Act of 1965 required states to adopt federally
approved water quality standards for any body of water that moved
across state boundaries.99
These federal efforts to support and prod state-level environmental
regulation produced unsatisfactory results. Air and water quality around
the country continued to deteriorate. 1 00 Congressional hearings in the
late 1960s and early 1970s spelled out three broad reasons for further
centralizing environmental regulation: interstate spillovers of pollu
tion; 101 the poor performance of states as environmental regulators; 102
96. The first federal environmental programs tended simply to support state regu
lation. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62
Stat 1 155 (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1995 & Supp. 1996)) (supporting re
search on water pollution and providing grants to states to support water pollution con
trol programs); Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat 322
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1995)) (providing funds for research and technical
assistance to states); Motor Vehicle Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-493, 74 Stat 162 (fed
eral research into air pollution from automobiles); Tom Jorling, The Federal Law of Air
Pollution Control, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1058 (Erica L. Golgin &
Thomas G.P. Guilbert eds., 1974); Percival, supra note 5, at 1 155-57.
97. Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat 392 (1963) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994)).
98. See Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat 392, 395-96 (1963) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994)).
99. See Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (codified at
33 U.S.C. § 466, transferred to §§ 1151-1160, and subsequently omitted by Pub. L. No.
92-500, § 2, 86 Stat 816 (1972)).
100. See EPA. supra note 95; JOHN C. EsPosrro, VANISlilNG Am 1 18-51
(1970); Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (But Only from a National Per
spective) for Federal Environmental Regulation, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POLY. F. (forth
coming 1997); see also Frank J. Barry, The Evolution of the Enforcement Provisions of
·

the Federal Water Pollution Control Act: A Study of the Difficulty in Developing Effec
tive Legislation, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1 103 (1970).
101. See, e.g., Air Pollution, 1967: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Air and
Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong. 993 (1967) (testi

mony of Lewis C. Green of the Missouri Air Conservation Commission):
[A]ir pollution is a problem that rarely falls within ready-made political bounda
ries. In any metropolitan area both the social costs incurred in failing to control it
and the benefits to be derived from regulation within a single political subdivi
sion inevitably spill over into other jurisdictions . . . . The necessity for . . . uni
formity is rather generally agreed upon.
Many other similar remarks can be found in the environmental hearing reports of the
1960s and 1970s.
102. See, �.g., id. at 796 (statement of Dr. Ivan L. Bennett, Jr., Deputy Director
Office of Science and Technology, Executive Office of the President) ("[f]he states
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and interstate competitiveness effects arising from differing environ
mental standards. 103 Based on the Congressional consensus established
on these points, the Clean Air Act of 1970104 and the Clean Water Act
of 1972105 shifted the center of gravity for environmental regulation
from the states to the federal government. Additional federal statutes
followed: the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, 1 06
the 1974 Safe Drinking Water Act107, the 1976 Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, 108 and the 1980 Comprehensive Environmental Re
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act. 1 09
Other forces also spurred centralization. Elliott, Ackerman, and
Millian suggest, for example, that the federalization of environmental
law may have reflected industry preferences for unified national stan
dards that would preempt varying state requirements. 110 Rose-Ackerman
identifies additional strategic incentives facing a number of actors who
supported centralized environmental regulation over disjointed state
processes.1 1 1 Finally, presidential politics - the positioning of the Sen
ate's leading environmentalist, Ed Muskie of Maine, as a challenger to
simply have not moved . . . ff]he incentive of matching grants has not succeeded in
bringing about the results that it had been hoped would be achieved."). The suggestion
that states might choose low environmental standards as a matter of policy was not rec
ognized at all.
103. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 91-1 196 (1970); Air Pollution, 1970: Hearing on
•

S.3229, S.3466, S.3546 Before the Senate Subcomm. 'on Air and Water Pollution of the
Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong. 487 (1970). Rep. Abner J. Mikva of Illinois
observed, for example, that " [w]hen states are competing daily to attract new industry,
it is unrealistic to expect that strict enforcement of antipollution regulations - which
imposes fmancial burdens sometimes higher than taxes themselves - will occur." Air

Pollution Control and Solid Wastes Recycling: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Public
Health and Welfare of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st
Cong. 487 (1970); see also BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 8, at 14-35; Revesz, supra
note 1.
104. Pub. L . No. 91-604, 84 Stat 1676 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1994)).
105. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat 816 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1994)).
106. Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat 973 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136136y (1994)).
107. Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (codified as amended at 40 U.S.C.
§§ 300f-300j (1994)).
108. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1994)).
109. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994)).
1 10. See Elliott et al., supra note 69, at 326-27.
1 1 1 . See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Does Federalism Matter? Political Choice in a
Federal Republic, 89 J. POL. EcoN. 152 (1981); see also Jerry L. Mashaw & Susan
Rose-Ackerman, Federalism and Regulation, in THE REAGAN REGULATORY STRAT
EGY 1 1 1 , 122-27, 133-36 (George C. Eads & Michael Fix eds., 1984).
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helped to ensure that a strong fed

eral Clean Air Act moved through the Congress.112
The legal literature caught up with the centralization policy trend
in

1977

with the publication of two seminal articles by Richard Stew

art.113 Stewart identified four core rationales for centralized environmen
tal law:

(1)

to address the tragedy of the commons and achieve national

economies of scale;

(2)

to overcome disparities in effective political

representation; (3) to correct market failures arising from pollution ex
ternalities (including physical, "psychic," and economic spillovers);
and (4) to obtain the advantages of pursuing moral ideals and the
"politics of sacrifice" on a national plane.114
Stewart's argument begins with the prisoners' dilemma dynamic,115
now better known in the environmental context as the "race to the bot
tom." He observes as follows:
Given the mobility of industry and commerce, any individual state or
community may rationally decline unilaterally to adopt high environmen
tal standards that entail substantial costs for industry and obstacles to ec
onomic development for fear that the resulting environmental gains
would be more than offset by the movement of capital to other areas with
lower standards. 116

The tendency not to adopt strict environmental controls or to move
toward lax environmental requirements derives from the fact that gov
ernments act strategically. Regulators and the politicians who appoint
them perceive that by cutting environmental standards and stealing a
march on other jurisdictions in the competition for new investment,

1 12. See Elliott et al., supra note 69, at 327-28.
1 13. See Stewart, Pyramids, supra note 7; Stewart, Development, supra note 7.
Debates over how much to centralize or decentralize government activity in general go
back much further, particularly in political science literature. See ALExls DE
ToCQUEVD..LE. DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 163 (Phillips Bradley ed., Henry Reeve &
Francis Bowen trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1945) (1835) (comparing governance of "cen
tralized nations" and "confederations"); PAUL E. PETERSON ET AL. . WHEN FEDER
ALISM WORKS 1-7 (1986); see also ROBERT A DAHL & CHARLES E. LINDBLOM,
PoLmcs. EcoNoMics AND WELFARE (1953); PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 338, 66-92 (1981); James Fesler, Centralization and Decentralization, in 2 INTERNA
TIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 370 (David L. Sills ed., 1968);
Grodzins, supra note 5; Scheiber, supra note 4.
1 14. See Stewart, Pyramids, supra note 7, at 121 1-19.
1 15. For more on this dynamic, see Mashaw & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 1 1 1 ,
at 1 17-18; see also Scott Barrett, Strategic Environmental Policy and International
Trade, 54 J. PuB. EcoN. 325 (1994) [hereinafter Barrett, Strategic Environmental Pol
icy]; Scott Barrett, Strategy and Environment, 27 CoLUM. J. WORLD Bus 202 (1992)
[hereinafter Barrett, Strategy and Environment]. For a general discussion of prisoners'
dilemmas and strategic behavior, see DDOT & NALEBUFF, supra note 31.
1 16. Stewart, Pyramids, supra note 7, at 1212.
.
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jobs, and industrial activity, they will increase their constituents' wel
fare by more than the utility losses inflicted by whatever environmental
degradation occurs. The knowledge that one's competitors intend to
lower or already have lowered environmental standards induces parties
to act preemptively or responsively and to lower their own standards,
triggering a downward regulatory spiral and nonoptimal results.1 1 7 Stew
art recognizes that national environmental laws facilitate the collective
action necessary to escape from this race. 1 1 8 While parties theoretically
can negotiate their way out of this prisoner's dilemma, the nature of en
vironmental problems, involving "recurring technically complex is
sues," makes ad hoc welfare-optimizing compacts among competing ju
risdictions improbable and centralized regulation cost-effective. 1 1 9
Stewart's second focus is the disjunction between the political
power of polluters and environmental interests.120 He notes that environ
mental advocates who try to rally the public in support of relatively dif
fuse and obscure benefits experience difficulty in achieving a critical
threshold of political activity and influence at local or state levels, 1 21
and are more often able to aggregate sufficient resources to be effective
at the national level. 1 22 Whether an asymmetry of political power be- .

1 17. The race to the bottom represents a structural failure insofar as competition
among jurisdictions creates economic externalities. Stewart also folds into his first point
a discussion of economies of scale in regulatory activities that tracks my technical inad
equacy category. See id.
1 18. See id.; see also Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law in a Global Era:
Progress, Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, 73 COR
NELL L. REv. 1 101, 1 1 94 (1988); Wtlliam W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regula
tory Competition, Regulatory Capture, and Corporate Self-regulation, 73 N.C. L. Rav.
1861 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L.
RBv. 421, 505 (1987); Roger van den Bergh et al., The Subsidiarity Principle in Euro
pean Environmental Law: An Economic Analysis 20-24 (1995) (paper prepared for
Conference on the Law and Economics of the Environment at the Norwegian Academy
of Science and Letters, on ftle with author) (providing European examples of this
phenomenon).
1 19. See Stewart, Pyramids, supra note 7, at 1212. As suggested earlier, Coase
demonstrates that absent transactions costs, efficient outcomes can be negotiated. See
Coase, supra note 18.
120. See Stewart, Pyramids, supra note 7, at 1213; see also supra text accompany
ing notes 79-89. This is the public choice problem in my taxonomy.
121. See Stewart, Development, supra note 7, at 747.
122. See, e.g., PHILLIP SHABECOFF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE 279 (1993). This
perceived imbalance has deep roots. Nearly a century ago, Gifford Pinchot, President
Theodore Roosevelt's first director of the National Forest Service, decried the "special
interests" operating in the political realm that threatened to "nullify the will of the ma
jority" with regard to conservation and environmental policy. See id,· see also BRUCE
A ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN CoALIDmTY Am (1981); J. CLAR
ENCE DAVIES ill & BARBARA S. DAVIES, THE POLITICS OF POLLUTION (1975);
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L.
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tween environmental and polluting interests continues to exist, and
more important, whether this asymmetry is greater at the local or state
level than at the national level, remains an issue today.
Stewart's third point concerns the widely recognized market failure
associated with pollution extemalities.123 His final rationale builds on
the claim that it is easier to carry out policies aimed at establishing
overarching moral principles on a national level than a state or local
one. He argues that the fundamental moral obligations of one citizen to
another and to future generations must be defined nationally and em
bodied in federal law.124

B.

Second-Generation Thinking: Rationales for Decentralization

From nearly the day that the ink was dry on Stewart's arguments
justifying federal environmental regulation, the tides of political think
ing and legal scholarship have run the other way.125 This second
generation thinking126 centers on five arguments for decentralization: (1)
the benefits of diversity and diseconomies of regulatory scale; (2) argu
ments for regulatory competition and against race-to-the-bottom fears;
(3) public choice claims regarding the representativeness of decentral
ized decisionmaking; (4) rejection of morality-based arguments for fed
eral regulation; and (5) an implicit assumption that transboundary pollu
tion spillovers are insignificant.127
RE.v. 1669, 1684-87, 1713-15 (1975);
YALE LJ. 702 (1981) (book review).

Peter H. Schuck, The Politics of Regulation, 90

123. This third line of analysis, concerning physical externalities, would be a mat
ter of structural failure in my regulatory failure taxonomy.
124. Just as the advancement of civil rights required federal action, so too does
environmental progress. Stewart specifically observes that citizens seem more willing to
make sacrifices for unquantifiable gains if they know that others are doing the same, an
observation that might support federal policymaking in various environmental areas. See
Stewart, Pyramids, supra· note 7, at 1264-65. In some respects, Stewart's pyramids-of
sacrifice argument resembles the "choice of public" question and thus represents a mat
ter of psychological externalities raising the possibility of structural deficiencies in the
regulatory regime.
125. Actually, the decentralization arguments predate Professor Stewart. The semi
nal article in this field is that of Tiebout, supra note 8.
126. See supra note 12; see also Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II
Lo
calism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. RE.v. 346 (1990); Frank H. Easterbrook, Anti
trust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 23, 33-35 (1983). For a recent
discussion, see David L. Markell, States as Innovators: It's time for a New Look to Our
"Laboratories of Democracy" in the Effort to Improve Our Approach to Environmental
Regulation, 58 ALB. L. REV. 347 (1994).
127. Although asserted vigorously in political circles, constitutional arguments
about the limits of U.S. federal regulatory authority bear little on the normative question
of the best level at which to regulate environmental problems so as to maximize social
welfare. Moreover, the constitutional polemics have been aired sufficiently elsewhere
-
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The Benefits of Diversity

The diversity argument for decentralized regulation represents a
rich vein in popular and academic analyses of U.S. federalism. The ar
gument has two separable strands. First, courts, 128 scholars, 129 and politi
cians130 have long trumpeted the opportunities for regulatory innovation
provided by the "states as laboratories." A decentralized regulatory
strategy permits the simultaneous testing of various policy responses.131
In particular, if the central policy issue is one of regulatory design, the
opportunity to experiment using state regulatory structures may be espe
cially welfare enhancing. Second, economics teaches that when environ
mental background conditions, emissions levels, climate, weather, risk
and thus will not be dealt with in this article. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct.
1624 (1995); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Na
tional League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Stewart, Development, supra
note 7, at 750-56; Stewart, Pyramids, supra note 7; see a/so Akhil Reed Amar, Five
Views of Federalism: "Converse 1983" in Context, 47 VAND L. RBv. 1229 (1994);
Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 CoLUM. L. REV. 1911
(1995); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Elastic Commerce Clause: A Po
litical Theory ofAmerican Federalism, 47 VAND. L. RBv. 1355 (1994).
128. See Federal Energy Regulatory Commn. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788-91
(1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Connecticut Light &
Power Co. v. Federal Power Commn., 324 U.S. 515, 530 (1945); New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 313 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
").
129. See, e.g., FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PuBuc AND ITS GOVERNMENT 4950 (1930) ("[O]ur federalism calls for the free play of local diversity in dealing with lo
cal problems"); see also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal
Law, 54 COLUM. L. RBv. 489, 493 (1954). For a more recent discussion, see Markell,
supra note 126.
130. As a political argument, decentralization emerged with considerable vigor in
the "new federalism" of the Reagan administration. See Ronald Reagan, Inaugural Ad
dress (Jan. 20, 1981), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES, s. Doc No. 101-10, at 331 (1989); Exec. Order No. 12,612, 3 C.F.R.
252 (1987); Gray, supra note 4; see also THE REAGAN REGULATORY STRATEGY,
supra note 1 1 1. It has had new life breathed into it with the election of a Republican
Congress in 1994. See GINGRICH, supra note 1, at 9. The very similar arguments for
"subsidiarity" in the European Union represent the same political thrust. See George A.
Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and
the United States, 94 CoLUM. L. RBv. 331 (1994); Trachtman, supra note 3, at 460-63;
W. Gary Vause, The Subsidiarity Principle in European Union-American Federalism
Compared, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INTL. L. 61 (1995).
131. Diversity also might be seen as nature's approach to problem solving. Biolo
gists often observe that natural systems develop competing approaches to problems with
preferred solutions emerging through evolution over time. See, e.g., RICHARD
DAWKINS, BLIND WATCHMAKER (1986); PAUL R EHRLICH, THE MACHINERY OF
NATURE (1986); STEVEN JAY GOULD, WONDERFUL LIFE: THE BURGESS SHALE
AND NATURE OF HISTORY (1989) (observing that nature responds to change in a vari
ety of ways through a process Gould calls "adaptive radiation").
.

.

.

.

•

.

December

1996]

Environmental Federalism
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though a centralized regulatory body might be capable of such tailoring,
the scale diseconomies of centralization argue for local regulation.133

2.

Regulatory Competition Versus Race-to-the-Bottom Theory

Second-generation theorists suggest that there is little or no reason
to fear a regulatory race to the bottom.134 More pointedly, the second
generation literature hypothesizes that far from unleashing a welfare-

132. See Jagdish Bhagwati & T.N. Srinivasan, Trade and Environment: Does Envi
ronmental Diversity Detract from the Case for Free Trade, in FAIR TRADE AND HAR
MONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? 159 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E.
eds., 1996) [hereinafter FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION]; Robert Mendel
sohn, Regulating Heterogenous Emissions, 13 J. ENVTL. EcoN. & MGMT. 301, 301-12
(1986) (asserting that the welfare loss from common standards rises with the heteroge
neity of the problem at hand); Nordhaus, supra note 28, at 8 ("Efficient policies are
Hudec

highly specific to particular sectors, regions, and time periods.").
133. The second-generation diversity argument corresponds to several categories
of regulatory failure. First, the arguments about states as laboratories and diseconomies
of scale speak to technical transaction costs. Second, the prospect that diverse sub
jurisdictions will not have regulations tailored to their circumstances and needs raises
the possibility of internalities that appear as a structural failure in my typology but
could, as noted earlier, be categorized also as a public choice problem.
134. See Judith M. Dean, Trade and the Environment: A Survey of the Literature,
in INTER.NATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 15 (Patrick Low ed., 1992);
Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Develop

ments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 913 (1982); Patrick Low &
Alexander Yeats, Do "Dirty" Industries Migrate?, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
THE ENVIRONMENT, supra, at 89; Revesz, supra note 1, at 1213-27. Others conclude
that there is no empirical evidence of companies moving to "pollution havens." See,
e.g., Adam B. Jaffe et al., Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of U.S.
Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 33 J. EcoN. LITERATURE 132
(1995); Joseph Kalt, The Impact of Domestic Environmental Regulatory Policies on
U.S. International Competitiveness, in INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS 221 (A.
Michael Spence & Heather A. Hazard eds., 1988). But see U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNT
ING OFFICE,

REPORT ON THE FURNITURE FINISHING INDUSTRY (1990) (finding evi

dence of industrial migration to Mexico due to environmental costs); Paula M. Block,
The Allure of Southeast Asia's Chemical Market, CHEMICAL WEEK, Apr. 15, 1987, at

42. Moreover, the economics literature that casts doubt on the seriousness of competi
tiveness pressures misunderstands how the race to the bottom plays out. Firms rarely
move based on environmental standards. Nor do governments overtly change their laws
to keep businesses from migrating. Thus, the image of a "race" does not really make
sense. Instead, governments relax their environmental enforcement. Or, even more com

monly, governments choose not to adopt more stringent standards, even if more vigor
ous requirements would be welfare enhancing, because economic interests are heard

while environmental ones are not. Empirical studies to measure this regulatory chill or
"political drag" would require gathering data on events that did not happen - a diffi
cult task.

See EsTY, supra

note

52, at 162-63.
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reducing race, interjurisdictional competition pressures governments to
regulate efficiently and effectively.135
Regulatory competition theory traces back to Tiebout's revolution

ary 1956 article arguing that a decentralized governmental system, with
horizontally arranged jurisdictions trying to attract residents on the basis
of differing tax and benefit structures, produces a Pareto-superior out
come.136 Later theorists have tried to extend the reach of Tiebout's anal
ysis by relaxing some of the many assumptions on which his theory
rests.137 Fischel, for example, applies Tiebout-type thinking to the envi
ronmental realm with a model that addresses pollution and industrial lo
cation.138 He concludes, under still quite restrictive assumptions, that
environmental externalities can be internalized in a welfare-optimizing
fashion with polluters compensating residents for their environmental
harms and thus making interjurisdictional competition desirable.139 Like
Tiebout, Fischel assumes away any job-loss problem and builds his
model on an assumption that individuals are perfectly mobile. Oates
and Schwab try to combat these weaknesses with a model that allows
for the immobility of labor and wage effects.140 In their two-issue world,
communities determine tax rates on capital and environmental standards
with an eye toward attracting an optimal mix of industry and pollution.

135. The suggestion of a race to the bottom is a bit of a misnomer. The better un
derstanding of this argument is not that standards will end up literally at the bottom, but
rather that they will be suboptimally low from a welfare perspective. Revesz and others
do not reject the possibility that regulatory competition will cause governments to lower
their standards. They simply suggest that any such lowering will enhance, not diminish,
social welfare. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 1232; see also Henry N. Butler & Jonathan
R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REv.
677 (1988); Ralph K. Wmter, The "Race for the Top" Revisited: A Comment on Eisen
berg, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1 526 (1989) [hereinafter Wmter, "Race to the Top"]; Ralph
K. Wmter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 25 1 (1977) [hereinafter Wmter, State Law].
136. While many commentators, including Tiebout, suggest that the proper test of
welfare is by reference to "Pareto superiority," Kronman and Coleman have demon
strated the limitations of the Pareto analysis. See Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Ex

change, and Auction: Philosophical Aspects of the Economic Approach to Law, 68
L. REv. 221 (1980); Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative
Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227, 228-35 (1980). The more appropriate principle is the
Kaldor-Hicks test. See JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND nm LAW 98105 (1988); Kronman, supra, at 235.
CAL.

137. Tiebout's model examines a resident choosing a community that "best satis
fies his preference pattern for public goods." Tiebout, supra note 8, at 418. Tiebout as
sumes full individual mobility, a wide choice of communities, full knowledge of each
community's taxes and services, and that the public goods chosen have no externalities
such as job or wage effects. See id. at 414.
138. See Fischel, supra note 8, at 1 19.
139. See id. at 125-27.
140. See Oates & Schwab, supra note 4.

December 1996]

Environmental Federalism

609

Oates and Schwab conclude that under these conditions, a rational gov"'
emment sets a tax rate of zero on capital and then achieves a welfare
maximizing environmental policy by cutting pollution until lost wage
income matches the gains from reduced pollution damage. No race to
the bottom ensues.141
In what may constitute the central statement of second-generation
thinking, Revesz builds on the preceding scholarship, the regulatory
competition literature in the corporate and bank charter contexts, 142 and
game theory analysis of the race to the bottom143 to conclude that
"there are no models consistent with race-to-the-bottom claims. "144 In
terjurisdictional competition, he argues, produces efficient regulatory re
sults and enhanced social welfare.145 From this theoretical observation,
Revesz moves to a policy prescription that presumptively favors decen
tralized environmental regulation.146 Although other commentators, es
pecially in the political world, do not articulate their claims quite as
well or as carefully as Revesz, their similar conclusions have made calls
for devolution a common refrain in the environmental realm.

3.

Public Choice Arguments in Support of Decentralized Regulation
In addition to efficiency gains, advocates of regulatory devolution

employ public choice theory to argue against centralized environmental
regulation. 1\vo arguments are commonly advanced: first, that decisions
made at higher and more distant levels of government compromise self
determination and are less "representative" than those made closer to

141. See id. at 336-49. As Revesz observes, "[t]he central insight of the Oates. and
Schwab study is that jurisdictions that seek to maximize their welfare will not set
suboptimally lax environmental standards." Revesz, supra note 1, at 1242.
142. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 1247-53.
143. See id. at 1229-47. Although Revesz suggests that his analysis raises doubts
about the "plausibility of race-to-the-bottom claims," id. at 1233, I think he does the
opposite. Revesz's payoff matrix shows that under some circumstances centralized regu
lation will prevent subjurisdictions from being "gamed" into setting suboptimal stan
dards. Sophisticated adherents to the race-to-the-bottom theory would not argue that a
race inevitably occurs in the absence of federal regulation, but rather that it sometimes
will - exactly as Revesz's game theory analysis indicates.
144. Id. at 1244. Revesz further observes that if races to the bottom occur, ad
dressing the environmental policy race with federal governmental intervention will only
drive state-versus-state competition into other realms such as worker safety, minimum
wage laws, or fair labor standards. As a result, all regulation would have to be central
ized. See id. at 1245-47.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 1253.
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home; 1 47 and second, that interest group distortions of political decision
making become more severe at higher levels of government.
Environmental problems often have important local dimensions
that are more likely to be captured by giving decisionmaking authority
to those close to the issue. 1 48 Cleanup standards for a toxic waste dump
should, for example, tum on what the future land use of the site is
likely to be. Similarly, how much money to spend to remove ra
dionuclides from drinking water depends heavily on the potential com
peting financial needs and risk exposures of the community in question.
This information is likely to be lodged at the local level. Of course, de
cisions made directly by the common citizen avoid altogether the risk
that elected representatives might not accurately reflect the public's
will. This longing for direct democracy often emerges with particular
force in the environmental domain because choices are being made
about public health and land use, and they evoke strong feelings and a
deep distrust of the elite decisionmaking implied by any form of repre
sentative government. '49
The second strand of the public choice argument against federal
ized environmental programs relates to the distortion of governmental
decisions by interest group politics. Some second-generation commenta
tors suggest that the asymmetries of political power between industrial
and environmental interests have been exaggerated. 1 50 Others indicate
that even if there ever were a perceivable gap in interest group access
and influence between the federal and state-local levels, it now has been
closed with the emergence of many environmental groups operating at

1 47. The "representativeness" argument discussed here is not wholly distinct from
the "diversity" claims outlined above.
148. As Newt Gingrich suggests: "We must replace our centralized,
micromanaged, Washington-based bureaucracy with a dramatically decentralized system
more appropriate to a continent-wide country. . . . 'Closer is better ' should be the rule
of thumb." GINGRICH, supra note 1, at 9.
149. See Soderbaum, supra note 20 (observing that changes in what constitutes
harm often emerge from elite analysis with public acceptance and understanding lag
ging). See generally DANIEL A FARBER & PHn..IP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBuc
CHOICE (1991); THE THEORY OF PuBLIC CHOICE II (James M. Buchanan & Robert
D. Tollison eds., 1984); Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure
Groups for Political Influence, 98 QJ. EcoN. 371 (1983); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,

Politics Without Romance: Implications ofPublic Choice Theory for Statutory Interpre
tation, 74 VA. L. REv. 275 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Pub
lic Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29, 32 (1985).
150. See, e.g., JAMES Q. WILSON, THE PoLmCS OF REGULATION 357-94
(1980); Schuck, supra note 122; Richard B. Stewart, Madison's Nightmare, 51 U. Cm.
L. REv. 335, 340-42 (1990).
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these levels.151 In addition, some second-generation theorists argue that,
irrespective of whether environmental interests are underrepresented at
the state and local levels, they are overrepresented at the national
level.152
More dramatically, some commentators argue that Madison's fed
eral architecture, designed to reduce the influence of economic fac
tions, 153 has given way to a special-interest-dominated federal govern
ment in which regulatory powers are often captured by rent-seeking
interests

or other narrowly

focused groups.154 In

this

world of

"Madison's nightmare, "155 environmental groups run amok inflicting
huge costs on society because their misguided actions play out with
magnified significance on the national or international stages.156

4. Moral Arguments
Second-generation critics flatly reject the morality of forcing sub
jurisdictions to pay for levels of environmental protection other than
those that they choose. They argue that the welfare loss inflicted on the
subjurisdiction cannot be justified. Butler and Macey, for example, ob
serve that Stewart's pyramids-of-sacrifice argument depends on "the
151. See JONATHAN H. ADLER, ENVIRONMENTALISM AT THE CROSSROADS:
GREEN ACTIVISM IN AMERICA (1995).
152. See, e.g., Stewart, Pyramids, supra note 7, at 1218 (discussing the "ratchet"

effect);

see also Peter H. Schuck, Regulation, Non-Market Values, and the Administra
tive State: A Comment on Professor Stewart, 92 YALE LJ. 1602, 1609 (1983).
153. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77-78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
154. See Stewart, supra note 150, at 340-42; see also ANTHONY DOWNS, AN Ec
ONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); WU.SON, supra note 150, at 390-94;
Becker, supra note 149, at 371-74; Robert Crandall, Air Pollution, Environmentalists,
and the Coal Lobby, in THE POLITICAL EcONOMY OF DEREGULATION 84 (Roger
Noll & Bruce Owen eds., 1983); B. Peter Pashigian, Environmental Regulation: Whose
Self-Interests Are Being Protected?, 23 ECON. INQUIRY 551-84 (1985).
155. See Stewart, supra note 150, at 342; see also WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR. &
PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION 53-61 (1995).
156. See, e.g., Arlie Schardt, Alar Again, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 7, 1995, at H18 (dis
cussing the Natural Resource Defense Council's ballyhooing over Alar); U.S. Court of
Appeals Dismisses Final Appeal on Alar, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Oct. 3, 1995, National
Desk; see also Nathaniel C. Nash, A Humbled Shell is Unsure on Disposal of Atlantic
Rig, N.Y. TIMEs, June 23, 1995, at D2; Nathaniel C. Nash, Oil Companies Face Boy
cott Over Sinking of Rig, N.Y. TIMEs, June 17, 1995, at A3. Of course, special interest
lobbying by industry can have an equally broad impact on national policymaking. See,
e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1257 (1994) (prescribing special treatment of mining
wastes); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1994) (establishing coke-oven preferential
treatment); Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste, 40 C.F.R. § 261.4 (1980)
(enumerating the various special interest exclusions from the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA) definition of waste); see also ACKERMAN & HASSLER,
supra note 122.
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flawed presumption that it is moral for the federal government to force
people to pay for goods they don't want." 157 In brief, this line of think
ing defmes the relevant political community narrowly and rejects the
claims of right by larger governmental entities to dictate environmental
standards.

5.

The Insignificance of Externalities and the Nirvana Fallacy

Many second-generation theorists acknowledge that externalities
justify centralized regulation but then proceed with environmental pol
icy prescriptions that implicitly dismiss the problem of interjurisdic
tional pollution spillovers.158 Other second-generation theorists claim
not that transboundary externalities do not exist, but rather that govern
mental reaction is not worth the bother. Although externalities or other
market failures may arise, they argue, the capacity of government to
regulate effectively is so limited that welfare losses are minimized by
letting unregulated market forces operate.159 Doubts about the ability of
government to design and implement regulatory policies that counteract
market failures in a manner that improves social welfare have been
called the Nirvana Fallacy.160 Adherents to this line of argument reject

157. Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Prin
ciple: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, Symposium, Con
structing a New Federalism, YALE J. ON REG. AND YALE L. & POLY. REV. (forth
coming 1996).
158. Revesz, for example, acknowledges that interjurisdictional externalities re

quire federal regulation, but then proceeds to offer policy prescriptions as though such
externalities do not exist. See Revesz, supra note 1. Others ignore the interstate spill
over problem altogether. See, e.g., GINGRICH, supra note 1.
159. Even if a let-the-harms-fall-where-they-may approach maximizes welfare, it
violates the protect-property-rights principle of good environmental policy. In fact, in
any case in which the costs of regulating (or of vindicating property rights) exceed the
value of the harms inflicted by pollution, nonintervention will optimize welfare. This ef
ficiency, however, is achieved at a cost, in terms of equity, as the polluter's welfare
gain comes at the expense of the pollutee's rights. Moreover, to the extent we accept a
nonintervention principle whenever the costs of regulation exceed the value of the
harms to be addressed, we create a serious moral hazard problem. In such a case, pol
luters have a significant incentive to drive up transaction costs and thereby avoid having
to pay compensation for their actions.
160. See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L.
& EcoN. l, 1 (1969); Maxwell L. Steams, The Misguided Renaissance of Social
Choice, 103 YALE LJ. 1219, 1229 n.33 (1994); see also Butler & Macey, supra note
157 (discussing the Nirvana Fallacy in the environmental federalism context); Peter S.
Menell, Institutional Fantasy/ands: From Scientific Management to Free Market En
vironmentalism, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 489 (1992).
·
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not just federal regulation but all regulation. This makes their claims
not truly relevant in the centralization versus decentralization debate.161

ill.

TEsTING THE SECOND GENERATION

This Part examines whether and how decentralized environmental
regulation addresses each of the categories of regulatory failure identi
fied in Part I. It seeks to determine:

(1) at which governmental level
(2) whether the structural

technical issues are likely to be best resolved;

impediments to achieving least-social-cost environmental policies will
be ameliorated or aggravated by a more decentralized regulatory ap
proach; and (3) whether decentralization reduces or worsens the public
choice problems associated with environmental policymaking. The anal
ysis is grounded in the reallties of

environmental problems and regula

tion because general regulatory theory, on which much of the existing
literature relies, often fails to capture the unique features of the ecologi
cal domain.

A.

Decentralization and Technical Welfare Loss

Decentralization appears likely to minimize technical transaction
costs in some cases, particularly when "on the ground" information
matters. But devolution may impede other more truly technical or scien
tific dimensions of the regulatory process. In many respects, the techni
cal adequacy issue boils down to a question of whether regulatory econ
omies or diseconomies of scale are salient. Generalizations in this
regard are not easy to make. Some issues (how to handle toxic waste
sites, for example) are local-information intensive; others (determining
safe levels of pesticide residues, for example) have only limited dimen
sions that vary geographically. Perhaps more important, every regula
tory decision represents a conglomeration of various policy activities,
some of which will benefit from decentralized processes and others of
which will be optimized under a centralized regime. The following tax
onomy of regulatory activities highlights the difficulty with sweeping
presumptions.
161. The Nirvana Fallacy is really about how to regulate. The fact that our current
regulatory approaches are inefficient does not mean that no regulation is ultimately the
preferred answer. By the same logic, just because today's federal regulation is flawed
does not mean that state or local regulation is preferred. As stipulated at the outset,
more efficient regulatory tools and strategies are undeniably needed, and such policy
advances represent the best response to Nirvana Fallacy concerns. Some Nirvana Fal
lacy proponents argue that federal regulation is particularly likely to be counterproduc
tive. This suggestion, however, generally collapses into claims about diseconomies of
regulatory scale or public choice distortions.
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Problem Identification

Initial awareness of an ecological or public health issue or harm
often emerges from actual observation of physical change. Since many
pairs of eyes spread across the land are more likely to see environmen
tal anomalies before a few observers in a centralized location, the dis
economies of scale in problem identification will often be significant.
Of course, certain environmental problems are better detected by some
eyes than by others.162 Complex scientific interactions such as the de
pletion of the ozone layer by chlorine compounds (CFCs) offers one
such example. Problem identification in these cases depends more on
technical sophistication than on geographic coverage. Under these con
ditions, an optimal environmental policy concentrates technical re
sources in a small number of places to amass sufficient expertise and
equipment to track the otherwise invisible problem.163 Because of the
diversity of environmental harms that governments seek to regulate, a
mix of decentralized and centralized, governmental and nongovernmen
tal problem-identification structures is likely to be useful.

2. Data Collection and Analysis
Beyond the problem-identification function, technical capacity gen
erally will be weakened by devolution. It makes no sense to ask every
state, city, or town to measure the level, size, and type of particulates in
its air, determine their connection to respiratory failure and other health
problems, identify the safe level of emissions, and design cost-effective
policy responses. Data collection and quality control, fate and transport
studies, epidemiological and ecological analyses, and risk assessments
all represent highly technical activities in which expertise is important
· and scale economies are significant. In addition, the core variables
within these functions do not vary spatially, and thus diversity claims
hold little sway.164 Absent centralized functions, independent state regu162. Not only will some problems require technical skill or equipment to "see,"
but some patterns and anomalies also can only be perceived on a broad-scale level.
163. Still, total centralization of technical functions in a single entity rarely will
make sense. Several competing facilities are likely to spur more rapid scientific ad
vances. Moreover, given the significant degree of uncertainty that pervades environmen
tal decisionmaking, it is important that the prevailing wisdom constantly be challenged
and that new perspectives on problems regularly be explored. In this regard, research di
versification helps to guard against putting all one's analytic eggs in the wrong basket.
Nevertheless, a single research entity might be optimal if a problem is unusually expen
sive to address (space exploration, for example) such that multiple efforts fragment
funding and leave all efforts inadequate to the task.
164. Specifically, while dose responses vary from person to person, animal to
animal, and plant to plant, these variations generally do not occur spatially. If 3 in 100
·

·

December

1996]

Environmental Federalism

615

lators will either duplicate each other's analytic work or engage in time
consuming and complex negotiations to establish an efficient division of
technical labor. The poorer the jurisdiction, moreover, the more likely
its regulators will lack basic technical competence. Likewise, the
smaller the regulating entity, the more likely it is to suffer from the ab
sence of scientific scale economies. Both of these dimensions of techni
cal failure are recognized as significant obstacles to good regulation in
many states. 165
Despite the prospect of scientific diseconomies of scale, decentral
ized policy structures still might be worthwhile if multiple approaches
to a problem were likely to improve the quality of regulation, the
chances of identifying more effective policy tools, or the efficiency of
the regulatory process. Fifty state laboratories might come up with the
"right" regulatory answer more often than one centralized body. There
are two ways in which the states might be thought to have a better
chance of getting this right answer than the federal government The
first involves an environmental problem that does not vary much across
the country, such as determining the safe level of pesticide residues. In
such a case, fifty efforts to establish this variable might be thought
more likely to generate a "correct" result, just as fifty throws of a dart
are more likely to yield a bullseye than a single toss.

residents of Connecticut will get sick from a certain level of toxic exposure, 3 in 100
Louisianans will as well. There is no need for both Connecticut and Louisiana to estab
lish this same correlation independently. In the rush to highlight the diversity of the
human experience, we often seem to forget the unvarying essence of Homo sapiens as a
species and, accordingly, the potential for regulatory economies of scale from centrali
zation. This principle is well established in the field of public health. See, e.g., James A.
Merchant et al., Byssinosis and Chronic Bronchitis Among Cotton Textile Workers, 76
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 432, 433 (1972) (showing that cotton dust exposure of
American millworkers created the same respiratory disease problems for them as for
British cotton millworkers). Of course, in some cases, widespread cultural patterns
(smoking and drinking, for example) may sufficiently shape the background levels of
risk so that responses will vary across jurisdictions.

165. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REPORT OF THE TASK
FORCE TO ENHANCE STATE CAPACITY (1993). Governmental regulatory capacity

likely will evolve over time and so too will the optimal mix of regulatory authority be
tween and among levels of government. In fact, devolving environmental responsibili
ties to the states makes much more sense than it would have 30 years ago insofar as

state regulatory capacity has improved dramatically over the intervening years. Simi
larly, issues evolve in ways that may justify changes over time in the level of govern
ment that regulates them. When a problem first emerges, the scientific uncertainties sur
rounding it may be so predominant that the technical advantages of a centralized

governmental response call for federal regulation. As the issue matures and becomes
better understood, the salience of the technical economies of scale may recede, which
argues for devolution of primary regulatory responsibility to the states and permitting
policies more tailored to localized interests.
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Against this hope, however, weigh several countervailing consider
ations. Will states-as-laboratories really mean more dose-response ex
perimentation? Will the state efforts be serious experimentation or sim
ply guesswork? How many states have the scientific infrastructure,
interest, and resources to fund rigorous analytic efforts? Most U.S.
states suffer from serious capacity problems in environmental regula
tion.166 Outside the United States, the number of regulating jurisdictions
capable of establishing regulatory programs built on even modest scien
tific and analytic underpinnings is even more limited. The theoretical
argument for diversity and decentralization thus runs very quickly into
practical capacity constraints in the technical domain.167 When complex
science is required, states are not the best laboratories; laboratories are
the best laboratories.
Another dimension of the states-as-laboratories argument relates to
the notion of "�·egulatory competition" and addresses the question of
whether competition among decentralized jurisdictions will improve
governmental efficiency. Without denying the need to eliminate slack in
governmental operations, there is neither empirical evidence to support
nor any theoretical reason to believe that state-level bureaucrats work
more efficiently than federal ones because they perceive themselves to
be in competition with other states.168 Moreover, nongovernmental orga
nizations, able to draw on outside experts and to achieve scale econo
mies by "selling" their ideas in many jurisdictions simultaneously, may
be better positioned to provide technical-competition. Environmental
groups, in particular, have an incentive to hustle and to seek quick dif
fusion of their scientific and policy advances because this is how they
win credibility and financial support.169
166. See EPA, supra note 165, at 5; see also Leslie Fuller Secrest et al., Seep No
Evil, AMER. CITY & COUNTY, May 1993, at 34.
167. The suggestion that decentralization allows for improved political judgments
in regulation (that is, better judgements about how much value a localized community
would place on a particular policy) may be correct but misses the point. Specifically,
the crucial welfare losses with regard to problems like food safety derive not from polit
ical miscalculations, but from technical errors in which the regulators misunderstand
causal relationships and thus make directionally incorrect policy interventions or miscal
culate risks by orders of magnitude. Of course, the technical-inadequacy argument
against environmental policy decentralization may not be generalizable as it turns on the
particular technical complexity of making good environmental regulatory decisions.
168. To the contrary, it is the author's experience, having visited dozens of state
Departments of Environmental Protection as well as numerous federal EPA offices, that,
as a general rule, federal officials are better trained, work longer and harder, and have
higher productivity than their state counterparts.
169. See Daniel C. Esty, "Why the World Trade Organization Needs Non
Government Organizations" (paper presented at University of Michigan Conference,
Nov. 8, 1996) (on file with author) (making the argument that the best "competition" in
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The second aspect o f th e states-as-laboratories argument involves
environmental problems that are geographically heterogenous, such as
how much money to spend cleaning up a toxic waste dump. The
"right" answer to such problems depends on locality-specific factors
such as on what chemicals are in the waste, whether the waste is mi
grating off-site, the likelihood that groundwater is affected, the depen
dence of those in the community on groundwater for drinking, the rela
tive scarcity of land, the likely future use of the site, the wealth of the
community in question, and other circumstances. In such cases, on-the
ground knowledge is of central importance, and the diversity of circum
stances is salient. Thus state-by-state or even community-by-community
regulation makes sense. Smaller jurisdictions can tailor their regulatory
solutions according to the exact, location-specific ,parameters of a given
hazardous waste problem. 110
Yet even when a problem is largely localized, substantial technical
questions, susceptible to economies of scale, remain. How big are the
risks posed by the chemicals present? What cleanup technologies are
available? How much will various policy alternatives cost? Ultimately,
diversity of circumstances argues primarily against regulatory

ity, not necessarily against centralization

-

uniform

and certainly not against a

hybrid policy structure that is centralized in part.1 7 1

environmental policy comes from environmental groups and businesses). In the environ
mental realm, nongovernmental entities already make substantial contributions to the
data and information bases upon which regulations are based - and in so doing pro
vide considerable intellectual competition to the government See, e.g., MARK DORF
MAN, ENVIRONMENTAL DIVIDENDS: CUITING MORE CHEMICAL WASTE (1992)
(spelling out "pollution prevention" ideas); PROJECT 88: HARNEssING MARKET
FORCES TO PROTECT OUR ENVIRONMENT 30-34 (Robert Stavins ed., 1988) [herein
after PROJECT 88] (adv�cing the idea of S02 emissions-trading to address acid rain, a
concept that was adopted in the 1990 Clean Air Act); DAVID J. SAROKIN ET AL., CUT
TING CHEMICAL WASTE: WHAT 29 ORGANIC CHEMICAL PLANTS ARE DOING TO
CUT CHEMICAL WASTE (1985).
170. EPA's traditional one-size-fits-all approach to Superfund site remediation rep
resents a classic example of inappropriate centralized regulation. Decentralized informa
tion gathering, analysis, and decisionmaking in hazardous waste cleanup cases almost
certainly would improve the technical content of the regulatory process.
171. Indeed, many U.S. federal environmental laws, although centrally adopted,
permit states to implement more stringent requirements than the national standard or
otherwise to tailor the regulatory program to their own needs. See, for example, the va
rying "non-attainment" standards of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 751 1-13 (1994).
Nevertheless, there appears to be some tendency of centralized regulatory structures to
enact more or less uniform standards. See James E. Krier, On the Topology of Uniform
Environmental Standards in a Federal System - and Why It Matters, 54 MD. L. REv.
1226, 1228-38 (1995); see also Richard 0. Zerbe, Optimal Environmental Jurisdictions,
4 EcoLOGY L.Q. 193, 222 (1974) (noting that local strategies do not require the "juris
dictional choice of local government").
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Policy Design

A decentralized regulatory structure offers a mechanism for testing
multiple policy alternatives simultaneously with the promise that better
approaches will emerge and be adopted broadly. But such gains derive
largely from avoiding uniformity and not from avoiding decentralization
per se.172 Moreover, the administrative advantage of local implementa
tion does not speak to the question of the optimal level of governmental
activity in environmental standard setting. Indeed, given economies of
scale in technical work and the risk of structural failure from pollution
spillovers and strategic behavior unleashing welfare-reducing races to
ward the bottom or top, the best solution may be nationally adopted, lo
cally implemented, nonuniform standards. Such a solution entails opti
mizing both the scale of standards and the scale of institutions.173
In some circumstances uniform standards may be welfare enhanc
ing.174 When environmental regulations are focused on products (as op
posed to

production processes), harmonization across jurisdictions can

create important economies of scale for the businesses selling these
products175 and for the states administering environmental controls. For
example, national automobile tailpipe standards allow Detroit to pro
duce vehicles from a single production line, thus lowering both average
and marginal costs.176 National standards also spare the fifty states the

172. See Zerbe, supra note 171, at 215-21 (discussing losses from uniformity).
173. See E-mail from Jonathan Wiener, Professor, Duke Law School, to Daniel C.
Esty, Professor, Yale Law School (Aug. 27, 1996).
174. See supra note 47 (discussing optimal specificity). As noted in Part I, the tai

loring of regulations to smaller and smaller subgroups achieves welfare gains by match
ing policies with local values, but this comes at the cost of increased administrative bur
den. There is a further question about what level of government is best positioned to
determine the optimal level of regulatory activity for any specific problem, particularly
in light of the fact that answering optimal-specificity questions consumes resources and
involves deliberation costs. The economies of scale in analytic methods argue for hav
ing the metaquestion of optimal scale answered nationally. See Wiener, supra note 173.
175. For example, some champions of decentralization also will be strong advo
cates of federal regulation when the scale economies of the national market are at issue.
In fact, 91 preemption statutes, substituting uniform federal standards for diverse state
regulations, were enacted into law during the Reagan era. See SUSAN RosE
Ac:KEkMAN, RETinNKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE REFORM OF THE

AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE 162 (1992).
176. To this day, U.S. automakers are striving to maintain a commitment to a "49-

state car" in the face of a thrust from a number of Northeastern states to set tailpipe
standards that match the more stringent California requirements. See Jake Brown, EPA
Proposes 49-State-Car Option, But Automakers, States Continue Talks, BNA, Oct. 2,
1995, available in 1995 WL, BNA-SED Database; Matthew L. Wald, E.P.A. Backs Plan
to Allow Cleaner Cars in Most States, N.Y. TIMBS, Sept 28, 1995, at A16; Adrian
Walker, World Considers Deal on Phase-In ofElectric Cars, BOSTON GLOBE, July 31,
1995, a t 13.
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expense of trying t o determine and enforce their own standards.177
Uniformity with regard to production-process pollution controls
also may be beneficial in some instances: following common ap
proaches to a common problem may be particularly welfare enhancing

if "network" effects are significant.178 Even if the pollution policies of
one jurisdiction are not perfectly aligned with the needs of another ju
risdiction, the latter rationally might adopt the farmer's standards to
avoid the considerable expense of creating a regulatory program from
scratch with all of the attendant development costs vis-a-vis data, risk
analysis, policy mechanisms, control technologies� training, and en
forcement.179 These costs will be especially large for small jurisdictions
that will have difficulty persuading producers of pollution-control goods
and services to tailor products to their jurisdiction's unique specifica
tions. Network effects may be particularly important in the environmen
tal realm because of the technical complexity of the requisite policy
analysis and design functions and the relative incapacity of many juris
dictions singularly to bear the costs associated with that complexity.
Uniform standards also may stimulate innovation in pollution-con
trol technologies. Notably, the larger the market, the bigger the potential
payoff to investors and the more likely it is that innovators and entre
preneurs will be able to acquire venture capital. Fragmented markets are
unattractive to potential investors.180 In fact, the relatively decentralized
environmental regulatory structure of the United States has already

177. See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 175, at 165; Elliott et al., supra note 69;
Mashaw & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 1 1 1 , at 1 13-34; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Envi
ronmental Policy and Federal Structure: A Comparison of the United States and Ger
many, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1587, 1592 (1994).
178. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 1 18, at 24-26; Philip Dybrig & Chester
Spatt, Adoption Externalities As Public Goods, 20 J. PuB. EcoN. 231 (1983); Michael
L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM.
EcoN. REV. 424 (1985); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Net
works of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REv. 757 (1995) (spelling out network benefits to com
mon contract terms).
179. The classic example of network effects is the QWERTY typewriter keyboard.
The layout of the keys is demonstrably nonoptimal, but changing the standard has
proven to be impossible because huge investments in training and knowledge would be
lost by a shift to another keyboard layout. See Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics
of QWER1Y, 97 AM. EcON. Assoc. PAPERS & PROC. 332 (1985); Steve Lohr, Busi
ness Often Goes to the Swift, Not the Best, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1995, § 4, at 3; see
also Klausner, supra note 178, at 792-808 (discussing network effects in legal interpre
tations in the corporate contract context).
180. As a general partner in a California venture capitalist firm testified in a writ
ten statement presented at a U.S. Senate hearing, the lack of centralization in U.S. envi
ronmental regulation "penalizes innovation and repels capital." Hearings on S. 978
Before the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 103d Cong. 79 (1993)
(statement of Dag Syrrist). The statement went on to decry the current regulatory struc.

.
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proven to be a serious obstacle to entrepreneurs seeking venture capi
tal.181 Further devolution promises to exacerbate the difficulty of achiev
ing scale economies sufficient to promote innovation, bring new tech
nologies to bear on U.S. environmental problems, and lower the cost of
environmental protection.182
Multiple jurisdictions could settle upon common policy approaches
that would allow the scale economies identified above to be achieved
without centralized regulation. Indeed, Alan Sykes argues that consumer
demand and the workings of the market will yield optimal compatibility
in standards across jurisdictions.183 But while such market-driven har
monization has emerged in some realms (VCRs and computers, for ex
ample), the coordination record in the environmental domain appears
far more spotty.184
Centralized environmental regulation, moreover, need not mandate
fixed uniform standards. One important alternative is minimum stan
dards that provide a limited common goal, ensuring that all parties meet
a basic level of environmental protection. For some jurisdictions, base
line standards may be the most appropriate endpoint for their environ
mental programs given their level of economic development and other
specific circumstances. In other jurisdictions, more stringent standards

ture, which "effectively partitioned a national market into several hundred regional and
local markets each with unique permitting requirements." Id. at 81.
181. Far less venture capital flows into environmental goods and services compa
nies than into other economic sectors of comparable size. See Internal Memorandum
from the Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and Technology .Policy,
Environment Division (1995) (on file with author).
182. As Howard Kunreuther has reminded me, a standardized regulatory structure
also facilitates development of the insurance market - which could be quite useful as a
policy response to environmental risks.
183. See ALAN SYKES, PRODUCT STANDARDS FOR INTERNATIONALLY INTE
GRATED GOODS MARKETS (1995) (focusing on computer software and other products,
not processes such as environmental production standards); see also DAVID VOGEL,
TRADING UP 189-91 (1995) (observing that in product markets, environmental stan
dards are often harmonized upwards).
184. T he Organization for Economic and Community Development (OECD) has
had some success in getting its member countries to coordinate their chemical testing
protocols. But efforts to harmonize pesticide regulation, basic environmental data col
lection, and other aspects of environmental regulation have proven far less successful,
even when the promise of scale economies are substantial. See OECD, THE OECD
CHEMICALS PROGRAMME (1993). Whether the actual environmental standards should
be uniform depends on the intersection of a number of factors including: (1) how much
the problem at hand varies spatially (which will be affected by the nature of the prob
lem, geography, climate, weather, and other factors); (2) how heterogeneous the af
fected population is in its values, including wealth (which shapes preferred tradeoffs be
tween income and environmental protection), risk preferences, and other variables; and
(3) how the size of welfare gains from scale economies in production and regulatory ad
ministration compare with potential welfare losses from diminished diversity.
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will be appropriate given higher levels of available resources and
greater public demand for environmental protection. Under a system of
minimum standards, governments remain free to adopt a higher level of
environmental protection.185
Many of the benefits of a decentralized regulatory structure also
could be achieved by using more flexible regulatory tools.186 Rather
than mandating specific uniform control technologies, pollution stan
dards can be peiformance-based - setting, for instance, an allowable
effluent limit per hour or day.187 While the pollution-control goal is cen. trally determined, the individual factory decides how to meet the goal.
Even greater flexibility and efficiency can be achieved through

ambient

standards that allow the regulatory system to reflect background pollu
tion levels and differences in physical conditions. Thus, for example,
companies operating in open windy areas may be allowed to emit more
than those operating in geographically enclosed areas.188
Further flexibility and efficiency can be built into both effluent and
ambient standards through a system of differentiated requirements. By
varying the goals or the timetables for reaching goals for diverse areas,
differences in circumstances can be accommodated within centrally de
vised regulatory programs. For example, particularly challenging air
pollution problems, such as those facing Los Angeles, can be given spe
cial consideration within a national clean air program. In fact, the Clean

185. The Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) art. 130T provides for
such a scheme. See Damien Geradin, Trade and Environmental Protection: Community
Harmonization and National Environmental Standards, 13 Y.B. EUR. L. 151, 178-86
(1994).
186. In fact, much of the welfare loss in environmental policy today appears to
come neither from diseconomies of regulatory scale nor the related problem of stan
dards being set at too high a level of aggregation and hence overriding the particular
ized circumstances and values of smaller scale communities. Rather, the loss comes
from the weakness of the scientific-technical bases for regulation and the vagaries of the
existing set of environmental tools and strategies. See, e.g., Revesz, supra note 9.
187. Many Clean Water Act standards take this form. See Clean Water Act
§§ 301-304, 33 U.S.C. §§ 131 1-1314 (1994). Unfortunately, the translation of these ef
fluent standards into specific obligations of dischargers shifts the regulatory focus from
performance standards to various "Best Available Technology" requirements. See Clean
Water Act §§ 301 (b)(l), 306, 33 U.S.C. §§ 13ll(b)(l), 1316 (1994).
188. The nonattainment and the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS) provisions for criteria air pollutants of the Clean Air Act could work in this
fashion, setting the pollution control goal centrally, but allowing local officials to deter
mine how to meet the standards through State Implementation Plans (SIPs). See Clean
Air Act Amendment of 1970 § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1994). But the promise of na
tional ambient standards has not been achieved. See John P. Dwyer, The Practice of
Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REv. 1 1 83, 1 198 (1995); William F.
Pederson, Why the Clean Air Act Works Badly, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1059, 1071-93
(1981).
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Air Act seeks to differentiate among extreme, severe, serious, and mod
erate "nonattairunent" areas, giving those with greater problems up to
seventeen extra years to come into compliance with the national
goals.1s9
The use of

economic-incentive-based regulatory tools can further

loosen the grip of federal regulators and give broad scope to private ac
tors to determine how best to meet environmental goals. The use of ef
fluent fees, pollution trading systems, and ecolabels or other public in
formation strategies permit considerable differentiation among locales
and even among individuals with different preferences within the same
locale. In addition, fees or emissions allocations can be adjusted to re
flect particular circumstances. Moreover, the trading that occurs explic
itly under systems like the acid rain control program of the

1990 Clean
Air Act and implicitly in any pollution-fee-based regulatory regime al
lows

for

efficient

market-determined

pollution-control

programs,

thereby maximizing the benefits from any dollar invested in pollution
prevention or -abatement programs and minimizing the welfare losses
imposed by the regulatory constraints.190
Ultimately, diseconomies of scale and diversity arguments do not
argue for state regulation but simply for flexible and efficiency-minded
regulatory tools and strategies. Likewise, the promise of technical econ
omies of scale does not necessarily argue for a

centralized environmen

tal regime in any strong sense. Specifically, one could envision an envi
ronmental policy structure that obtained scale economies in the
technical aspect of the regulatory process without centralizing other
dimensions of the environmental control system. In fact, the optimal
policy response to the problems of technical inadequacy is probably the
creation of a National Institute for the Environment (NIE). An NIE, like
the National Institutes of Health (NIH), would serve as a centralized
data gathering and analysis mechanism. It would offer scientific support
to regulating jurisdictions that would use the data and information pro
vided to set their own standards. An NIE also could develop model leg
islation as one way of consolidating diverse information into a form
that would be useful to regulating jurisdictions. Such a mechanism
189. See, for example, ozone (smog) requirements under the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 181(a)(2), 104 Stat 2423 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
751 l(a)(2)).
190. See PROJECT 88, supra note 169; Daniel J. Dudek et al., Technology-Based
Approaches versus Market-Based Approaches, in GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAW
182 (Phillipe Sands ed., 1994); Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Market-Based
Environmental Regulation: A New Era From An Old Idea, 18 EcOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1991);
Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives, 13
CoLUM J. ENVTL. L. 153 (1988).
.
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would go a considerable distance toward addressing the capacity prob
lem

that

historically

has

plagued

state-based

environmental

regulation. 1 9 1
Decentralization generally fails to minimize technical environmen
tal regulatory costs. While diseconomies exist in a few parts of the reg
ulatory process, most aspects of environmental research and analysis
show significant economies of sca1e. The strength of diversity argu
ments thus must be seen essentially not as

technical, but either as struc
tural (smaller jurisdictions empowered to establish their own standards

will reduce the intema1ities associated with uniform standards, thereby
increasing socia1 welfare) or as related to

public choice (decentralized

political processes are more likely to track localized citizen prefer
ences). In either case, to achieve the goa1 of minimizing technical wel
fare loss, technical and scientific responsibilities should not be devolved
to state govemments. 1 92

4.

Implementation, Enforcement, and Policy Evaluation

The implementation and enforcement of environmental policy is
done best on a relatively decentralized basis to ensure that the regulat
ing entity is aware of loca1 circumstances and is accessible to the regu
lated community. There is, however, an important caveat to this genera]
principle: enforcement against large companies may be accomplished
better by the federal government. At the very least, the need to protect
states from especially powerful economic and political forces argues for
a system of federal oversight of state environmental programs.193 More-

191. It is ironic that the Congress, which is pushing regulatory devolution so
strongly, is not advancing efforts to address the state capacity problem. Efforts to create
a Bureau of Environmental Statistics have failed and the Office of Technology Assess
ment was abolished. See House Expected to Act on Rescissions Bill; Senate to Continue
on EPA Cabinet Status, BNA, Apr. 26, 1993, available in 1993 WL BNA-BWI
Database; Greg Pierce, Study Advises Devolving EPA Powers, WASH. T!MEs, Apr. 12,
1995, at A9; Senate Bill would Elevate EPA to Cabinet, BNA, May 20, 1994, available
in 1994 WL BNA-BWI Database. Moreover, data-gathering efforts such as the Na
tional Biological Survey have faced sharp budget cuts. See Tom Kenworthy, By Any
Name, Biological Service Appears To Be Endangered Species, WASH. POST, June 27,
1995, at A15.
192. By extension, the technical advantages of centralization argue for increased
international scientific and analytic cooperation. W hy, for example, does the United
States spend $100 million per year testing pesticides, some of which already have un
dergone exhaustive analysis in Europe or Japan? Common testing protocols and data
exchange would allow the United States to incorporate risk analyses done elsewhere,
thereby improving the speed and cutting the cost of U.S. regulation.
193. Many state officials privately observe that the threat of unleashing the "go
rilla in the closet" - the federal EPA - makes it much easier for them to do their job.
,

,

See National Clean Air Coalition Press Conference Concerning the President's Clean

Michigan Law Review

624

[Vol.

95:570

over, when problems are transboundary in scope, and especially when
the jurisdictions

are separate countries, decentralized enforcement
breaks down entirely. 1 94
The evaluation and refinement of environmental policy strategies

benefits from comparative analysis and therefore from some degree of
centralization. Nevertheless, because each subjurisdiction has an incen
tive to cooperate in

drrrying

out evaluation procedures and in sharpen

ing its own programs, there is no need for rigid or coerced centraliza
tion of policy evaluation activities.
B.

Decentralization and Structural Welfare Loss

It is well established that intemalities should be avoided, externali
ties should be internalized, and efficiency in the provision of a collec
tive good requires the jurisdiction of the government that provides it to
match the boundaries of the good. 1 95 There seems, however, to be some
confusion over the type and pervasiveness of jurisdictional mismatches
in the environmental realm.196 To determine what level of government

Air Proposals, Federal News Service, June 12, 1989, available in LEXIS, News Li
brary, FEDNEW File; see also David R. Hedas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in
a Triangular Federal System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd?, 54 MD. L. REv. 1552, 1574
(1995).
194. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, Customary (And Not So Customary) International
Environmental Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 105, 1 10-1 1 (1995) (observing
that uncontrolled transboundary pollution is the rule rather than the exception); Edith
Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson, Why Do States Comply With International Agree
ments?, 1 HUMAN DIMENSIONS Q. 1, 4 (1996) (reporting on a study finding that inter
nationally decentralization does not improve compliance); David Wrrth, Climate Chaos,
74 FOREIGN POLY. 3 (1989); see also DUNCAN BRACK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL 99-1 14 (1996) (discussing widespread noncompli
ance with the Protocol and illegal trade in CFCs). See generally LAKSHMAN D.
GURUSWAMY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND W ORLD OR

DER 3 1-43 (1994),
195. See OLSON, supra note 40, at 42-43; see also BAUMOL & OATES, supra
note 8, at 287 (arguing that jurisdictions need to be sufficiently large to encompass the
benefits and costs associated with the pollutant and its control); Butler & Macey, supra
note. 157 (advancing a Matching Principle).
196. Although some commentators suggest otherwise, concern about interstate ex
ternalities has provided a driving force for the adoption of national environmental laws
in the United States. See H.R. REP No. 94-1 175 (1976); H.R. REP No. 95-294 (1977)
(discussing Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977). But see Revesz, supra note 1, at 1212
(arguing that "interstate externalities explain only isolated parts of the federal environ
mental statutes"). Concern about transboundary externalities also represents the corner
stone of centralized environmental regulation in the European Union. See, e.g., van den
Bergh et al., supra note 1 18. A related question is how well federal laws address inter
state externality issues. That many federal laws do not perform this task particularly
well is undeniable; however, this inadequacy is more an argument for federal legislative
reform than for broad policy devolution.
.

.

·

December 1996]

Environmental Federalism

625

should set environmental policy to minimize structural welfare losses,
the critical variables are the prevalence and magnitude of externalities
and internalities.

1.

Physical Externalities

Given the widespread theoretical acceptance of externalities as a
rationale for centralized environmental regulation, policy conclusions in
favor of decentralization depend on an implicit assumption that inter
state externalities are not significant. Such a dismissive attitude toward
pollution externalities does not, however, square with environmental
reality.

a. Empirical evidence. While a few environmental harms (some
waste problems, for example) are geographically localized, many forms
of pollution (surface water contamination and most air pollutants, for
example) spread across the land. Because state boundaries often do not
fully encompass airsheds and watersheds, interjurisdictional externali
ties arise. Given a fixed extent of pollution, it is axiomatic that decen
tralization will create more borders and therefore more transboundary
spillovers. Moreover, advances in environmental science over the last
two decades have resulted in the discovery of a number of previously
unrecognized externalities. These include, most notably, global concerns
such as ozone layer depletion and possible climate change due to the
accumulation of greenhouse gases.197 In addition, recent scientific work
has broadened the acknowledged geographic scope of the impact of pre
viously identified problems. For example, DDT - long banned in the
United States and Canada - has been discovered in the Great Lakes,
demonstrating, scientists believe, that high-level winds can transport air
borne chemicals thousands of miles, in this case from Mexico.198 Simi
larly, recent studies have discovered significant transboundary spillovers
of S02 and acid rain, heavy metals, and bioaccumulative toxics.199 We
will probably continue to find additional linkages and elements of inter-

197. See Adrienne C. Brooks, NASA Identifies Cause of Ozone Depletion, SCI
ENCE NEWS, Dec. 24, 1994; Richard A. Kerr, Antarctic Ozone Hole Fails to Recover,
SCIENCE, Oct 14, 1994, at 422; Richard A. Kerr, Studies Say - Tentatively - That
Greenhouse Warming is Here, SCIENCE, June 15, 1995, at 1567; Richard Monastersy,
Dusting the Climate for Fingerprints: Has the Greenhouse Warming Arrived? Will We
Ever Know, SCIENCE NEWS, June 10, 1995, at 362.
198. See, e.g., R.A. Rappaport et al., "New" DDT Inputs to North America: At
mospheric Deposition, 14 CHEMOSPHERE 1 1 67 {1985); Andrew Lawler, NASA Mission
Gets Down to Earth, SCIENCE, Sept. l , 1995, at 1208.
199. See, e.g., William F. Fitzgerald, Mercury as a Global Pollutant, WORLD & I
(Oct. 1993) at 192; Carrie Levine, Arctic as Polluted as Europe 100 Years Ago Study, Reuters North American Wire, Mar. 3, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library,
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dependence and thus additional extemality-based reasons to consider
centralized environmental regulation.
b. What Form of Centralization? The presence of a transboundary
harm demands some form of overarching governmental action across
the scope of the harm. Lack of a mechanism to facilitate collective ac
tion among jurisdictions whose fates are ecologically linked leads to a
tragedy-of-the-commons dynamic that promises market failure, alloca
tive inefficiency, welfare loss, and infringements on property rights. At
the very least, the jurisdictions sharing an environmental resource or
problem must establish a process for clarifying the scope of the prop
erty rights in question as well as rules and procedures for allowing
these rights to be traded (and, if necessary, vindicated at law) at low
cost. Such a structure requires some degree of centralization. Thus, the
question is not whether to have centralized regulation, but rather what
kind of centralization to pursue.
As discussed in Part I,200 how far one moves from cooperative pol
icies toward more full-blown centralization is simply a matter of de
gree. If environmental property rights are clear and mechanisms for
trading and vindicating these rights are available at a reasonable cost,
centralized regulation is not needed. But often these conditions are not
met.201 Beyond this theory, empirical observation supports the conclu
sion that collaboration among decentralized jurisdictions often yields
unsatisfactory results in response to externalities. Even among the U.S.
states, collaboration in response to interstate pollution is minimal.202 Be
yond federal mandates, states take little account of the harms that their
industries cause to downriver or downwind jurisdictions.203 Internation-

Txtnws File (finding mercury, PCPs, and insecticides in Arctic fish); R.A. Rappaport et
al., supra note 198.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 57-62.
201. As noted in Part I, every time we move from a single jurisdiction (with a
fully centralized regulatory regime) to a multijurisdictional world, we reopen the "why
regulation" question.
202. The struggles of the Ozone Transport Assessment Group demonstrate this
fact. See Anthony Jewell, Utilities Group Says Federal Ozone Rules May Be Unfair to
State, CoURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky), Feb. 7, 1996, at 2B; Proposed Ozone Transport
Plan Would Fall Hard on Utilities, ENERGY REP., Feb. 26, 1996, available in
WESTLAW, 1996 WL 8375588; Doug Sword, Midwest Fights Dirty Image, Blame for
Pollution Called Unfair, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Mar. 17, 1996, at 17A.
203. See GERRARD, supra note 73, at 98 (noting prevalence of locally undesirable
land uses (LULUs) on state boundaries); Richard E. Ayres, Enforcement of Air Pollu
tion Controls on Stationary Sources Under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 4
EcOLOGY L.Q. 441, 452-53 (1975); Revesz, supra note 186, at 16 (noting that states
encourage tall stacks, pushing pollution downwind). Maine's independent governor
Angus King recently demanded that tlte EPA take action to stop pollution from other
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ally, efforts to internalize pollution externalities are even more crude.204
Countries often assert their "sovereignty" over their resources and en
vironmental policy as though this mantra provides immunity from re
sponsibility for transboundary pollution spillovers.205 Ultimately, though
the difficulty of coordinating across jurisdictions - which is undoubt
edly greater internationally than among national subjurisdictions speaks to the question of what sort of regulatory regime will be possi
ble; it does not change the need for overarching governmental interven
tion to avoid market failure and property rights infringements.
2.

Economic Externalities: The Race to the Bottom

The prisoner's dilemma dynamic inherent in circumstances of eco
nomic interdependence and the resulting risk of economic externalities
and welfare loss long have been understood. To respond to
noncooperative "beggar-thy-neighbor" tariff and currency policies that
led to global economic chaos in the 1930s, the architects of the post
World War II international order recognized the need to erect an elabo
rate worldwide regulatory regime for international trade.206 The prospect
states blowing into Maine. See John Milne, Maine Blames Massachusetts, Others For
Polluting Air, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 2, 1995, at 20.
204. See generally Bodansky, supra note 194. But see INSTITUTIONS FOR THE
EARTH: SOURCES OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
(Peter M. Haas et al. eds, 1993) (identifying some examples of international coopera
tion). For specific case reports, see Christopher Babinski, Survey of the Baltic Basin
States, FIN. TIMEs, Dec. 16, 1992, at 14 (discussing northern Europe acid rain
problems); Jane Shaw, Debate Over Acid Rain Will Intensify in 1981, CHEM. ENGI
NEERING, Feb. 1981, at 435. More recently, Japan has become alarmed at China's pol
lution spillovers across the Sea of Japan. See Geoffrey Murray, Massive Environmental
Cleanup Urged in China, Japan Economic Newswire Plus, Nov. 12, 1994, available in
DIALOG, File No. 612.
205. There is, in fact, no sovereign right to pollute. On the contrary, both Principle
21 of the Stockholm Declaration of 1972 and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration of 1992
establish the opposite principle, that states have a "responsibility to ensure that activi
ties within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment or other
States or areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." Declaration on the Human

Environment: Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
supra note 42, at 10; Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra note 42,
at 2. Thus, it is the victims of transboundary pollution that suffer an affront to sover
eignty. But see Marc Pallemaerst, International Environmental Law from Stockholm to
Rio: Back to the Future?, in GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 , 5 (Phillippe Sands
ed., 1993) (noting that the responsibility for spillovers is juxtaposed with a "sovereign
right" to exploit one's own resources).
206. For a complete history of the GATI', see JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD
TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969). See also EsTY, supra note 52, ch. 4. For a
further history of other parts of the "Bretton Woods" regime, see ROBERT SOLOMON,
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM, 1945-1976, at 10, 13, 31-32, 21 1-13
(1977). Similar "commons" problems in the context of governmental redistributive
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of economic spillovers in the environmental domain entails a similar
situation: horizontally arrayed jurisdictions competing for economic ad
vantage through beggar-thy-neighbor environmental policies.
Fears of a welfare-reducing race to the bottom represent one of the
central underpinnings of federal environmental regulation in the United
States.207 Competitiveness concerns also have been at the heart of the
debate about the appropriate scale of environmental regulation in the
context of liberalized international trade.208 Yet it has become a key
tenet of second-generation thinking that such fears are unjustified and
even counterproductive from a social welfare perspective.209
There is little controversy about the dynamic that underlies such
fears. Whenever a jurisdiction's industries are in competition with com
panies from other locales that have lower environmental compliance
costs, governmental officials face pressures either to reduce the regula
tory burden or to risk lost sales for their industries, reduced future in
vestment, job displacement, and even industry migration.210 The ques
tion is whether this strategic dynamic enhances or reduces social
welfare. Second-generation theorists refer to these pressures as "regulafunctions also have been identified. See DAVID L. SHAPmo, FEDERALISM 46 (1995)
(arguing that redistributive governmental activities must be centralized); see also PE
TERSON, supra note 1 13, at 76-77.
207. See supra note 66.
208. See EsTY, supra note 52, at 1 55-80; Stewart, supra note 64; see also Owen
Lomas, Environmental Protection, Economic Conflict and the European Community, 33
McGn.L LJ. 506 (1988); Max Baucus, Protecting the Global Commons: The Nexus
Between Trade and Environmental Policy (Oct. 30, 1991) (address before the Institute
for International Economics).
209. Many economists speak out of both sides of their mouths on this issue. On
the one hand, they recite the economic orthodoxy that finds no empirical evidence of a
race to the bottom. See ROBERT REPETTO, JOBS, COMPETITIVENESS, AND ENVmON
MENTAL REGULATION: WHAT ARE THE REAL IssUES? 9 (1995); Jaffe et al., supra
note 134; Kalt, supra note 134; Low & Yeats, supra note 134. On the other hand, they
endorse the basic theory of comparative advantage, which suggests that we should ex
pect (and desire) pollution-intensive operations to move to jurisdictions with lower en
vironmental standards. See, e.g., The Freedom To Be Dirtier Than the Rest, ECONO
MIST, May 30, 1992, at 7 (explaining the economic logic for having more polluting
industries located in developing countries); Let Them Eat Pollution, EcONOMIST, Feb.
8, 1992, at 66 (discussing Harvard economist and now Treasury Deputy Secretary Larry
Summers's infamous World Bank memo advocating migration of dirty industries to de
veloping countries).
210. See Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Compet
itiveness, 102 YALE LJ. 2039, 2041, 2084-86, 2098 (1993); Kym Anderson, Environ
mental Standards and International Trade 7 (April 1996) (unpublished paper prepared
for the World Bank's Annual Conference on Development Economics, Washington,
D.C., Apr. 25-26, 1996) (maintaining that one country's environmental policy choice is
not independent of the choices of other countries). But see REPETTO, supra note 209
(arguing that competitiveness effects are not serious).
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tory competition" and believe that the results are presumptively effi
cient and welfare optimizing.211 Revesz not only proffers the welfare
enhancing promise of the regulatory competition dynamic but also dis
parages the logic of the race to the bottom. He declares that race-to-the
bottom arguments in the environmental area have been made "with es
sentially no theoretical foundation" and that interstate regulatory com
petition should be seen as "presumptively beneficial. "212 Race-to-the
bottom theorists obviously disagree on both counts.

a. Regulatory Competition Versus the Race to the Bottom. The two
theories can be distinguished by their assumptions. If the environmental
policy process resembles a prisoner's dilemma, then suboptimal results
may ensue,213 but if the market for location rights is relatively competi
tive and the environmental standard-setting process parallels pricing
under perfect competition, then there is no reason to fear a race to the
bottom.214 Standards may be reduced, but governments will not pursue
suboptimal environmental policies just to obtain economic gains.215
Thus, the central question is: Does the "market" for environmental
policymaking look more like perfect competition, in which efficiency
gains can be anticipated from the competitive forces unleashed, or im
perfect competition, in which market failures will reduce welfare?216
Revesz acknowledges distinctions between the market for location
rights and a widget market, but he finds the differences unimportant.217
For him, as for other regulatory competition theorists, the law is a

21 1 . See Revesz, supra note 1, at 1253. Even Stewart, the original proponent of
federal regulation to respond to the race to the bottom, now seems to believe that state
against-state regulatory competition will often lead to better results. See Stewart, supra
note 64, at 1341 n.36.
212. Revesz, supra note 1, at 1244, 1253.
213. Revesz himself demonstrates this logic. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 122933; see also Alvin K. Klevorick, Reflections on the Race to the Bottom, in FAm. TRADE
AND HARMONIZATION, supra note 132, at 459.
214. See Revesz, supra note l, at 1233-35.
215. Suboptimality might, moreover, arise in the form of standards that are "too
high." Indeed, in some industries, locational decisions may tum on employee amenities
such as a clean environment, in which case governments might "overspend" to attract
the facility, producing a "race to the top." See EDWIN S. Miu.s & BRUCE W. HAMIL
TON, URBAN EcONOMICS 38 (4th ed. 1989) (observing that higher amenities may al
low a company to pay lower wages).
216. As Klevorick notes, if the prisoner's dilemma is an accurate picture of com
petition among governments, then those who argue that there is a race to the bottom are
on firm ground, but if the regulatory market is not subject to failure, then interjurisdic
tional competition will enhance and not harm welfare. See Klevorick, supra note 213, at
461.
217. See Revesz, supra note l, at 1234-35.
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"product," like any other.218 Just as price competition disciplines com
panies in the private marketplace, regulatory competition forces govern
ments to compete for citizens and companies under conditions that
closely resemble competition among producers of other goods.219 Thus,
Revesz asks rhetorically: "If one believes that competition among sell
ers of widgets is socially desirable, why is competition among sellers of
location rights socially undesirable?"220
The answer to this question is straightforward: states act strategi
cally.221 Competition in the regulatory market does

not work like prod

uct competition. Unlike firms in perfect competition, states in their reg
ulatory mode are not pure price takers.222 They cannot ignore the fact
that a slight reduction in environmental standards (the price of their lo
cation rights) might bring economic welfare gains in excess of any

218. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 1 18, at 1 ("The law as a product anal
ogy invites a prediction that the governments producing law will compete for custom
ers, rent-producing citizens, firms, and transactions - if given the freedom to do so.").
See generally Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation
Puwe, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985).
219. When governments act in other ways, for example, in their redistributive role,
we know that races will be triggered and that such functions must be done centrally.
See, e.g., PETERSON, supra note 1 13, at 76-77 ("The more a local community engages
in redistribution, the more the marginal benefit/tax ratio for the average taxpayer de
clines, and the more the local economy suffers."). Thus, to the extent that environmen
tal policies are redistributive, they must be centralized. "Environmental justice" goals,
for example, should be pursued on a national basis. Similarly, addressing certain indi
visibly national environmental problems (cleaning up Department of Energy weapons
factories or other defense-related contamination, for example) is also redistributive, and
requires a centralized regime at least to raise the necessary funds if not to manage the
details of each cleanup effort.
220. Revesz, supra note 1 , at 1234. Revesz assumes that citizens are immobile. In
his analogy to the widget market, he assumes that firms are the only consumers of loca
tion rights.
221. See Barrett, Strategy and Environment, supra note 1 15. For evidence that
states (and Indian tribes) in fact do seek to attract industry on the basis of their rela
tively lax environmental standards, see GERRARD, supra note 73, at 135-38; High De
sert Regional Economic Development Authority, Advertisement, EXPANSION MGMT.,
Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 16 (promising "flexible air standards"); Healdsburg Redevelopment
Agency, Advertisement, CAL. STRATEGIES, Autumn 1995, at 22 (offering "environ
mental problem-solving"); see also DAN McGOVERN, THE CAMPO INDIAN LAND
FILL WAR (1995) (discussing waste companies' interest in low-standard Indian reserva
tions as the site for new facilities).
222. Revesz elides this critical point. Indeed, while much of the early part of his
article, see Revesz, supra note 1, at 1213-18, focuses on the environmental policy chal
lenge as a prisoner's dilemma and implies strategic behavior and imperfect competition,
he then shifts abruptly to a discussion of regulatory competition, see id. at 1234-35,
which implies a model of perfect competition and assumes away the problem of strate
gic behavior. See Brian Langille, "A Day at the Races": A Reply to Professor Revesz
on the Race to the Bottom (June 15, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
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losses from the resulting environmental degradation. In contrast, per
fectly competitive firms face no such incentive because they can sell
any quantity that they choose at the market-clearing price.223 Moreover,
they will lose, not gain, by lowering their price.
Differences between the markets for widgets and location rights
need not always produce a race to the bottom.224 Yet there are a host of
factors suggesting that the market for environmental-policy-driven loca
tion rights is relatively imperfect and thus that untrammeled regulatory
competition produces suboptimal outcomes. These factors are not uni
versally or uniformly present, but their frequency in the real world is
such that the benefits of regulatory competition cannot be presumed.225
First, environmental regulation operates in a realm where quantita
tive welfare comparisons are difficult. The "hard" variables in any
cost-benefit calculus dwarf the "soft." Thus, while the logic of regula
tory competition in the tax or corporate-control realms may be strong
because the "consumers" can see, evaluate, and appreciate the "prod
uct" that they are buying, no such transparency exists with regard to
environmental regulation. Tangible, demonstrable, and plainly apparent
economic benefits of reduced environmental regulation overwhelm the
uncertain, intangible, future costs associated with environmental degra
dation. The assumption of perfect information that undergirds perfect

223. For a discussion of basic Marshallian welfare theory, see RICHARD A. BI
LAS. MICROECONOMIC THEORY: A GRAPmCAL ANALYSIS 67-80 (1967); Gerald D.
Jaynes, Economic Theory and Land Tenure, in CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS, EM
PLOYMENT, AND wAGES IN RURAL LABOR MARKETS IN AsIA 43 (Hans P. Bin
swanger & Mark R. Rosenzweig eds., 1984); Jerry A. Hausman, Exact Consumer's Sur
plus and Deadweight Loss, 71 AM EcoN. REV. 662 (1981).
224. However, a beneficial regulatory competition process is likely to occur only
under a narrow set of circumstances. See Truman F. Bewley, A Critique of Tiebout's
Theory of Local Public Expenditures, 49 EcONOMETRICA 713, 714 (1981); Brian R.
Copeland & M. Scott Taylor, Trade and Transboundary Pollution, 85 AM EcoN. REv.
716 (1995); James R. Markusen et al., Competition in Regional Environmental Policies
When Plant Locations are Endogenous, 56 J. OF PUB. EcoN. 55 (1995) (finding subop
.

.

timal "Nash" equilibriums under many circumstances when i:he assumption of perfect
competition is put aside); Martin C. McGuire, Regulation, Factor Rewards, and Inter
national Trade, 17 J. PUB. EcoN. 335, 354 (1982). But see FISCHEL, supra note 19
(spirited defense o f the realism o f th e Tiebout model); William A . Fischel, Property

Taxation and the Tiebout Model: Evidence for the Benefit View from Zoning and Voting,
30 EcoN. LIT. 171 (1992).
225. See Ian Ayres, Supply-Side Inefficiencies in Corporate Charter Competition:
Lessons from Patents, Yachting, and Bluebooks, 43 KANs. L. REv. 541, 543 (1995);
Klevorick, supra note 213, at 460 (stating that race to the bottom is "highly contex
tual"); James R. Markusen et al.,

Environmental Policy When Market Structure and
Plant Locations are Endogenous, 24 J. ENVTL. EcoN. & MGMT. 69, 84 (1993); Stew
art, supra note 210, at 2059 (concluding that races to suboptimal outcomes will some
times occur).
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competition theories cannot be squared with the reality of environmen
tal policymaking: the invisibility and lag times of many environmental
harms; threshold effects that produce unpredictable discontinuities in
dose-response functions; and the natural political tendency to discount
unknown and uncertain future harms.226 Revesz's theory can bear more
weight if one assumes away technical transaction costs, but to do so is
to distance oneself from environmental reality and to diminish the pol
icy relevance of the work.
Second, politicians do not make environmental policy choices by
equating the marginal costs and marginal benefits of lowering standards
to gain a factory or to avoid losing one. Instead, industrial investments
are "lumpy." Thus, the image generated by regulatory competition the
ory of governments carefully calibrating the price of their location
rights (that is, the stringency of their environmental controls) to get the
optimal level and kind of industry seems farfetched.227 In addition, in
the bidding for capital investments, there may well be a "winner's
curse" that results in a systematic overvaluation of the benefits of a
new factory and a simultaneous undervaluation of its environmental
costs.228 This tendency to overbid arises because in the competition for
a new facility, the winner will be the jurisdiction most optimistic about
the net value of the project and thus willing to bid the highest (by low
ering its environmental standards the most).229 Finally, governments
may lower environmental standards230 generally to signal their interest
in attracting business and jobs.231 In such circumstances, when policy is
set in the abstract and without any direct connection to the cost of ac
quiring the marginal firm, there may well be a tendency to overdo the
signal and loosen standards too much.232

226. Revesz dismisses such results as "errors" in the policy process and argues
that any race to the bottom that ensues is a function of the "state's failure to act in an
economically rational manner." Revesz, supra note 1 at 1243. But this is an example of
where theory and policy intersect. It is not clear that politicians are making an "error."
Perhaps they are acting economically irrationally, but they certainly are not acting polit
ically irrationally. If one's theory depends on assuming away noneconomic elements of
political reality, the policy relevance of the analysis becomes quite limited.
227. See Markusen et al., supra note 224, at 69.
228. See Peter B. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Ex
plaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, Sympo
sium, Constructing a New Federalism, YALE J. ON REG. & YALE. L. & POLY. REV.
68, 98 (1996).
229. See id.
230. "Lowering" environmental standards may not entail voting in lax rules but
may simply involve less strict enforcement of existing rules.
231. There are many examples of such signals in states' or countries' advertise
ments about their business climates. See supra note 221.
232. See Swire, supra note 228.
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Third, governmental bodies are relatively weak instruments of
market discipline.233 Compare a hypothesized corporate charter race to
the bottom with environmental regulatory competition. The original the
ory in this regard, advanced by Cary, is that company executives will
seek to incorporate in Delaware because of the advantages that that
state's laws provide in protecting managers' positions at the expense of
shareholder welfare.234 Winter disputes this theory and argues that mar
ket forces constrain managers.235 Specifically, he observes that manag
ers who routinely seek to protect themselves at the expense of the
shareholders will become targets for takeovers or will drive their firms
into bankruptcy.
In the environmental field, the "electoral market" constraining
government "managers" works less directly. Political decisionmakers
often are free to accept money and other benefits from polluters in re
turn for advantageous regulatory decisions. Unifying the mass of voters
who are negatively, but indirectly, affected as a result is extremely diffi
cult.236 Thus, there is no comparable control on suboptimal political de
cisions about environmental regulation of the sort that exists in the mar
ket for corporate control.237
The study of races to the bottom in the bank charter context sup
ports a similar conclusion.238 Bank regulation, like environmental rules,

233. Although Revesz acknowledges this weakness in his analogy to perfect com
petition, he dismisses the concern as simply one arising from governmental undervalua
tion of environmental benefits and "not a consequence of the competition among
states." Revesz, supra note 1 , at 1235. But this cursory treatment of the public choice
problem is insufficient. It is the very prospect of systematic undervaluation of environ
mental benefits by politicians that renders the analogy to a perfectly competitive market
ini.tpt.
234. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Del

aware, 83 YALE LJ. 663, 663-84 (1974).
235. See Ralph K. Wmter, Jr., Shareholder Protection and the Theory of the Cor
poration, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 , 262-73 (1977); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federal
ism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law,
105 HARV. L. REv. 1435 (1992); Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in
Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709 (1987).
236. See supra notes 51-52. Even Wmter acknowledges that states should not be
allowed to set their own rules regarding takeovers because the managers will not be
good agents for the shareholders. See Wmter, supra note 235, at 251-92; see also
Mashaw & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 1 1 1, at 1 1 8-21 .
237. Again, Revesz could argue that the inefficiency arises here not because of
regulatory competition but rather because of public choice failures. As a matter of pure
theory, this might be correct, but to ignore the realities of the political marketplace
reduces the strength of any policy conclusions that might
theorizing.

be drawn from such

238. See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the
Dual Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677, 713 (1988).
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represents a public good that is not purely local. The bank charter race
arises because bankers protected by

FDIC

insurance can obtain above

average returns through risky lending, confident that success will yield
handsome rewards and that a significant portion of the costs of failure
will be borne by others. As one state relaxes its regulatory control to
enable its bankers to take advantage of this risk-spreading opportunity,
other welfare-maximizing states will be tempted to follow suit to avail
their own bankers and depositors of the opportunity for high rates of
return.239
This race might be triggered, even in the absence of the

FDIC risk

spreading scheme, by pressure on politicians to avoid disadvantaging
local bankers. Even if all of the downside risk is borne locally, the
structure of the bank charter problem, like pollution harms, entails un
certain future risks that might lead a welfare-maximizing politician to
ward lax regulation given that the benefits of high returns will accrue
immediately while the costs will arise in the future (perhaps even on
someone else's watch) if at all. When some of the costs clearly will be
spread to others (through

�IC

insurance or pollution spillovers), the

calculus favoring lax regulation and tending to create a race to the bot
tom becomes overwhelming.240
Finally, even if one assumes that the technical analysis of one's
own jurisdiction is perfect and that no physical pollution spillovers or
public choice distortions exist, one cannot be assured of a welfare
maximizing process of regulatory competition if any other jurisdiction
suffers from either technical inadequacies or public choice flaws. Once
any party moves off its "true" optimal level of environmental regula
tion - to a standard that is either too high or too low - others cannot
be assured, under the Theory of Second Best, that staying with their
own "island jurisdiction" optimization strategy will continue to maxi
mize welfare.241 The conclusion

I draw

is a modest one: the scope for

failure in the market for environmental-policy-determined location
rights is significant enough to make untenable a presumption that regu
latory competition in this domain will be welfare enhancing.

239. This analysis relaxes the assumption that there are no interjurisdictional spill
overs, reflecting the reality of both national insurance schemes and many pollution
problems.
240. Revesz again could argue that the bank-charter-policy failure arises because
of either externalities or public choice problems - not the dynamics of competition.
Once again, this rests the theory on very narrow and counterfactual assumptions. Note,
furthermore, that Butler and Macey's solution to the bank charter race - risk-adjusted
FDIC rates - relies on more refined central regulation, not state-based control.
241. See Anderson, supra note 210, at 12 (arguing that when there is more than
one distortion, optimizing any particular policy dimension may not increase welfare).
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b. Economic Models. A second strand of regulatory competition
theory consists of extensions of the Tiebout hypothesis.242 Early models,
Tiebout's included, are based on problematic assumptions.243 But
Revesz and other regulatory competition theorists rely on the latest re
finement of the hypothesis by Oates and Schwab, which aims to over
come these shortcomings.244 Ironically, Oates and Schwab can be read
to corroborate race-to-the-bottom fears, as they find interjurisdictional
competition efficiency enhancing only under tightly defined circum
stances.245 If governments rely - as they all do - on "inefficient tax
instruments," including nonzero taxes on capital, welfare-diminishing
levels of pollution result. Oates and Schwab further note that other
"distortions," such as policy decisions that deviate from the will of the
electorate or the existence of "conflicts of interest within a heterogene
ous community," also lead to suboptimal results.246
Recognizing the pervasiveness of positive tax rates on capital,·
Revesz strains to rescue his argument by claiming that these suboptimal
results are "due to an 'error' on the part of state regulators rather than
to a structural failure of state autonomy in a federal system. "247 In the
end, Revesz's theoretical dismissal of the race to the bottom depends on
heroic assumptions, including perfect governmental rationality, a point
of departure not unlike the Tiebout and Fischel models with which he
himself finds fault.

242. See supra text accompanying notes 136-37.
243. Tiebout's model assumes that (1) individuals are entirely mobile and choose
to live where the taxes imposed and the services provided best match their own "prefer
ence patterns"; and (2) everyone lives on dividend income and therefore is immune to
job loss concerns. As the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) debate
made clear, in the real world jobs are an issue. In addition to their restrictive assump
tions, the work of Tiebout and Fischel can be criticized on a number of other grounds.
In particular, their models fail to address the problems of shifting majorities, agenda
manipulation, and strategic behavior. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Tiebout Models and
the Competitive Ideal: An Essay on the Political Economy of Local Government, in

PERSPECTIVES ON LoCAL PuBuc FINANCE AND PuBuc POLICY 23, 36-41 (John
M. Quigley ed., 1983).
244. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 1242.
245. See Oates & Schwab, supra note 4, at 350.
246. See id. at 351; see also Susan Rose-Ackerman, Beyond Tiebout: Modeling the
Political Economy of Local Government, in LoCAL PROVISION OF PuBuc SERVICES:
THE TIEBOUT MODEL AFraR TwENTY-FIVE YEARS 55, 59-65 (George R. Zodrow
ed., 1983) (demonstrating that if the assumption of homogeneity within each commu
nity is dropped so that majority positions outvote minority ones, new voting instabilities
emerge).

247. Revesz, supra note 1 , at 1243. As Richard Stewart notes, one does not even
have to assume extreme myopia on the part of governments, but simply standard setting
under conditions of uncertainty. See .Stewart, supra note 210, at 2045-56.
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More significantly, Revesz does not leave the argument at this
point. Rather than offering the conclusion that under some circum
stances interjurisdictional competition may not lead to a race to the bot
tom,248 he talces two further steps. From the shaky ground of his analy
sis of Tiebout and regulatory competition theory, and seemingly in
contradiction of himself,249 Revesz dismisses the theoretical possibility
of races to the bottom and makes the additional leap to a policy pre
scription presumptively favoring decentralized regulation.250 It is here
that his logic most seriously falters.
First, the suggestion that there is no theoretical foundation for the
race-to-the-bottom dynamic either rests on too narrow a set of assump
tions to be of much interest, or overstates the conclusions that can be
drawn from Oates and Schwab and their progeny. Models demonstrat
ing the logic of a race to the bottom under certain circumstances
abound.251 That other models premised on other assumptions show that
competitiveness-driven suboptimal environmental policies need not en
sue does not support the claim that there is no theoretical basis for the
248. Revesz tries to bolster his dismissal of race-to-the-bottom concerns with the
observation that states sometimes exceed federal standards. See Revesz, supra note 1, at
1228. But his anecdotal examples only further prove the difficulty of making sweeping
conclusions, since for every example of states exceeding federal standards that Revesz
cites, a recent example of states reducing their environmental controls to reestablish
their competitiveness can be identified. See, e.g., Joel Stashenko, NY Eases off Lake
Pollution Agreements, Run.AND HERALD, July 28, 1995, at 1 (explaining New York's
decision to back away from phosphorus emissions controls in Lake Champlain); James
P. Sweeney, Environmental Bloc Holds Its Own, But Wait till Next Year, SAN Dmoo
UNION-TRIB., Sept. 22, 1995, at A6 (reporting on the scaling back of environmental
regulation in California); James Rusk, Ontario Proposes Environmental Law Overhaul,
TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, Aug. 1, 1996, at B13 (reporting on Ontario's "sweeping
overhaul" of its provincial environmental regulations that would relieve pulp mills from
eliminating chlorine, reduce testing for toxics, and other pollution reducing "burdens").
Whether a particular environmental issue will engender a competitiveness-inspired race
to-the-bottom or a NIMBY-induced race to the top depends on the structure of the par
ticular problem. See John Douglas Wilson, Capital Mobility and Environmental Stan
dards: Is There a Theoretical Basis for a Race to the Bottom?, in FAIR TRADE AND
HARMONIZATION, supra note 132, at 393.
249. Revesz's own analysis reveals a race if the structure of the relevant game is a
prisoners' dilemma. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 1230-33.
250. See id. at 1253.
251 . See Eric W. Bond & Larry Samuelson, Bargaining With Commitment, Choice
of Techniques and Direct Foreign Investment, 26 J. INTL. EcoN. 77 (1989) (finding a
race to the bottom under a pure property tax scenario); Sam Bucovetsky & John Doug
las Wiison, Tax Competition with Two Tax Instruments, 1991 REGIONAL SCIENCE AND
URBAN EcoNOMICS 333, 349 (showing that public goods are underprovided when
wages are taxed, even capital is not); Markusen et al., supra note 224, at 82-84 (show
ing "lumpy" investments result in a race to the bottom); Oates & Schwab, supra note
4, at 342-45 (illustrating a race in which capital is taxed); Wilson, supra note 248 (dis
cussing a race to the bottom under varying conditions).
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unless Revesz can demonstrate that his picture of the

environmental policy process more closely resembles reality than do
competing views. This he cannot do.
Second, just because a race to the bottom need not occur does not
mean that it will not occur. In fact, to the extent that the no-need-to
worry viewpoint depends on numerous, and often counterfactual, as
sumptions, the theoretical existence of a world where races to the bot
tom do not arise provides little basis for optimism that welfare
. enhancing regulatory competi�on will emerge broadly in the real world.
Indeed, Revesz's greatest misstep derives from his attempt to draw pol
icy conclusions. He lays down the gauntlet early by challenging envi
ronmental federal regulation as "likely to produce results that are unde
sirable. "252 While we might all agree that the current structure of
regulation produces undesirable results, Revesz does next to nothing to
show that the source of the problem is the

federalness of the

regulations.
Ultimately, Revesz's argument that a race to the bottom is not in
evitable cannot support the weight he puts on it. Having knocked a
brick out of the foundation of federal environmental regulation, Revesz
could have asserted that centralized regulation is not justified in all cir
cumstances. He could have then provided examples of cases in which
regulatory competition might be preferable. But this is not his claim, as
he makes no attempt to delimit the sphere in which his argument holds.
From a policy perspective, the key question is not whether, theo
retically, we could design a world without races to the bottom, but
whether we now live in one. Interstate pollution spillovers are perva
sive, as are public choice distortions of the political process. The fact
that politicians set environmental standards strategically with an eye on
potential job losses and the investment effects of their policies should
not be surprising.253 The view that we can avoid races to the bottom by
getting governments to adopt more sophisticated taxation schemes and
otherwise acting in a manner that represents perfect economic rational-

252. Revesz, supra note 1 , at 1212.
253. See, for example, reports on the 1990 Clean Air Act debate, such as: Mar
garet E. Kriz, Politics in the Air, 21 NATL. J. 1098 (1989); Robert Kasten, Jr., Why
Reich is Wrong on Jobs, WASH. T!MEs. June 8, 1993, at F l (discussing Clean Air Act
job effects). See also EsTY, supra note 52, at 21-23. The European Union's inability to
implement a proposed carbon-BTU tax offers further evidence of the salience of com
petitiveness concerns in environmental policymaking. See Electricity Companies Con
firm Opposition to EC Carbon Tax Proposals, Press Assn. Newsfile, July 2, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Panews File; Colin Moynihan, Changing Stars For
Energy's Direction, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Feb. 21, 1993, at 39.
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ity and public representativeness may be correct.254 Yet in the realm of
practice rather than theory, environmental policymakers remain justified
in fearing the dynamic of a regulatory race to the bottom.255

3.

Psychological Externalities, Internalities, and the
"Choice of Public"

From a pure welfare maximization perspective, nonuse or exis
tence values of environmental resources should be taken into account in
setting environmental policy. For example, the value Americans place
on African elephants should be reflected in African elephant conserva
tion policy decisions. The ethereal nature of psychological spillovers
casts doubt, however, on the substantiality of these welfare claims.
Even if the utility gains or losses from such spillovers can be docu
mented, another question must be asked: Do the claims rise to the level
of a property right? If not, they may not need to be factored into the
regulatory cost-benefit analysis.256

a. Choice-ofPublic Issues. In important respects, nature and geog
raphy define the optimal scope of governmental intervention in the en
vironmental realm. While regulatory strategies generally are established
along political boundaries such as cities, states, and countries, ecologi
cal problems almost never conform to these often artificial borders.257
Thus a regulatory response conforming to political boundaries will
often be suboptimal. Moreover, a second dimension to the optimal regu254. See Revesz, supra note 1 , at 1243; Wilson, supra note 248, at 36.
255. Revesz suggests that even if there exists a race in the environmental domain,
federal regulation may still not be called for because halting the environmental policy
race will simply drive state-versus-state competition into other arenas, such as worker
safety or minimum wages. See Revesz, supra note 1 , at 1244-45. This suggestion makes
little sense. Fundamentally, this line of analysis fails to recognize the technical com
plexity of environmental policymaking as well as the irreversible nature of some envi
ronmental harms. Thus, driving interstate competition out of the inherently obscure
realm of environmental policy and into that of other governmental activities, where the
costs and benefits of various policies are more easily compared, will be beneficial.
256. One might argue that such interests represent only a conditional right, that is,
one that can be enforced only if it is paid for. Thus, Americans with an interest in Afri
can elephants or the Amazonian rain forest might be entitled to have their desires fac
tored into the Kenyan or Brazilian policy process only to the extent they were willing to
pay. But some commentators argue that certain resources (forests supporting biodivers
ity, for example) are global public goods creating property rights and not merely condi
tional interests for which payment must be made. See Christopher D. Stone, What to do

About Biodiversity: Property Rights, Public Goods, and the Earth's Biological Riches,
68 S. CAL. L. REv. 577, 583, 619 (1995). But see EsTY, supra note 52, 125-26 (argu
ing that extrajurisdictional beneficiaries should pay).
257. Ironically, political boundaries defined by nature, such as a river establishing
a state border, tend to divide ecosystems in ways that are unhelpful from an environ
mental policy point of view.
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latory jurisdiction is defined by the concept of citizenship, and therefore
bounded by the reach of the "community. " Because citizenship implies
duties to fellow citizens, those within the community are . entitled to
have their views factored into the policy process; those outside are not.
Decisions about the management of the Grand Canyon, for example,
properly include the value placed on this resource by all Americans.258
The physical bounds of an environmental resource or pollution harm
should determine the choice of public question and the optimal jurisdic
tion for environmental regulation unless the relevant community is big
ger, in which case the community defines the proper scope of govern
mental activity.
Identifying

the community vis-a-vis environmental issues can pres

ent a serious challenge. In some circumstances, political boundaries de
limit communities of shared values and thus prove useful in defining
the optimal regulatory unit. In many cases, however, environmental in
terests and values are not coterminous with existing jurisdictional lines.
What happens, for instance, when "others" mismanage environmental
resources from which "we" derive some benefit? Some legal scholars
intimate that this question is trivial and that "we" can only legitimately
be concerned about our own political jurisdiction's policies and have no
business worrying about the "mistakes" that others make.259 Many
economists also implicitly accept the division of the world into a "we"
about whose utility we care and a "they" about whom we do not care.
Nordhaus, for example, argues that if other jurisdictions set suboptimal
environmental policies, we should not worry and might even have cause
for celebration.260 Low standards in other jurisdictions will shift " dirty"
industries to their territory, sparing us from pollution and providing us
with goods at lower prices. In effect, such jurisdictions subsidize our
consumption of certain goods that otherwise would be more expensive
because of our pollution control costs.
But "we" may

not be better off when a neighboring jurisdiction

makes an environmental regulatory mistake, even one in which the
physical harm is confined to that jurisdiction. Nordhaus is right . to be
concerned with the utility of a defined "us," but the meaning of that
term now has broadened for many environmental issues such that a dis-

258. The community is defined here by the fact that the resource is a national
park, acquired in the name of all Americans. Communities also may be defined by a
sense of shared values, common traditions, or other linkages.
259. See Richard Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LE
GAL STUD. 103 (1979). This line of thinking does not help us answer the question of to
what jurisdiction - town, county, state, nation, or world - we are to look for answers.
260. See Nordhaus, supra note 28.
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tinct "they" is no longer identifiable. Interest in distant environmental
harms may derive from a sense of community identity that exceeds nar
row jurisdictional bounds. Simultaneously, our sense of community may
be broadened by an expanded interest in environmental issues. In some
cases, the utility of people in other places, even other countries, may
become subsumed within our own utility calculus, and to that extent
"they" become a part of "us. "261
It seems doubtful, for example, that many Americans exposed to
stories about horrendous environmental conditions in China would, as
economists might forecast, react with glee at the prospect of obtaining
products subsidized by a Chinese willingness to absorb environmental
insults considered unconscionable here. Instead, the informed public re
acts with revulsion, even outrage.262 Beyond the threat of physical spill
overs that might harm America,263 I suspect that Americ�s feel some
identity, despite all their political differences, with the Chinese people
who must breathe acrid air.264
In other cases, the health of ecosystems to which we have no phys
ical connection may enter directly into our utility calculus. Americans
who will never visit Yellowstone National Park value its preservation.265
After the Exxon Valdez oil spill, tens of thousands of school children
261. In such circumstances, "our" welfare is linked to "their" welfare, or, in
other words, our utility functions are interdependent.
262. Consider the recent high degree of outrage over the importation into the
United States of products made in sweatshops. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, A
Crusader Makes Celebrities Tremble, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1996, at B4; Steven Green
house, Labor and Clergy are Reuniting to Help the Underdogs of Society, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 18, 1996, at Al; Hany F. Rosenthal, Manufacturers Agree on No-Sweatshop
Guarantees for Shoes, Clothes, AP. Aug. 2, 1996, available in 1996 WL 4434191.
263. China is the world's second largest emitter of greenhouse gases, and it is
forecast to be the world's largest emitter by early in the next centwy.
264. Part of this connection may derive from a sense that the Chinese authorities'
indifference to the suffering caused by environmental damage borders on a violation of
human rights. In the realm of natural rights, "we-they" distinctions do not exist. See,
e.g., I U.N. WORLD CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS: VIENNA DECLARATION AND
PROGRAMME OF ACTION, U N. Doc. NConf.157/24 (1993), reprinted in 32 lNTL. LE
GAL MATERIALS 1661, 1 665 (1993) ("All human rights are universal, indivisible, in
terdependent and interrelated."). Interestingly, Adam Smith argued that the destruction
of all of China would not cause a man of humanity in Europe to lose a moment's sleep,
whereas the loss of his own finger would cause him to sleep not a wink. See ADAM
SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 136-37 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie
eds., Clarendon Press 1976).
265. There is a growing literature on "existence values" and "contingent valua
tion" that tries to measure these welfare gains and losses. See, e.g., ROBERT CAMERON
MITCHELL & RICHARD T. CARSON, USING SURVEYS TO vALUE PUBuc Goons:
THE CONTINGENT vALUATION METHOD 64-67 (1989); Frederick R. Anderson, Natu
ral Resource Damages, Superfund, and the Courts, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFP. L. REv. 405,
407-08, 408 n.5 (1989); Jeffrey C. Dobbins, The Pain and Suffering of Environmental
.

December 1996]

Environmental Federalism

641

sent the EPA letters and pictures expressing distress over the fate of sea
lions, birds, and other wildlife. Although only a tiny fraction of those
students ever will visit Prince William Sound, one cannot doubt the
sincerity of their identification with the environmental injury that oc
curred there.
The extent of our interest in a distant environmental harm is also
likely to be determined by the scope and severity of the harm itself and
by our confidence, or lack thereof, that those on the scene are handling
the problem appropriately. When other jurisdictions reveal themselves
to have no effective means for addressing environmental harms, our po
litical identity may expand to encompass even very remote injuries.266
Just as human rights violations matter to those whose rights are not vio
lated, so too a total disregard for the impact of pollution on human
health or ecosystems may lead others to conclude that the failing state
has forfeited its claim to sovereign environmental policy judgments. In
the context of our current national debate over environmental federal
ism, this "state failure" argument is hardly an academic concern be
cause some U.S. states simply lack the regulatory capacity to respond
adequately to all environmental problems.267
For present purposes, I make this political identity argument solely
as a matter of fact. I do not advocate greater popular sensitivity to phys
ically distant environmental harms, but merely observe that such harms
increasingly figure into our utility and disutility assessments. The il)ter
connectedness of modem life is much more extensive and complex than
is suggested by a simplistic focus on pollution impacts within immedi
ately shared physical space or narrowly defined political borders. As
people regard themselves as part of an ecologically defined community,
they come to define themselves as a political community as well, often
to a greater extent than mere physical interdependence would demand. I
grew up, for instance, in Western Connecticut alongside the Naugatuck
Loss: Using Contingent Valuation to Estimate Nonuse Damages, 43 DUKE LJ. 879,
880-81 (1994).
266. China's runaway pollution may evolve in this direction. Concern about mis
management of the rainforests of the developing world may also reflect such
sensibilities.
267. See Sam Schuchat, Unfit Stewards, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept 20, 1995, at A21
(identifying examples of weak state environmental protection efforts); see also supra
note 165 (discussing weaknesses in state "capacity"). A number of existing federal en
vironmental programs seem to reflect, moreover, a national ecological and political
identity that spans the fifty states. One could argue, for example, that the Clean Water
Act's construction grants program, providing federal funds to build wastewater treat
ment facilities, represents a commitment that no American should live in a community
where untreated sewage flows into nearby rivers. See Clean Water Act §§ 201-219, 33
u.s.c. §§ 1281-1299 (1994).
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River, which flows from Massachusetts to Long Island Sound. Those
living in the area of the river often describe themselves as being from
the Naugatuck Valley. This is not simply because downstream residents
may be polluted by upstream users of the river, but because the pres
ence of a shared resource creates a political community.268 Why else
would upstream users identify with downstream users, from whom they
do not anticipate direct physical spillovers? Similarly, many people
have important aspects of their political identity established by their
proximity to the Chesapeake Bay, the Gulf of Mexico, the Mississippi
River, the Great Plains, the Rocky Mountains, Puget Sound, or the Cen
tral Valley.269 Nature defines our sense of community an� makes us
more cosmopolitan. More fundamentally, we live in an era in which po
litical boundaries matter but do not uniquely describe community iden
tity.270 Our analysis of the optimal scale of environmental regulation
should reflect this fact.
This choice of public analysis also should be seen as an extension
of the learning of international law over the past fifty years. Specifi268. From the transcendentalism of Thoreau to Aldo Leopold's admonition to
"think like a mountain," Americans have long recognized the role nature plays in trans
forming man's understanding of himself. But my argument here is a little different. I see
man's relationship to man as defined by nature. Geography - the fault lines of natural
resources and ecosystems - shapes people's sense of identity in important ways and
thus establishes the relevant community for governmental activity in the environmental
realm. Those who see themselves as residents of the Gulf Coast, for instance, care not
only about how their own community and state affect the quality of life on the Gulf;
they also care about how neighboring cities and states respond to the environmental
challenges that the· Gulf presents - and even how neighboring countries such as Mex
ico and those of the Caribbean Islands manage their portions of this shared space. Obvi
ously, environmental policy errors in the next town over matter much more than ones
thousands of miles away. Nevertheless, people have a nontrivial interest in environmen
tal policies being made much farther afield. Echoes of this geography-and·nature
defines-the-community theory actually run deep in American history. For example,
Thomas Paine argued that the physical distance from Great Britain made rule of the col
onies inappropriate. See THOMAS pAINE, COMMON SENSE 90 (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
Penguin Books 1 982) (1776); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Some New World Lessons for
the Old World, 58 U. Cm. L. REv. 483, 485-97 (1991) (stressing the importance of ge
ography in defining the optimal physical scale of a political jurisdiction).
269. Interestingly, some of the EPA's most successful recent initiatives have been
"geographically defined" - focused on the Chesapeake Bay, the Great Lakes, etc. and have tapped into this nature-detennined sense of political identity.
270. Most people see themselves as part of a variety of communities, with geo
graphically defined political identities being only one - and perhaps not even the most
important - of the units around which their lives are organized. When it comes to en
vironmental problems, people are particularly unlikely to define themselves merely on
political-jurisdictional lines, especially if these are narrowly local or state-based. See
Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. Cm. L. REv. 253, 262-63 (1 993) (ob
serving that few people have a sense of community defined by local political
jurisdictions).
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cally, interdependence in many forms mutes territorial sovereignty.271
Cuius regio, eius religio, the 350-year-old axiom of the Peace of West
phalia establishing a strict principle of national territorial domain as the
foundation for relations among states, cannot be counted upon to maxi
mize social welfare in a world of pervasive economic and ecological
linkages.272 The current devolutionary mood ignores this complex inter
dependence.273 In doing so, it puts at risk some of the important benefits
that accrue from having a broader political identity.
Broad-scale regulatory decentralization, for instance, threatens to
disrupt the free movement of goods and services across the fifty states.
Suppose, for example, that labor standards were deregulated entirely,
and Idaho chose to abandon all limitations on child labor. California
then might seek to block goods from Idaho as morally subpar, just as
today Americans object to the importation of goods produced by Ban
gladeshi child laborers or Chinese prison workers. In the U.S. context,
such threats would be constrained by the constitutionally mandated in
terstate customs union, but the level of political outrage might be con
siderable. In fact, in an earlier era, President Franklin Roosevelt argued
that federal labor standards were needed for just this reason. In striving
to protect the national free trade regime, he declared that " [g]oods pro271. See generally ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH lNTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS
(1995); MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGIITS AND WORLD PUBLIC OR
DER 367-449 (1980); Ernest S. Easterly ill, The Rule of Law and the New World Order,
22 S.U. L. REv. 161 (1995); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation,
100 YALE LJ. 2347 (1991).
272. The concept of territorial sovereignty emerged, moreover, in response to the
very specific problem of Europe's seventeenth-century religious wars and worked to
control intolerance in a world of religious diversity. Today's environmental situation is
not parallel. In an ecologically interdependent world, what others do within their sover
eign borders cannot be ignored. Tolerance is not necessarily a virtue in the environmen
tal domain. If Pennsylvania and New Jersey foul the Delaware River, the downriver cit
izens of Maryland pay the price. If China releases CFCs, the whole world's ozone layer
deteriorates, not just the part over China. In the environmental domain, a principle of
"you do what you want in your territory and I will do what I want in mine" does not
work.
273. Recognition of the economic interdependence and other interconnections of
modem American society served to underpin the centralization of government advanced
during the New Deal. See, e.g., NATURAL REsoURCES COMMITTE,E THE STRUC
TURE OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (1939), cited in HENRY M. HART, JR. & AL
BERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW, at Ix.ii (rev. ed. 1994). The understanding that law provided the
"conditions of continuity" needed to facilitate complex human interactions of the sort
that are commonplace in a national economy emerged at this time and provided the
foundation for the prosperity the United States has achieved as the world's largest uni
fied market See id.; see also THE RELEVANCE OF lNTERNATIONAL LAW (Karl W.
Deutsch & Stanley Hoffman eds., 1968).
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duced under conditions which do not meet rudimentary standards of de
cency should be regarded as contraband and ought not to be allowed to
pollute the channels of interstate trade."274 In effect, Roosevelt recog
nized the need to respond to the regulatory demands of the political
community created as a result of the free trade regime itself. The same
logic applies to baseline environmental standards.
Maintaining a free trade area requires a core set of accepted com
mon norms to guide behavior within the community.275 Indeed, many
would argue that the existence of shared values is what defines a com
munity. Because those in the community have a legitimate interest in
the terms on which commerce is conducted by others in the community,
they must be able to establish guidelines for behavior that all will fol
low.276 Centralized ground rules for commerce, including environmental
conditions, are part of the bargain that makes liberalized trade possi
ble.m Without centrally determined moral baselines for economic inter
actions, parties to free trade agreements face constant temptations to
disregard the principle of nondiscrimination278. and to breach their obli
gations to keep their markets open to others whenever another party
conducts its affairs in a manner that could be deemed unacceptable.279

�

274. President's Message to Congress on The Fair Labor Standards Act (May 24,
1934), reprinted in S. REP. No. 75-884, at 2 (1937); see also id., quoted in Powell v.
United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 5 1 6 (1950).
275. In addition, "shallow" integration (lowering of tariff barriers) often leads to
"deeper" integration (across regulatory policies, etc.). See ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE ET
AL., A VISION FOR THE WORLD EcONOMY 5 (1996).
276. Of course, there always exists a risk that the baseline rules will be manipu
lated by rent-seeking interests whose goal is not "fair" trade but protectionism. See
EsTY, supra note 52, at 45-46.
277. The threat of trade disruptions from differences over environmental policy are
very real, as can be seen from the steady stream of "trade and environment" disputes
that have recently faced the international trading regime. See EsTY, supra note 52, Ap
pendix C (listing recent disputes). The prospect of California imposing trade penalties
on Idaho in the same way that the United States has imposed them on Mexico and other
countries seems remote given the protection afforded by the .Constitution's Commerce
Clause. But the lack of past state-versus-state efforts to impose trade penalties over per
ceived moral failings provides no guarantees against future tensions, especially if a radi
cally decentralized regulatory structure were to emerge.
278. The "nondiscrimination principle" that compels the parties to treat foreign
goods and producers as they treat their own goods and producers is the heart of any free
trade agreement. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause); General Agree
ment on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, arts. I, ill, 61 Stat. A3,
A12-A13, A18-Al9, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 196-200, 204-08 [hereinafter GATT].
279. One of the core problems with Revesz's regulatory competition analysis and
the arguments of others seeking to decentralize all regulation is that they implicitly as
sume that trade policy will not be decentralized and that the considerable benefits of
liberalized trade will be preserved despite environmental policy devolution. If, however,
decentralization is preferable in the environmental realm, why not in trade? The answer
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At the very least, total regulatory decentralization puts stress on
the free trade regime as states express revulsion at the prospect of keep
ing their markets open to ethically suspect imports and of losing jobs
and investment to other states whose standards seem to dip below a
moral minimum.280 In fact, decentralization may expose the parties to a
free trade agreement to the potentially high costs of adjudicating moral
claims on a case-by-case basis, and to the regular disruptions of trade
that unilateral moral judgments inflict. The alternative is to recognize
that in return for the welfare gains of being part of a free trade commu
nity, one must surrender a measure of sovereignty and accept at least a
core set of centrally determined baseline behavioral rules, including en
vironmental standards.281
Interdependence, moreover, may be self-reinforcing. As interde
pendence in one dimension becomes recognized and the political com
munity is redefined accordingly, that same redefinition will create addi
tional

dimensions

of

interdependence.

For

example,

" shallow"

economic integration such as agreement on a free trade zone creates a
"thin" community that may thicken over time as people recognize
other aspects of their common enterprise. The strengthening of the po
litical community leads to common noneconomic projects like environ
mental protection that make possible "deeper" economic integration.282
The progress ·of European unification demonstrates this phenomenon.
Focused initially only on coal and steel, the European Union has grown
to encompass a broad set of economic issues, and more recently envi
ronmental issues as well.283 The process of further integration now de-

is obvious: If decentralized jurisdictions are given sovereignty over their trade policies,
there can be no guarantee that markets will be kept open. The world's experience with
"beggar thy neighbor" behavior is long and sordid. See Jmrn H. JACKSON, WORLD
TRADE AND THE LAW OF GA'IT 9-10, 37-39 (1969).
280. Ironically, many of those who seek decentralization - which implies accept
ance of the ethical standards others choose to set for themselves - are also sharp critics
of moral relativism when it comes to international affairs.
281. The GATI also recognizes the need, in some areas, for minimum thresholds
for behavior that establish the minimal sense of community required to support eco
nomic integration. Products of prison labor, for example, are not entitled to nondiscrim
inatory treatment See GA'IT, supra note 278, art X:X.I(e), 61 Stat at A61, 55 U.N.T.S.
at 262. This moral and political dimension of the argument for some degree of central
ized environmental regulation echoes the pyramids of sacrifice rationale for federal reg
ulation articulated by Professor Stewart See Stewart, Pyramids, supra note 7, at 1217-

19.

282. The demand for labor and environmental side agreements to the NAFrA may
reflect the same dynamic. See LAWRENCE ET AL., supra note 275.
283. See ANDRE SAPIR, THE HARMONIZATION OF SOCIAL PouCIES: LESSONS
FROM EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (1994). The limits of Europe's political redefinition,
however, currently are being tested as certain members of the Union resist the efforts of
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pends on the development of a stronger European identity and sense of
community, which will result in greater interdependence.284 As interde
pendence grows, so too does the need for new areas of cooperation to
allow states more flexibility in making the policy trade-offs that collec
tive action inevitably demands.285 Adding the environment to the list of
community ventures serves this purpose.286 How far this process will
continue is hard to predict. Indeed, there is no reason to suppose that
community redefinition - both expansion and contraction - moves in
eluctably toward any particular end.
In sum, there exists no clear line between "us" and "them" in the
environmental realm. In certain important respects the biosphere cannot
be subdivided. Despite the current devolutionary climate, ecological in
terdependence is a fact.287 A Kantian cosmopolitan perspective in which
each person defines himself politically at least in part as a citizen of the
world is an inescapable reality in the realm of environmental policy.288
This universality demands, at some level and to some degree, integrated
environmental protection programs across state and even national
boundaries.
To the extent that we have a worldwide political identity, we need
a set of global environmental norms to guide our behavior as citizens
on this scale. Similarly, to the extent that we have a national political
identity as Americans, there will be another (probably more numerous
and more specific) set of environmental rules that represents the moral

other members to broaden the European policy agenda to encompass an ever-growing
number of issues. The extent to which environmental issues are within the ambit of this
new European community remains to be seen.
284. This need for a European political community lies behind the current debate
about the EU's "democratic deficit." See, e.g., J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of
Europe, 100 YALE LJ. 2403, 2466-74 (1991).
285. See ERNST B. HAAs. THE UNITING OF EUROPE: PoLmCAL, SocIAL, AND
ECONOMIC FORCES 486-527 (1958).
286. See JOHN G. ·RuGGIE, THE FUTURE OF INTER.NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
(1981); see also JOHN EASTBY, FUNCTIONALISM AND INTERDEPENDENCE (1985)
(discussing and synthesizing the work of Ernest Haas).
287. In fact, the impetus behind devolution may well be an increasing awareness
(and dislike) of interdependence. Devolution, in other words, may be an isolationist re
sponse to an integrating world.
288. This is true even if Kant's own policy prescription, a "Union of Nations,"
seems hopelessly idealistic. See IMMANuEL KANT, Idea for a Universal History with
Cosmopolitan Intent, in THE PmLosoPHY OF KANT 1 16 (Carl J. Friedrich ed., 1949);
see also JOHN LocKE. Two TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT 397 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1698) (describing all mankind as part of "this great and
natural Community"); John Dunn, The Nation State and Human Community: Life
Chances, Obligation, and the Boundaries of Society 37 (1993) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author) (discussing "the collective ecological imperative to save a habitat
for the human species as a whole").
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behavioral minimum that each citizen owes to his fellow citizens. Given
these elements of community identity, a presumption in favor of decen
tralized

environinental

regulation

cannot be justified

because

it

prejudges the critical question of the relevant political community vis-a
vis the environmental problem at hand. The existence of resource man
agement and environmental problems of different scales and of commu
nities of interest of varying sizes makes manifest the case for a corre
sponding hierarchy of regulatory structures.

b. Internalities. Broader jurisdictions, of course, increase the risk
of internalities.289 Sensitivity to this type of structural regulatory failure
lies behind much of the recent political momentum for environmental
devolution.290 Admittedly, the welfare losses from less accurate central
ized representation can be serious. Yet internalities do not make the
case for total decentralization, given the presence of technical scale
economies or transjurisdictional externalities; selective or partial devo
lution makes more sense.
Federal law should facilitate such devolution.291 National standards,
for example, should be either true baselines or tailored to varying local
conditions. When communities want to exceed federal standards, they
generally should be free to do so.292 Policymakers must recognize, fur
thermore, that there exists a trade-off between devolution designed to
address internalities and centralization that minimizes the welfare loss
from externalities. The jurisdiction that is of optimal size for one prob
lem will not be right for another. Even within a single policy area, the
physical externality argument may point to one scale for intervention,
while the scope of the community might argue for another, and the risk
of a race to the bottom yet a third. Hybrid regulatory systems capable

289. As the previous section indicates, some internality claims reflect a constricted
sense of community and should not be accepted.
290. See, e.g., GINGRICH, supra note 1 , at 9; see also Butler & Macey, supra note
157, at 31-33.
291. In general, it will be easier to devolve appropriate degrees of authority from a
central base than to coordinate among initially decentralized jurisdictions because inter
nalities generally do not present a zero-sum game. Pure internalities can be fixed by let
ting a subjurisdiction go its own way at no cost to those in the broader jurisdiction. In
the externality case, if the costs thrown onto "outsiders" are to be internalized, the "in
siders" who have not been paying to address the harm must do so. To internalize posi
tive externalities, the outsiders must be asked to pay for benefits that previously have
accrued to them for free.
292. This freedom makes unequivocal sense in the case of production process
standards. When product standards are at issue, the benefits of having a national market
with econoinies of scale for producers must be weighed against the benefits of locally
tailored product requirements.
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of addressing various problems and parts of problems at different levels
of aggregation therefore make sense.
Minimizing structural welfare losses requires a case-by-case juris
dictional matching principle. Problems that are by-and-large local in
scope (waste site cleanups, drinking water quality, and spending on
playgrounds, for example) should be regulated at the local level.
Problems that arise on a regional scale (controlling pollution in a river
system or an airshed, for example) should be managed on an ecosystem
basis across states or even countries when necessary. To the extent that
an environmental problem, such as acid rain, spans a great number of
states, a national regulatory structure may be required. When problems,
such as depletion of the ozone layer by CFCs are worldwide in scope,
regulation on a global scale will be optimal from an environmental
perspective.
C.

Public Choice

Ensuring that environmental regulation reflects local knowledge
and local priorities makes sense. Bureaucrats in Washington (or even in
regional offices of the federal EPA) cannot know the future land use of
a contaminated waste site as well as those in the community where the
site is located. In deciding "how clean is clean enough," local judg
ment is essential. Similarly, while the sandstone buttes of Utah may
look remarkable to an Easterner (and thus worthy of national park sta
tus or similar protection), citizens of Utah will know that this geogra
phy is relatively commonplace in their area and thus that not every
butte deserves federal protection.293 In such cases, decentralization im
proves the decisionmaking process. Broad-based participation in the
policy process, moreover, serves an important educational function294
and may yield outcomes that are perceived as more fair.295 But the goal
of giving people control over their own environmental destinies pro
vides no basis fqr a sweeping presumption in favor of decentralized en
vironmental decisionmaking.

293. I am indebted to my colleague Robert Ellickson for this example.
294. One of the sources of tension in the environmental policy process derives

from the fact that what is understood to be hannful evolves over time. Elites often per
ceive and understand the changed circumstances first, but their judgment may be disre
garded as unrepresentative. Education is therefore important to help build popular sup
port for efforts to internalize new externalities.
295. In fact, there may be fewer opportunities for "exit" and "voice" at the state
and local levels as well as reduced opportunities to recoup losses in some other policy
domain. See Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 CoLUM. L. REV. 473, 509 (1991).
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Images of spirited New England town meetings where well
informed citizens debate the destiny of their community bear little re
semblance to today's state and local decisionmaking in general or envi
ronmental policymaking in particular. Generally, only those with a di
rect stake in local land use decisions appear at planning and zoning
board meetings. On occasion, an issue will generate enough controversy
for a public meeting to draw a crowd. But far more often decisions are
made with little or no public participation or discussion. Similarly, at
the state level, very few environmental issues generate sufficient media
attention to produce any real public debate. Thus, decentralized deci
sionmaking may exclude from representation, albeit passively, the
views of significant numbers of citizens.
Technical complexity may intersect with public choice issues to
cast further doubt on the prospect that decentralization will produce bet
ter matches between environmental policy and citizen needs. In particu
lar, knowledge of the existence of an environmental problem must be
separated from knowledge of what to do about the harm. People often
have the former without the latter. With regard to the deeper sort of
knowledge relating to appropriate policy responses, the American citi
zenry often appears to be better informed about national environmental
issues that have received widespread media coverage than state or local
ones.296 . In addition, it is useful to separate "first order" preferences
(the desire that drinking water be safe to drink, for example) from "sec
ond order" preferences (benzene should be reduced to a level of seven
parts per million, for example). People cannot be wrong about their first
order preferences as these are value judgments. But there is no guaran
tee that members of the public will select optimal policy prescriptions
in pursuit of their broader desires. In fact, the technical complexity of
the regulatory process and the need to put competing values on a com
mensurate basis makes environmental decisionmaking especially ob
scure to the average citizen.
As a result of these complexities, environmental decisionmaking is
particularly susceptible to special interest distortion.297 Rent-seeking be296. For example, a discussion of toxic contamination frequently makes little
sense until described as a Love Canal-type problem.
297. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Con
gress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 CoLUM. L. REv.
1001, 1013 (1995) (describing state interests contributing to passage of Radioactive
Waste Act); Stewart, Pyramids, supra note 7, at 1213-15; Michael C. Blumm, Public
Lands: The Case Against Transferring BLM Lands to the States, NRLI NEWS (W'mter
1995), at 13 (stating that while "capture by the organized describes much federal land
decisionmaking, it would reign unrestrained if the individual states were the
decisionmakers").
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havior undoubtedly affects national as well as state environmental poli
cymakfug, but there is no evidence that public decisionmaking is sys
tematically more distorted at the federal than at state and local levels.298
Indeed, given general popular indifference to many state and local envi
ronmental decisions, as well as greater media attention to federal-level
activities, one might suggest precisely the opposite.299
Federal interest group excesses tend to engender a corrective back
lash300 and spawn countervailing forces.301 In contrast, state and local
environmental policy manipulation often goes unnoticed. Localized dis
tortion is no doubt smaller and more incremental; but it is no less sig
nificant when summed, and perhaps is more insidious for its relative in
visibility.

Moreover,

the interest group structure of these issues

(environmental resource users concentrated on one side and a diffuse
public on the other, for example) offers at least theoretical support for
the suggestion that centralized decisionmaking will provide a more bal
anced playing field for the contending interests.302 The difficulty of mo-

298. But see Stewart, supra note 150, at 340-42 (arguing that these distortions at
the federal level become magnified).
299. Even Business Week, hardly an apologist for a big federal government, re
cently suggested that "local bodies can be as bureaucratic and inefficient as the feds and often far more corrupt" Kevin Kelly et al., Power to the States, Bus. WK., Aug. 7,
1995, at 48, 50; see also FISCHEL, supra note 19, at 139 (arguing that local regulation
is easiest to distort in support of special interests and against individual property own
ers); Robert Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning, supra note 19, at 702 ("Studies have
documented the lawlessness of zoning variance decisions in most communities."). Or as
Robert Percival more modestly observes: "[H]istory demonstrates that state and local
officials generally are too vulnerable to local economic and political pressures favoring
development to be given exclusive responsibility for environmental protection." Perci
val, supra note 5, at 1 178; see also Oliver A. Houck & Michael Rolland, Federalism in

Wetlands Regulation: A Consideration of Delegation of Clean Water Act Section 404
and Related Programs to the States, 54 Mn. L. REv. 1242, 1309 (1995) (noting that,

with regard to adequate wetlands protection, "state and local governments were not do
ing the job").
300. For example, a tremendous amount of criticism has been leveled at the Natu
ral Resources Defense Council (NRDC) over Alar and at Greenpeace over the Brent
Spar incident. See Better to Blunder than to Lie, THE INDEPENDENT, Sept. 6, 1995, at
16; Dwight Lee, Eco-hype Working Against the Cause?, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1992,
at F3; Thomas Gale Moore, Environmental Kooks Dream Up Crises, S.F. CHRON.,
Sept. 1 4, 1992, at B3; Judith Perera, Greenpeace Faces Honesty Backlash, Inter Press
Service, Sept 5, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, INPRES File; Joseph Per
kins, False Alarms: 'Environmentally Correct' Policies Often Are Based on Distorted
Science, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRm., July 2, 1993, at BS.
301. Consider the emergence of the Wise Use Movement in response to environ
mental groups. See also GREGG EASTERBROOK, A MOMENT ON THE EARTH (1995).
302. At the centralized level, environmental groups find it easier to reach critical
mass and thereby to compete on more equal footing with industrial interests. See IN
TEREST GROUP PoLmCS IN THE AMERICAN WEST (Ronald J. Hrebenar & Clive s.
Thomas eds., 1987); INTEREST GROUP POLmCS IN THE S OUTHERN STATES (Ronald
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bilizing the public in many separate jurisdictions is well established.303
The technical complexity of environmental issues exacerbates the usual
asymmetry because concentrated interests find it easier to assemble the
data, information, and scientific analysis that carry great sway with reg
ulators who are short on facts. Thus, whatever the asymmetry at the
federal level, it is magnified at the state level.
Insofar as uninformed citizens do participate in making technically
complex environmental regulatory judgements, their participation is of
dubious value, and it cannot be assumed that their real interests are ulti
mately represented. In fact, popular indifference to the details of envi
ronmental policy debates may be rational. Ecological and public health
issues are in many cases sufficiently complex that average voters rea
sonably conclude that the investment of time necessary to participate
meaningfully in such debates exceeds any return that might be obtained.

If this is the case, decentralized decisionmaking, which would entail
more environmental voting, will be welfare reducing even if it is more
democratic in some formalistic way. Given the _nature of environmental
policy questions, the answer to public choice problems may not be de
centralized democracy, but rather expert resolution with vigorous legis
lative oversight.304 At the extreme end of the devolutionary spectrum,
one could envision a system wherein citizens voted every night by re
mote control from their homes on environmental regulatory decisions.
But seeking public guidance on how many parts per million of EBDC
residue to permit on com simply produces chaos and, as Justice Breyer
argues,

"

[c]haos is not democracy. "305 Representative democracy need

not be undemocratic and may translate into decisions that better reflect
the public's interest than purer or more direct forms of democracy.306

J. Hrebenar & Clive S. Thomas eds, 1992). Of course, when costs are concentrated and
benefits diffuse, NIMBY concerns may predominate, leading to distortions in the oppo
site direction. Land use decisions in particular, in which neighbors are often close at
hand and well organized, are susceptible to NIMBY distortions because those who
might benefit from a new land use (by having a shopping mall built, for example) have
a less direct interest and therefore less incentive to participate in the decision process.
303. See supra note 79 (describing the abundant public choice literature on this
point).
304. Justice Breyer, among others, has argued for expantled expert decisionmaking
in the environmental realm. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS Cm.CLE:
TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 61-64 (1993); see also GRAHAM & Wm
NER, supra note 74.
305. BREYER, supra note 304, at 73.
306. Whether every individual votes on every decision or policies are set at the
most centralized level by the President, the critical issues remain the same: (1) How
well infonned is the decisionmaker? Are the technical inadequacies of the policy pro
cess minimized? (2) Does the decisionmaker take into account all of the relevant costs
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Doubt about the virtues of an entirely decentralized environmental
regulatory regime does not imply that all decisions should be left to
centralized experts. As a theoretical matter, however, the recent sweep
ing claims about the value of decentralization as a mechanism for im
proved self-determination in the environmental domain must be ques
tioned. The better answer is a multitier regulatory structure capable of
mixing and matching decision levels depending on the issue at hand.
CONCLUSION
This article should not be read as an argument in favor of central
ized environmental regulation. It is intended simply to give pause to
those who are driving for decentralized environmental regulation across
the board. If this article accomplishes its purpose, it will lead to a reex
amination of the presumption in favor of decentralized environmental
regulation and to a recognition that the diversity of environmental
problems we face demands a range of regulatory response strategies and
levels of governmental activity. I hope, furthermore, that it will refocus
the environmental policy reform debate from

where we regulate to how

we regulate. Policy progress depends on atte!ltion being concentrated on
the real issues that create welfare losses: shaky scientific and analytic
foundations for regulatory decisions, jurisdictional mismatches that
skew cost-benefit calculations, and public choice distortions of the poli
cymaking process.
Regulatory theory in the environmental domain must rest on an un
derstanding of the unique nature of environmental problems and envi
ronmental regulation. Examined in light of the particular characteristics
of ecological and public health harms - technical complexity, time
lags, threshold effects, problems that overlap jurisdictional boundaries,
and special interest policy distortions - and the specific regulatory fail
ures that produce welfare losses, the hypothesized advantages of decen
tralization often diminish. In particular, while decentralization may in
some circumstances improve the technical content of environmental
policy decisions, frequently it will not. Devolution will help to improve
environmental policymaking if it better aligns public values and regula
tory outcomes, but the welfare losses from creating new interjurisdic
tional externalities and exposing the technical incapacity of many de
centralized governmental units may overwhelm any representativeness
gains obtained. Moreover, the prospect of public choice distortions of

and benefits? Is the regulatory calculus structurally sound? (3) Do the citizenry's views
get faithfully translated into policy outcomes? Are public choice distortions minimized?
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the policymaking process appear as severe or more severe at a decen
tralized level.
My call is not, however, for across-the-board centralization. In
stead, I seek a middle road between the centralizers and the localizers in
favor of a spectrum of regulatory entities. This diversity is structurally
isomorphic to and simultaneously driven by the diversity of scales on
which public health and ecological harms arise. While implicating a
more complicated regulatory process, my argument for multiple tiers of
governmental activity in the environmental domain (from local to inter
national) responds to the fact that centralization, even if it allows juris
dictional externalities to be corrected, will not prove to be optimal in all
cases. Sometimes the externalities corrected will be relatively small in
comparison to the representativeness losses incurred by moving to a
higher level of government. In other cases, regulatory failures arising at
the more centralized level - internalities, diseconomies of scale, public
choice distortions, the absence of competent authorities, and so on -.
will

outweigh

the

gains

obtained by

correcting

a jurisdictional
·

externality.
Ultimately, a regulatory approach that minimizes welfare loss for
one type of governmental activity and one type of environmental prob
lem may well lead to greater welfare losses in other regulatory activities
or may exacerbate regulatory failures for other issues. The understand
ing that the appropriate level of environmental regulation fundamentally
must be determined issue by issue, guided by nature and the geographic
scope of the problem in question, also leads to a presumption against
any presumption about the correct level of governmental intervention.
The varying dimensions of community identity in the environmental
realm add to the importance of having regulatory structures at local,
state, national, and international levels. We can and should take advan
tage of hybrid environmental policy mechanisms that permit more sub
tle and refined forms of regulation capable of systematically minimizing
the sum of the welfare losses from technical, structural, and public
choice regulatory failures.

